Preamble

The House met at half-past Two o'clock

PRAYERS

[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]

Oral Answers to Questions — TRANSPORT

Inland Waterways and Canals

Mr. Hannan: asked the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation when he expects to receive a report from the Committee of Inquiry on Inland Waterways and Canals which he appointed in February this year.

The Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation (Mr. Hugh Molson): I understand that the Committee is making steady progress, but that it cannot yet say when it will be able to report.

Mr. Hannan: Does the Parliamentary Secretary not recollect that when the Minister made his original statement in the House and replied to criticisms that the appointment of this Committee was a delaying tactic, he said that the need was for the Committee to report quickly and objectively? What is his interpretation of the word "quickly"? Is it a year, or two years, or five years?

Mr. Molson: We are most anxious that the Committee shall report as soon as possible. We have inquired what the cause of the delay is, and we understand that a good deal of the written evidence, which was asked for as long ago as last April, has not yet been received.

Mr. G. R. Strauss: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that this is a very distressing situation, that there was really no point at all in having a Committee of Inquiry when all the facts were known, and that the only excuse which the Minister could give was that it would not take very long before we could have the report and a decision, and be able to get

on with the work? Now it appears that the report is delayed because the Committee is not getting the evidence, and that we shall not get the report for months or even years. The situation for our canal system is very serious.

Mr. Molson: I can assure the right hon. Gentleman that we are most anxious that this Committee shall get on with its work as quickly as possible. It was, however, set up to go into these various problems as a result of the very strong representations which were made to us, notably by the Inland Waterways Association, which is one of the associations which has not yet presented its written evidence.

Mr. W. R. Williams: Is the Parliamentary Secretary aware that some sections of the canal system in Openshaw. Manchester, are in such a dilapidated state that they constitute a serious menace to life and health, and that several young children have already lost their lives? Will he not ask for an interim report from this Committee, to deal particularly with unused canals or sections which are in such a dangerous condition?

Mr. Molson: No, we certainly will not ask for an interim report. We are anxious to receive the final report as soon as possible. I am very glad to think that what has been said in the House today may have the effect of inducing the various interests concerned to speed up the presenting of the evidence.

Mr. Atkins: asked the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation whether, in view of the fact that goods can be carried by water with a considerably smaller expenditure of oil per ton-mile than by road, he will issue a general direction to the British Transport Commission to make the greatest possible use of its fleet of vessels on the canals and inland waterways.

The Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation (Mr. Harold Watkinson): There is no need for a direction. The British Transport Commission has informed representatives of trade and industry that there is spare capacity on the services provided by its craft and that it will do its utmost to cater for traffic offered for conveyance by inland waterway.

Mr. Atkins: As these vessels are very economical compared with lorries, will my


right hon. Friend ask the British Transport Commission to redouble its efforts to find the traffic to take advantage of their capacity?

Mr. Watkinson: I am grateful to my hon. Friend for giving more publicity to this service. I hope that many industrialists will take advantage of it.

Lighting-Up Time (Summer)

Mr. Gresham Cooke: asked the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation when it is proposed to bring into operation Section 41 of the Road Traffic Act, 1956, with regard to advancing lighting-up time in summer by half-an-hour.

Mr. Watkinson: On 1st January, 1957.

Mr. Gresham Cooke: While thanking my right hon. Friend for that reply, may I ask whether he would say that on the ground of road safety this advance of the lighting-up time by half-an-hour in the summer should be strictly obeyed by cyclists as well as by drivers of mechanically propelled vehicles?

Mr. Watkinson: Yes, Sir. I am much obliged to my hon. Friend. If we make this small, but I think important, modification, I hope that everybody will abide by it, otherwise it will be quite purposeless.

Provisional Driving Licences

Mr. J. Harvey: asked the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation whether, pending the recommencement of official driving tests, he will take steps to authorise persons who have taken a prescribed course of lessons with a recognised driving school to drive unaccompanied in a car displaying an L plate.

Mr. Mulley: asked the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation, having regard to the hardship to persons who have acquired vehicles for business and professional purposes and who are now unable to qualify to drive them, if he will remove, in approved cases, during the period that driving tests are suspended, the requirement that a holder of a provisional licence must be accompanied by a qualified driver.

Mr. Watkinson: I have given careful thought to this matter and have decided

that, for the time being, I should be justified in suspending the requirement that the holder of a provisional licence must be accompanied when driving by the holder of a substantive licence. The steps necessary to give effect to this decision will be taken as soon as possible.

Mr. Harvey: Is the Minister aware that his answer will give great satisfaction to those whose livelihood depends upon their being able to drive and to those who derive their livelihood from teaching others to drive?

Mr. G. R. Strauss: Whilst appreciating the difficulty which the Minister is trying to meet, may I ask whether there does not appear to be a certain element of danger to road safety here? Would it not be better to waive the requirement that a licensed driver should accompany a driver who has an L plate only after he has had that L plate licence for a certain period, perhaps three months, rather than that anybody should be able to get an L plate and a provisional licence and then drive immediately by himself, without having someone fully qualified to drive with him?

Mr. Watkinson: I will look at what the right hon. Gentleman has said. As a matter of fact, most L plate drivers will already have done three months on the road, but I do not think that this is other than a useful temporary measure, particularly to avoid hardship to those drivers who might otherwise be prejudiced in their jobs. Those are the people whom I am anxious to help.

Mr. P. Williams: Is it not the case that in the earlier times when there was rationing of petrol, motor driving schools were entitled to give certificates of competence? Would this not be a better way, thus avoiding the danger of giving unbridled opportunities to motorists to take out a licence and start straight away on their own?

Mr. Watkinson: That is quite a different question.

Motor Driving Schools

Mr. Dye: asked the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation what assistance, by modifying his regulations about driving tests or otherwise, he proposes to give to the motor driving schools which have had to close down since his


decision to suspend driving tests, and the owners of which are faced with bankruptcy.

Mr. E. L. Mallalieu: asked the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation if he will give authority to the staffs of existing motor driving schools to conduct driving tests of motorists during the withdrawal of official testers for the present emergency.

Mr. Edward Evans: asked the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation whether he is aware of the hardship suffered by owners and instructors at schools and garages specialising in teaching driving arising from the suspension of the driving test, resulting in most cases in complete loss of earnings and unemployment; and what steps he proposes to take to alleviate this hardship.

Mr. V. Yates: asked the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation what schemes he has considered which would mitigate the hardship experienced by the driving schools in Birmingham and elsewhere arising from the suspension of driving tests: and what proposals he has for resuming the tests on a limited basis.

Mr. Wade: asked the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation, with a view to alleviating the hardship suffered by driving schools consequent upon the cessation of driving tests, if he will provide temporary employment within his Department for the qualified staff of driving schools pending the resumption of driving tests.

Mr. Watkinson: As I said on 28th November, in reply to Questions by my hon. Friend the Member for Taunton (Mr. du Cann) and the hon. Member for Falmouth and Camborne (Mr. Hayman), I am most anxious to resume driving tests as soon as possible, and I am considering various possibilities with this end in view.

Mr. Yates: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that that reply does not get us very much further? How long must we wait for cases of hardship, which are very serious in a city like Birmingham, to be dealt with?

Mr. Watkinson: The answer is that this afternoon I am seeing a deputation from all the interests concerned. They are coming to tell me of their difficulties.

I propose to discuss the matter fully and see what suggestions we can arrive at.

Mr. Dye: Cannot the right hon. Gentleman make an arrangement whereby those who are learning to drive can register for tests when they are resumed, so that the schools can continue with the work of training potential drivers?

Mr. Watkinson: I had better wait until the schools themselves come to see me this afternoon to tell me what their ideas are.

Mr. Wade: As I understand that there is serious overwork among those who are dealing with petrol rationing and a threat of serious unemployment among the staffs of driving schools, will the Minister consult the Minister of Fuel and Power and consider the possibility of offering employment to the staffs of the driving schools to see them over this very difficult period when they often have no work to do?

Mr. Watkinson: I will certainly look at that.

Mr. Mikardo: Would the right hon. Gentleman take advantage of the changes in the arrangements for driving schools enforced by the present situation, and consider the possibility—I put it no higher—of laying down some standards of competence for instructors in driving schools?

Mr. Watkinson: That is something which I will certainly look at.

British Transport Commission (Correspondence from Members)

Mr. Mikardo: asked the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation what general directions he has given to the British Transport Commission with regard to correspondence from Members of the House.

Mr. Watkinson: None, Sir. I know that the Chairman of the British Transport Commission attaches the highest importance to full and prompt replies being given to these letters.

Cattle Transport

Mr. Mikardo: asked the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation what general directions he has given to the British Transport Commission with regard to the transport of cattle.

Mr. Watkinson: None, Sir. The conditions under which cattle must be transported are laid down in the Transit of Animals Orders made under the Diseases of Animals Acts. These Orders provide very detailed provisions about the construction and fittings of road and rail vehicles and the manner in which animals are to be carried.

Mr. Mikardo: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that recently great difficulties have been caused in Reading through an unprecedented and sudden growth in cattle traffic, which doubtless took the British Transport Commission by surprise? Is he aware that there were too many cattle for the pens and they overflowed into the roads, which caused danger to some passers-by and perhaps some cruelty to the animals? Whilst appreciating that it was difficult, for many reasons, for the Commission to control that traffic, may I ask whether the Minister will look at the possibility of trying to ensure that the Commission does not experience a repetition of such an occurrence?

Mr. Watkinson: I appreciate that, but I understand that the hon. Member has obtained a settlement in Reading.

Road Haulage Services (Supplementary Fuel Ration)

Mr. Ernest Davies: asked the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation whether he is satisfied that essential road haulage services can be fully maintained with the allocations proposed under the rationing scheme; and if he will make a statement.

Mr. Watkinson: Road transport generally will suffer reductions in supplies of fuel but the issue of supplementary rations will be designed to enable essential traffics which must go by road to be moved.

Mr. Davies: That may be the intention of the Minister, but how does he consider it will be possible for the very large number of small operators, whom the Government have encouraged to come back into the road haulage industry, to continue to operate, in view of the very high price of petrol and the limited supplies which they will receive? Would not the country be far better off today if there were a co-ordinated road and rail service and if the industry had not been atomised in this way?

Mr. Watkinson: The hon. Gentleman is wrong, because the main hope of our getting through this difficulty satisfactorily is by the maximum amount of mutual aid and self-help, for which private enterprise is well equipped.

Mr. Davies: If these small operators are unable to operate profitably, because of the high price and shortage of petrol, will they not have to go out of business, and will that not mean that there will be a large amount of traffic taken off the roads, and that there may not be alternative facilities?

Mr. Watkinson: I cannot agree with that question either. The answer is that neither the price nor the ration should stop essential goods being moved by road.

Mr. Gresham Cooke: Will not small operators get the same percentage of previous fuel as large operators get, and also will not small operators be allowed to increase their charges to meet their new costs?

Mr. Watkinson: They will get exactly the same treatment as everybody else, but I must make it plain that the treatment is on the essentiality of what they are doing, and not necessarily on the ration.

Mr. Nabarro: A very good Tory answer, for all that.

Cardiff (Rhoose) Airport (Passengers)

Mr. C. Hughes: asked the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation how many passengers have been carried to and from Welsh airports during the present year, to the most convenient date; and what percentage increase or decrease has been recorded compared with the same period last year.

The Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation (Mr. John Profumo): The only Welsh aerodrome from which regular services are operated is Cardiff (Rhoose) Airport. During the nine months January-September, 1956, 38,000 passengers were carried to and from this airport, including those in transit. This is an increase of 31 per cent. over the number for the corresponding period of 1955.

Mr. Hughes: Does not the general position in Wales, and the figures, reveal a disturbing lack of progress in the


Principality by comparison with other parts of the country? Can the Minister approach B.E.A. to see whether additional services can be operated in Wales?

Mr. Profumo: The further development of air services in Wales is a matter for the commercial judgment of the air companies interested, but my right hon. Friend is prepared to consider sympathetically proposals from any company for the operation of new services in the Principality.

C-Licensed Vehicles

Mr. Nabarro: asked the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation what conversations he has had with representatives of industry, including road hauliers, upon suspension of restrictions excluding C-licensed vehicles carrying goods other than for the registered owner, and thus plying, in part, for hire and reward; and, in view of the urgent need to load all road haulage vehicles to capacity and save fuel, whether he will make a statement.

Mr. Watkinson: I would refer my hon. Friend to the reply I gave to my hon. and gallant Friend, the Member for Buckingham (Sir F. Markham), on 29th November, in which I said that the Government has asked licensing authorities to consider sympathetically the issue of a short-term B licence to the holders of C licences who can save fuel by pooling their C-licensed vehicles to carry their own goods.

Mr. Nabarro: Yes, but is that measure adequate in the circumstances? Would my right hon. Friend have regard to the fact that there are today about 900,000 C-licensed vehicles, of which nearly half a million are plying on fairly long-distance traffic as opposed to local delivery services, and as most of those long-distance C-licensed vehicles are returning to their bases empty, or nearly empty, does that not represent in the aggregate a vast waste of motor fuel?

Mr. Watkinson: I am sure that my hon. Friend, with his usual care, has read the initial statement that I made. If he bas read it, he will have seen that this case is met by the B licences, provided that those concerned can show that they are really going to save fuel and that the goods they are carrying cannot go by rail.

Mr. D. Jones: Is not this Question and Answer a clear indication that many thousands of miles are wasted each year by C-licensed vehicles travelling back empty, and is not that a complete justification of our arguments against the 1953 Act?

Mr. Collins: asked the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation what instructions he has given to guide the officers concerned with the allocation of supplementary petrol for goods vehicles on C licences, in assessing the comparative priority to be accorded to vehicles used for nationwide delivery and those normally used for local deliveries.

Mr. Watkinson: I will, with permission, circulate in the OFFICIAI. REPORT the criteria which I have asked my regional transport commissioners to bear in mind when considering applications for supplementary rations.

Mr. Collins: Can the Minister say whether that is a full report? Considerable doubts have been raised, owing to misleading statements which have appeared. Can the right hon. Gentleman meanwhile confirm that 50 per cent. of the basic ration is not the maximum amount of the supplementary ration which may be allowed for goods vehicles? Can he give an assurance that, having regard to the nature of the goods and the need to prevent unemployment, the allocation will be sufficient, in case of proved need, to ensure that services are maintained?

Mr. Watkinson: There is a clear list of priorities, which I am circulating in the OFFICIAL REPORT, AS to need, subject only to the over-riding necessity to save 25 per cent. of total consumption, my regional traffic commissioners will be as generous as they possibly can be.

Following is the information:

GOODS VEHICLES—SUPPLEMENTARY RATIONS OF MOTOR FUEL

1. Forms of transport other than road should be used whenever possible. The over-riding consideration governing the issue of supplementary rations will therefore be whether the traffic must be moved by road and cannot be handled by other means.

2. Subject to paragraph I special consideration will be given to

(a) traffics and activities listed in the Annex below; including long-distance traffics in the Annex for which it is essential that road transport should be used;


(b) feeder services to and from the railways or the ports;
(c) traffics which require the use of specially constructed vehicles and which cannot be transferred to other forms of transport.

3. In so far as supplies allow and subject to paragraph I above, the needs of traffics which are not included in the Annex but which must be moved by road if important industries and services are to be carried on, will be met by supplementary issues, first to A- and B-licensed vehicles and secondly to C-licensed vehicles. Save in exceptional circumstances supplementary rations for traffics not included in the Annex will not be issued for

(a) long-distance work unless it is clear that no other means of transport can be used;
(b) C-licensed vehicles of one ton or less unladen weight.

Annex

Bulk movement of essential foods.

Retail delivery of:

(a) milk
(b) other basic foods in rural areas or areas far from shops.

Seeds and raw materials necessary for food production or food processing.

Essential medical supplies.

Essential materials for the steel industry.

Essential activities related to coal production.

Delivery of house coal.

Newsprint and newspapers.

(Note: This list is not necessarily exhaustive and its application may be varied according to the circumstances and needs of different districts.)

Mr. Collins: asked the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation what, after need has been proved, will be the maximum supplementary petrol allocation for goods vehicles, with C licences, expressed as a percentage of the basic petrol ration for such vehicles.

Mr. Watkinson: Supplementary rations for individual vehicles will not be related to the basic ration for those vehicles, but to the nature of the work which the vehicle performs.

Mr. Collins: Is the Minister aware that the present basic ration for goods vehicles is only some 25 per cent. of the normal consumption? Will he, in his instructions to his officers, ensure that the allocation to important industries is sufficient to ensure that they are, with economy, fully maintained and that full employment is maintained?

Mr. Watkinson: I have just explained—I want to make it plain, and I am

grateful to the hon. Gentleman for asking the question—that the duty of the officers is to save 25 per cent. of the total consumption. Having done that, they will then judge, not on the basic ration, but on the need in respect of the goods which are to be moved, and they will also take account of alternative methods of transport by canal or rail. Subject to those things, they will be, as I said, as generous as they possibly can be.

Traffic, Central London

Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: asked the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation what reduction has been effected in the number of private motor cars in central London as the result of petrol restrictions.

Mr. Watkinson: Preliminary estimates indicate a reduction in total traffic of about 10 per cent. Figures for private cars are not available.

Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that, unwillingly but nonetheless effectively, the Government are at last reducing traffic congestion in central London? Will he now agree that keeping private cars out of central London is the quickest and least complicated solution to the problem, especially as public transport facilities are capable of carrying all the people who want to come into London daily and of moving them out again, provided that they do not all want to travel at the same time?

Mr. Watkinson: No, Sir. As the hon. and gallant Gentleman knows, I am entirely opposed to banning motorists from any area of London or using the temporary difficult petrol situation for the same purpose.

Oral Answers to Questions — SHIPPING

Shipowners (Liability)

Mr. Knox Cunningham: asked the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation (1) when the international Conference to consider the draft convention of the International Maritime Committee relating to the limitation of liability of owners of seagoing vessels will be held;
(2) the nature of the communications which have passed between Her Majesty's Government and the Government of the


Kingdom of Belgium with regard to the holding of an international Conference to consider the draft convention of the International Maritime Committee relating to the limitation of liability of owners of seagoing vessels.

Mr. Profumo: Her Majesty's Government are anxious that this Conference should take place as soon as possible, and, as I have already informed my hon. Friend, it is hoped that it will be held next year. Her Majesty's Embassy in Brussels has been instructed to ask the Belgian Government, who are responsible for convening the Conference, how soon it is likely to take place.

Mr. Knox Cunningham: asked the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation if he is aware of the opposition which exists in the United Kingdom to the retention of any statutory right of the owners of vessels to limit their liability when claims are brought in respect of personal injuries or loss of life; and whether he will consider the introduction of legislation to meet this view.

Mr. Profumo: I am aware that there are differing opinions on this subject, and this makes it all the more important to secure international agreement on the extent of the liabilities of shipowners. Their liabilities in respect of claims for personal injury or loss of life are covered by a new draft convention which will, I hope, be the subject of an inter-Governmental conference at an early date. The prior introduction of legislation would, therefore, be inappropriate.

Mr. Knox Cunningham: Would my hon. Friend answer this question? If he were walking on the Embankment and were run into by a motor car he would recover in full. If he were a few feet away in a small boat he would possibly recover only a small percentage of his claim. Under what principle does he say that there should be that differentiation?

Mr. Profumo: I think that is a hypothetical question, but I did not say there should be that differentiation. All I said was that it would be inappropriate to introduce legislation in advance of the inter-Governmental discussions which we hope will take place on this matter at an early date.

Mr. Hector Hughes: Does the hon. Gentleman not realise that this is a very important matter? What steps are being taken towards resolving it?

Mr. Profumo: If the hon. and learned Member would, perhaps, look in HANSARD at the previous Questions and the Answer which I gave to them, he will see what action we are taking. We certainly do regard this as a very important matter indeed.

Large Tankers

Mr. Edelman: asked the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation if he will introduce legislation to enable him to make contracts for the construction of super-tankers for the import of oil.

Mr. Philips Price: asked the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation whether, in view of the stoppage of oil supplies from the Middle East, he will take steps to encourage the construction of large oil tankers for conveyance of oil round the Cape.

Mr. Watkinson: The construction of tankers is the responsibility of the shipping industry, and I understand that several companies are, in fact, placing orders for very large tankers. I cordially welcome this development, though, as construction requires considerable time, I am afraid it cannot assist in our immediate difficulties.

Mr. Edelman: That really is not good enough. As our oil problems are likely to last for many years, and in order to reduce our dependence upon transport through the Suez Canal, will not the Government take powers to build a nationally-owned fleet of oil tankers, and give priority to the construction of the vessels?

Mr. Watkinson: No, Sir, because that would not advance the building of the tankers, but would probably retard it.

Mr. Gough: Would my right hon. Friend agree that, whereas the shipping industry is anxious to build large tankers, there is a financial bottleneck? Will he ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer to look into the matter and perhaps encourage the banks and insurance companies to provide the finance required to build large tankers?

Mr. Philips Price: Can the right hon. Gentleman say how many of these tankers are likely to be built, and when they are likely to be finished?

Mr. Watkinson: What I can say is that no tanker which is not at the moment under construction can make any rapid and early contribution to meeting our present difficulties.

Commander Maitland: asked the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation what consultations he has had with the oil companies and port authorities in regard to proposals to facilitate the increased use of large tankers.

Mr. Watkinson: My Department has recently been in touch with the oil companies and port authorities as regards their plans in this important matter, and I shall continue to watch the position closely. I understand that schemes for reception facilities for large tankers are in hand or under examination in the Thames, Southampton Water, the Mersey and the Clyde, and also at Milford Haven.

Commander Maitland: Is "watching the situation" enough? Should not the Government give a lead in the matter, as it will take a considerable time to provide the necessary facilities?

Mr. Chetwynd: Will the right hon. Gentleman say what is the largest size of tanker which can be accommodated in this country at present, and what plans are being made so that we can take larger tankers?

Mr. Watkinson: To answer my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Horn-castle (Commander Maitland), the point is that we have now to consider making facilities available for 60,000-ton and larger tankers. Those arrangements are in hand. If my hon. and gallant Friend wishes to know the details, which are far too lengthy for me to give him at this moment, I shall be very happy to tell him later what arrangements we are making.

Mr. G. R. Howard: I welcome the fact that my right hon. Friend is watching the situation, but would it not be true to say that there is only one port in the British Isles—Milford Haven—which is at the moment capable of taking large tankers?

Mr. Watkinson: Yes, Sir, but, as I have just said, the other ports which I have mentioned are taking steps to ensure that they can cope with them, too.

Exports (Suez Canal Closure)

Mr. Donnelly: asked the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation what steps he is taking to deal with the growing problem of shipping British exports, with particular reference to countries affected by the closure of the Suez Canal.

Mr. Watkinson: The shipping industry is fully alive to the situation and is taking all possible steps to overcome the difficulties arising out of the temporary closing of the Suez Canal. I am keeping in close touch in case I can be of any assistance should the occasion arise. Of the 76 ships requisitioned in connection with the Suez emergency, 40 have already been released. I expect to release the remainder during the next few weeks.

Mr. Donnelly: Can the right hon. Gentleman say what practical steps in procedure should be attempted by exporters confronted with this difficulty? Should they get in touch with his Department and ask for facilities or help?

Mr. Watkinson: Yes, certainly, Sir, or with the Board of Trade. I have myself been informed by industry only of difficulties in connection with the export of motor cars, but those have now been largely overcome.

Oral Answers to Questions — ROADS

Watling Street, Grendon (Pedestrian Crossing)

Mr. Moss: asked the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation whether he will take steps to cause a pedestrian crossing to be placed across Watling Street at Grendon in the County of Warwick.

Mr. Molson: I do not think that the circumstances here warrant a zebra crossing or that one would be of any real help to pedestrians. The police agree with this view.

Mr. Moss: Has the Minister noticed the number of accidents which have taken place in this village recently, and is he aware of the popular vote in the village against the lack of safety provisions at these crossroads?

Mr. Molson: I have been made familiar with the problem by the numerous Questions which the hon. Member has asked on the subject. I have indicated that we think that the only satisfactory measure would be to widen the road, which we hope to do when money is available.

Traffic Lights

Mr. Hay: asked the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation whether he will advise highway authorities, as a contribution towards economy in the use of motor fuel, to switch off traffic lights at unimportant cross-roads.

Mr. Molson: While I appreciate the motive underlying the hon. Member's Question, I am advised that little, if any, saving of fuel would be effected if his suggestion were adopted.

Mr. Hay: Does my hon. Friend not appreciate that when motorists are stopped at traffic lights quite a considerable waste of fuel takes place? Could he not look at this matter a little more sympathetically, particularly in the case of outlying and suburban parts of our towns and cities, where these traffic lights are often quite unnecessary in any event?

Mr. Molson: At present there are comparatively few fixed-time installations left. Most of them are vehicle-actuated and therefore do not result in any delay.

Viscount Hinchingbrooke: Could we not go in for the excellent French system of having flashing orange lights at night?

Mr. Molson: That scarcely arises out of this Question.

Improvement Schemes

Mr. Dodds: asked the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation what plans have been devised or are under consideration to take advantage of the months when motor traffic will be reduced because of petrol restrictions to accelerate work on much-needed road improvement schemes.

Mr. Watkinson: While I am sure that highway authorities and contractors will take as much advantage as they can of the lessening of traffic to speed up work on road improvements, the effects of restrictions on fuel supplies will be felt by them as well as by the road materials industry, in common with other industrial consumers.

Mr. Dodds: I thank the Minister for that Answer, but is it not now obvious that the present roads will be more than adequate for the available motor traffic, if this Government stay in power much longer?

Oral Answers to Questions — RAILWAYS

Liverpool Overhead Railway

Mr. Logan: asked the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation if he has considered the approach made to him by the Liverpool Corporation; and what action he is now prepared to take to retain the service of the Liverpool Overhead Railway.

Mr. Watkinson: I have told the Liverpool Corporation that I remain of the opinion that this is a local issue and that the provision of financial help from the Government to keep the railway going is out of the question. On this understanding I have offered the assistance of an official from my Department to act as impartial chairman at any further local discussion of the problem should this be desired.

Mr. Logan: Is the Minister aware of the congestion that is likely to arise in Liverpool if this railway is discontinued? Is he aware that I am afraid that there may be strikes on the dockside arising from the traffic problem on Merseyside? Apart from the delegations which have been coming to the House, wasting time, would some practical purpose now be served by the Minister coming to Liverpool to co-ordinate the services of Merseyside and to retain a service essential to the Port of Liverpool? Will the right hon. Gentleman call such a meeting to secure co-ordination? Is he aware that that is necessary, and that no other method of transport can be brought into operation in Liverpool?

Mr. Speaker: Order. I think that was a speech.

Mr. Watkinson: I have offered, in my Answer, to do what I can, if Liverpool wants me to do it.

Mr. Ernest Davies: But in view of the fact that this railway is still carrying about 8 million passengers a year—[An HON. MEMBER: "Nine million"]—or 9 million, an hon. Gentleman says, would


it not be desirable, in view of the petrol shortage, to keep this railway open, at least for the next few months, until the petrol shortage has been overcome?

Mr. Watkinson: As I have said, if I receive any approaches from Liverpool, I will do what I can to help to get a settlement.

Mr. K. Thompson: Whilst agreeing with my right hon. Friend that this is essentially and exclusively the responsibility of the Liverpool Corporation, will he nevertheless give the assurance that if the Liverpool Corporation takes its courage in its hands and decides to preserve this railway, my right hon. Friend will support, so far as he is able, any application which the Corporation may make to raise the funds to acquire and run the railway over the next few months?

Mr. Watkinson: As I have said, I will do anything I can to help.

Mr. Tilney: In the light of the petrol shortage, may I ask my right hon. Friend whether he is aware that the Socialist-controlled Corporation of Liverpool only last month did away with tramway track to the extent of more miles than there are of the Liverpool Overhead Railway, in order to substitute buses?

Railwaymen (Call-up Suspension)

Mr. Ernest Davies: asked the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation what reply he has given to the Chairman of the British Transport Commission's request that railwaymen in key positions be released from National Service or their call-up deferred during the present emergency.

Mr. Watkinson: After consulting my right hon. Friends the Minister of Labour and National Service and the Minister of Defence, I have informed the Chairman that as from 14th December the call-up for National Service of railwaymen in key positions will be suspended for the duration of the present emergency, that the release of any who have been recalled as Army reservists will follow the procedure described in the statement by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War on 20th November, and that it is not possible to release men who are already serving as National Service men.

Mr. Davies: I am glad for once to be able to say that I am gratified at the reply I have received, but might I ask the Minister whether he can reconsider the latter part of his reply? In view of the serious shortage of manpower which may confront the railways because of the increased traffics which are bound to be loaded on to them, will he consult his right hon. Friend with a view to releasing those National Service men called up? I understand that the number is not inconsiderable.

Mr. Watkinson: I will certainly keep it in view, because I am most anxious that the railways should carry all the traffics offered to them, but this is a substantial concession.

Mr. Ellis Smith: Since engineers manufacture and maintain railways equipment, should not they equally be exempt?

Mr. Watkinson: That is a very long-term suggestion, and this is a very short-term concession.

Passenger and Freight Traffic

Mr. Nabarro: asked the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation what steps he has taken, in pursuit of oil economy, to secure transfer of passenger and freight traffic from road to rail.

Mr. Watkinson: In determining both the motor fuel ration for public service vehicles and the criteria for the issue of supplementary rations for goods vehicles, one of my main concerns has been to limit fuel consumption as far as practicable to road vehicles catering for traffic which cannot move by other forms of transport. The British Transport Commission is, I know, for its part in close touch with traders and industry to ensure that the maximum possible use is made of rail facilities.

Mr. Nabarro: Would my right hon. Friend have special regard to coal and coal-class traffic? Is he aware that many millions of tons of coal are still being moved in thimblefuls to power stations and gas works by road haulage vehicles? [An HON. MEMBER: "Private enterprise."] No, some of it is by B.R.S. As this is essentially traffic which is suitable to, and ought to be moved by, rail in all circumstances, will my right hon. Friend take urgent and dynamic steps to secure that result?

Mr. Watkinson: My hon. Friend is dealing with a very good point, and I have already given that kind of instruction to my regional traffic commissioners.

Mr. G. R. Strauss: Are we to understand from that Question and Answer that an important section of the Conservative Party now believes that in all circumstances—I repeat, in all circumstances—the Government should take action to divert traffic from road to rail where that is economically justifiable?

Mr. Watkinson: What the House might understand from the Question and Answer is that it is clearly in the national interest that the railways, which are 20 per cent. under-loaded in respect of freight, should at present be fully loaded in order to save petrol.

Oral Answers to Questions — MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

Suez Canal Zone

Mr. Lewis: asked the Minister of Defence why plans were prepared by the military authorities in Cyprus for a landing in the Suez Canal Zone, by Her Majesty's Government on 25th August, 1956; and why this plan was altered and the landing called off on 18th August, 1956.

The Minister of Defence (Mr. Antony Head): They were not.

Mr. Lewis: Will the Minister look at the position again in view of a report in the New York Times that the officers concerned in Cyprus—

Mr. Speaker: Order. I do not think the Minister can be responsible for what appears in the New York Times.

Mr. Lewis: Will the Minister look at the position again,;n view of the fact that the officers concerned have issued a statement to the effect that the War Office and the Ministry of Defence did, in fact, give these orders?

Mr. Head: I can only repeat that that is not so.

Mr. Warbey: Is the Minister aware that the French Minister of Defence, M. Bourges Manoury, stated that the British Government had asked for 60 days' delay—

Mr. Speaker: Order. The hon. Member is quoting the French Minister of Defence, but he is questioning the British Minister of Defence.

Mr. Warbey: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. The Question relates to an operation conducted under a joint Anglo-French command. Therefore, I submit that such supplementary questions as mine can be raised.

Mr. Speaker: The hon. Member can ask his supplementary question without basing it on something said by someone for whom the Minister of Defence is not responsible, joint though the operation may have been; and it might then be in order.

Mr. Usborne: On a point of order. If it is true that one may not ask a Minister about a point of view which is expressed by a person for whom he is not directly responsible, how do you explain, Mr. Speaker, that we are apparently entitled to ask Ministers what is their view of statements made at the United Nations by people for whom they are not directly responsible?

Mr. Speaker: That is a general question, and I should like to look at the individual questions the hon. Member has in mind. Of course, there is Governmental responsibility for the representations which they make at the United Nations, and that is a slightly different procedure.

Mr. Lewis: Further to that point of order. When I put my supplementary question, you will recollect, Mr. Speaker, that I started to ask the Minister whether he would look at the New York Times and I was about to say—[HON. MEMBERS: "No."]—that one of his officers had made statements. You stopped me from quoting the New York Times, That I appreciate, but is it not a fact that on many occasions questions have been asked about serving officers and that Press reports of what the officers have said have been quoted?

Mr. Speaker: The hon. Member asked his second question and it was answered. I did not stop him asking his second question.

Mr. Warbey: Will the Minister say whether the Anglo-French operation against Egypt was postponed for 60 days


at the request of the British Government and against the wishes and desires of the French Government.

Mr. Head: That has nothing to do with this Question. [Interruption.] Hon. Members really must give me a chance. This has nothing to do with the Question, but I can repeat the same answer, and say it was not.

Operations, Egypt

Mr. Benn: asked the Minister of Defence what orders were given to General Stockwell when he was put in command of the forces sent ashore at Port Said; and if he will publish in the OFFICIAL REPORT that part of the directive which gave the military objectives of the operation.

Mr. Head: General Stockwell's orders were to carry out the military operations necessary to secure compliance with the conditions laid down in the communication addressed to the Governments of Egypt and Israel on 30th October. No further directive was issued.

Mr. Benn: In that case, can the Minister tell the House why General Stockwell reported in Port Said that his goal had been complete seizure of the Canal, and will he please explain from whom General Stockwell received those orders, if not himself?

Mr. Head: If the hon. Member will read the communication which was addressed to the Governments of Egypt and Israel, he will see that it included the occupation of Ismailia and Suez. That was stopped because of the unconditional cease-fire by both the Israeli and Egyptian Governments.

Mr. Mikardo: asked the Minister of Defence if he will give an up-to-date estimate of the Egyptian casualties resulting from the recent Anglo-French action.

Mr. Hayman: asked the Minister of Defence whether, as a result of the recent visit of the Paymaster General to Port Said, he will give an up-to-date estimate of the numbers of civilians killed and wounded there.

Mr. G. M. Thomson: asked the Minister of Defence whether he will make a further statement on the number of Egyptian casualties in Port Said in the

light of information drawn to his attention by the hon. Member for Dundee, East.

Mr. Warbey: asked the Minister of Defence what is now his estimate, based on the latest available information, of Egyptian civilian casualties in Egypt as a whole, and in Port Said in particular.

Mr. Hastings: asked the Minister of Defence how many of the civilians of Port Said were killed and injured, respectively, in the recent bombardment; and how many of these were children.

Mr. de Freitas: asked the Minister of Defence his latest estimate of the number of civilians killed or wounded during our aerial attacks on Egypt.

Mr. Head: On casualties in Port Said I would ask hon. Members to await the reply to be given at the end of Questions this afternoon by my right hon. and learned Friend the Paymaster-General.
I have no information about casualties elsewhere in Egypt.

Mr. Hastings: Has the right hon. Gentleman's attention been called to photographs, said to have been taken in Port Said, which have been published in this country on the responsibility of the International News Service, showing many dead children as well as adults? Can he say whether those appalling photographs are faked or not?

Mr. Head: I have seen a number of photographs and some of them have been sent to have their authenticity examined. I think that many of them are of extremely dubious origin. I draw the attention of hon. Members to the fact that I have placed in the Library a number of photographs which give a much fairer picture of the damage in Port Said.

Mr. C. I. Orr-Ewing: Is it not true that in a film of horrors which has been prepared for propaganda purposes by Nasser there are included shots of the fighting in Budapest? Is not that a most arrant attempt to deceive the people of this country?

Mr. Head: The authenticity of much of this propaganda is extremely doubtful. I am seeking confirmation of this fact, and I would rather not say anything until I have something firm to say.

Mr. Hayman: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the photographs in the Library, which I have just examined, give very little information? Is he aware that I have received from a constituent a letter which her son wrote from Suez? He said:
You know, Mum, the destruction is very bad here, whole blocks of houses destroyed and hardly a building free from shell or bullet holes. When we went in the debris was still everywhere. It is all a pack of lies about the 'military targets', it would be impossible not to hit civilians' buildings here.

Mr. Head: I do not agree with the hon. Member about the photographs in the Library. What they show very clearly is that the damage in Port Said has been grossly exaggerated. The propaganda photographs have been restricted to the Arab town, which was highly inflammable and which caught fire. I further point out to hon. Members that if one considers the operation, it is quite remarkable how very small the amount of damage was.

Mr. Wigg: Does the right bon. Gentleman still stand by his statement in the House on 21st November that only 100 civilians were killed and 540 wounded?

Mr. Head: I ask the hon. Member to await the full statement on this subject which is being made by my right hon. and learned Friend the Paymaster-General at the end of Questions.

Mr. Remnant: What truth is there in the recent report that Nasser shot a number of Egyptians? Will my right hon. Friend publish what information he has about that?

Mr. Head: I have no first-hand information about that.

Mr. Thornton-Kemsley: asked the Minister of Defence what was the military appreciation, at the time of the cease-fire in Egypt, of the time it would take for Anglo-French forces to establish themselves in Ismailia and Suez; and what would then have been the length of the lines of communication from the bridgehead at Port Said.

Mr. Head: The Answer to the first part of the Question is about seven days and, to the second, 101 miles.

French Personnel, Israel

Mr. Benn: asked the Minister of Defence to what extent Supreme Allied Command established for the Anglo-French forces at the Headquarters in Cyprus extended its authority to French personnel in Israel.

Mr. Head: To no extent whatever.

Mr. Benn: In that case, can the Minister of Defence please tell the House why the Anglo-French Command in Cyprus authorised French pilots to fly from Cyprus to Israel to train the Israeli Air Force, after the ultimatum had been given?

Mr. Head: I know of no such authorisation from Cyprus.

Egypt (Supply of Arms)

Mr. Lewis: asked the Minister of Defence if he will now make a further statement in regard to the total value of arms and munitions supplied to Egypt by Her Majesty's Government since October, 1951.

Mr. Head: No, Sir.

Mr. Lewis: Why was it that last week the Minister refused to give me this information while on the same day his right hon. Friend gave the figures requested to two of my hon. Friends? Why were £9 million worth of arms supplied to Nasser while only £3 million worth were supplied to Israel up to 26th July, when the Government knew that Nasser and the Egyptians were receiving large quantities of arms from Soviet Russia? Can he explain that?

Mr. Head: My right hon. Friend the President of the Board of Trade gave a total figure of all civilian and military supplies. That was not sub-divided, and since the war it has not been the custom of the Service Departments or the Ministry of Defence to give precise figures of this nature.

Mr. Fernyhough: asked the Minister of Defence if he can now give details of the quantity of arms, their type and value, supplied by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to Egypt during the two years ended 31st August, 1956.

Mr. Head: I cannot add to the information given to the Press on 11th November.

Mr. Fernyhough: Can the right hon. Gentleman say why he was so forthcoming on 11th November, at his Press conference, about the supply of arms by the Russians to the Egyptians and why, at the same time, he is so reluctant to give the House information about supplies by Her Majesty's Government to Egypt? What has he to hide?

Mr. Benn: On a point of order. With very great respect, Mr. Speaker, the Question does not relate to a matter for which the Minister of Defence is responsible. I should be very grateful if you would give your Ruling on that.

Mr. Speaker: He might be, otherwise it would not have been possible to table the Question. I thought he might have some intelligence on the subject.

Mr. Benn: Earlier, my hon. Friends sought to point out to the Minister information given by the French Ministry of Defence, with which the Minister has very close contact. In that case surely it was also fair to have assumed that the Minister might have information to give the House.

Mr. Speaker: In this case, apparently, the Minister has already given information to the Press about it, and I had some grounds for supposing that he knew what he was talking about when he did so.

Mr. Head: This is based upon very good information, and was given to the Press and the House, I think, by the Foreign Office some time ago. I should also say that we have never stated the details of arms supplied to other countries. That has always been the case, and I have no doubt that Soviet Russia would very much like to have the information which the hon. Member wants.

Scientists and Technicians (Russian Language)

Mr. Willey: asked the Minister of Defence what steps are being taken to expand existing courses for the teaching of Russian to scientists and technologists while they are doing their National Service.

Mr. Head: In present circumstances it is not possible to spare more scientists and technicians from their duties to learn Russian.

Mr. Willey: Will the right hon. Gentleman pay regard to the recommendation of the Advisory Council on Scientific Policy and see that he helps in extending our capacity to translate Russian technical documents, so that we can keep ourselves abreast of Russian technical developments?

Mr. Head: I had heard of this recommendation before the hon. Member asked his Question. I have every sympathy with it, but the fact remains that we are extremely short, during the period for which we have these men in the Services, of technicians of this type.

Israeli Operations, Egypt

Mrs. McLaughlin: asked the Minister of Defence what Egyptian military documents have been captured during the recent fighting in the Sinai Peninsula.

Mr. Head: None. No British forces were engaged in operations in the Sinai Peninsula.

Mrs. McLaughlin: Is the Minister aware that a number of hon. Members have been circulated with documents which were captured from the Egyptians during the military operations in the Sinai Peninsula, and that these documents show that Egypt has been preparing to invade Israel since before February last year?

Mr. Benn: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. Several times today you have ruled that my hon. Friends could not quote the French Ministry of Defence, and other sources available to us, but the hon. Lady has now quoted the Israeli Government, and the hon. Member for Wokingham (Mr. Remnant) quoted a report of what Colonel Nasser had done, for which the Minister of Defence is certainly not responsible. I wish you would clarify your Ruling in order to help the House.

Mr. Speaker: If the hon. Member has a complaint to make he should put it down in the right way. I would ask him, in fairness, to look at the Question, which asks:
what Egyptian military documents have been captured during the recent fighting in the Sinai Peninsula.


The right hon. Gentleman answered, "None." Then the hon. Lady asked whether he was aware that documents had been circulated. She did not say they were from Israel, or I should have stopped her. I thought that it was a criticism of his denial that none had been captured.

Mr. Head: I may have misunderstood the hon. Lady's Question, but I assumed that she meant "captured by British troops." I would not say that no documents were captured by troops other than British troops in the Sinai Peninsula.

Mr. Wigg: asked the Minister of Defence the time and date on which he informed the General Officer Commanding, Middle East Forces, that the Israeli Government were preparing major operations against Egypt.

Mr. Head: On 26th October the Government were informed by Her Majesty's Ambassador at Tel Aviv that mobilisation of the Israeli forces had begun. During the next two days further information was received indicating that Israeli forces were concentrating in the Negev. The Commander-in-Chief Middle East Land Forces, who was in London at the time, was at all times kept informed.

Mr. Wigg: I am much obliged to the Minister for that reply. Will he now be good enough to answer my Question? Will he give his personal word of honour that neither he nor General Keightley knew of the Israel attack before it took place?

Mr. Head: The Answer to the Question is exactly as I have stated it. We were informed of this by our Ambassador, who got it from the Military Attaché in Tel Aviv.

Mr. Stokes: Will the Minister assure the House that no information on this subject was given either to the Prime Minister or to the Foreign Secretary at the meeting in Paris on 16th October?

Mr. Head: I was not present at that meeting, but so far as I am aware, the answer is "No."

Mr. Wigg: Does the right hon. Gentleman still say that neither he nor General Keightley knew that the Israeli operation was to begin, and also that neither knew of its scope?

Mr. Head: The possibility of an Israeli attack on Egypt has been in the minds of the General Staff and of the Defence Committee and the Cabinet for some considerable time. Our first true knowledge that it was going to take place was when we were informed about the mobilisation.

Mr. Gower: Is it not remarkable that so many questions addressed to my right hon. Friend from the benches opposite appear designed to establish facts which, if established, would be discreditable to this country?

Mr. Wigg: Is it not a fact that if the facts are discreditable they are discreditable to the Government and not to the country?

Aircraft Maintenance

Mr. de Freitas: asked the Minister of Defence whether he will examine the use of skilled technicians in the maintenance of aircraft, in particular to see if some of the work at present carried out for the Army by Royal Air Force specialists could not be done by soldiers.

Mr. Head: We have been going into this, and I hope to say something definite very shortly.

United States Equipment (Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement)

Mr. Wigg: asked the Minister of Defence what representations have now been made by the United States Government complaining that Britain has violated the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement after having been warned by the United States Government on 3rd November that the United States equipment supplied for the defence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation area must not be used against Egypt; and what reply he has sent.

Mr. Head: No representations on this subject have been received from the United States Government since they sent Her Majesty's Government a copy of their statement to the Press on 3rd November. This did not call for a reply.

Mr. Wigg: Again the right hon. Gentleman is not answering the Question. Is not he aware that the Defence Department in Washington made a statement on 15th November saying that the British


and French Governments had violated an Agreement which they had entered into in 1950? Was not that statement broadcast by the B.B.C.?

Mr. Head: A statement was reported in The Times on 16th November, but what I have said in answer to the hon. Member's Question is correct. The only official representation that we have had was this copy of their statement to the Press on 3rd November.

Mr. Wigg: On a point of order. In view of the disingenuous and unsatisfactory reply given by the right hon. Gentleman—

Mr. Speaker: I wish that the hon. Member would conform to the rules of the House.

Mr. Wigg: In view of the unsatisfactory nature of the right hon. Gentleman's reply, I beg to give notice that I shall take an early opportunity of raising this matter on the Adjournment.

General Sir Charles Keightley (London Consultations)

Mr. K. Robinson: asked the Minister of Defence on what date in October General Sir Charles Keightley arrived in London; how long he remained here; what was the purpose of the visit; and with which of Her Majesty's Ministers he had consultations.

Mr. Head: General Keightley was recalled from the Middle East on 22nd August for consultations with the Chiefs of Staff and senior Ministers about the situation in the Middle East. He returned to Cyprus on 30th August. Thereafter, he paid periodical visits to London for the same purpose, including a longer visit in October.

Mr. Robinson: The right hon. Gentleman has not answered my Question. My Question asked on what date in October did General Keightley come here, and for what purpose was he recalled. Will the right hon. Gentleman now tell us what the dates were, and also give the House an assurance whether or not the discussions included the discussion of plans for Anglo-French military intervention in Egypt, in conjunction with an Israeli attack?

Mr. Head: The purpose of General Keightley's recall—[HON. MEMBERS: "Dates."] The House might let me answer and shout afterwards. The purpose of General Keightley's visits here was for consultations concerning our military precautions in the Mediterranean, which were taken subsequent to the Canal being taken over by Colonel Nasser. The dates of his visit were from 22nd to 30th August; from 2nd to 13th September; 27th September, and from 1st to 29th October.

Mr. Lee: In reply to Question No. 50 the right hon. Gentleman told us that the Cabinet were under the impression that certain preparations were being made by Israel to invade Egypt. Under those conditions, why was it that they asked for an assurance that there would be no invasion of Jordan, without asking for one at the same time in respect of Egypt?

Mr. Head: I cannot remember the exact date concerned in that question, but what I said to the hon. Gentleman is correct, namely, that we heard of the Israeli mobilisation from Her Majesty's Ambassador in Tel Aviv on the dates that I have mentioned.

Oral Answers to Questions — ATOMIC ENERGY

Advanced Reactor Systems

Mr. Mason: asked the Lord Privy Seal to what extent the Atomic Energy Authority is giving consideration to the building of atomic energy package stations.

The Lord Privy Seal (Mr. R. A. Butler): The Authority is examining a number of advanced reactor systems, some of which may be particularly suitable for development on a small scale; but none is likely to reach the stage of commercial use for some time.

Units, Calder Hall and Chapel Cross

Mr. Warbey: asked the Lord Privy Seal the prospective completion dates for Calder Hall No. 2 unit and for the two units under construction at Chapel Cross.

Mr. R. A. Butler: The Atomic Energy Authority expects that the second unit at Calder Hall will be completed in the


autumn of 1958, and that the two units at Chapel Cross will be completed during 1959.

Mr. Warbey: Does not this remarkable rate of progress show what might be done in the civil construction of atomic power stations if a similar priority and urgency were given to those? In view of the great need to replace oil supplies, will the Government see that a similar urgency is given to them?

Mr. Butler: I am glad that the hon. Member acknowledges that there is great progress on the production of the second unit at Calder Hall and the other two units at Chapel Cross. I can assure him that the Government are giving urgent attention to the point which he has put so forcibly to the House.

PORT SAID (MINISTER'S VISIT)

The following Questions stood upon the Order Paper:

Mr. WIGG: To ask the Paymaster-General whether he will make a statement on his visit to Port Said.

Mr. EMRYS HUGHES: To ask the Paymaster-General if he will make a statement on his recent official visit to Egypt.

The Paymaster-General (Sir Walter Monckton): With your permission, Sir, and that of the House, I will answer Questions No. 149 and 150 together.
Yes, Sir. I went to Port Said on 24th November to see for myself the damage caused by the recent allied operations and to obtain what information I could, in the course of a visit which lasted only 24 hours, about the numbers of Egyptian and other nationals who had died or been wounded as a result of the operations. I also inquired about the arrangements for transmitting Press and other information from the city.
I made a thorough tour of Port Said in a Land Rover and flew all over the city in a helicopter at low altitude. I interviewed not only members of Her Majesty's Forces who had taken part in the operations, but also several prominent nationals of other countries, including Egyptians, who were available and willing to assist me.
One of the main concerns of those who planned and took part in the operations was to limit damage and loss to the lives and property of Egyptians and other nationals. I am fully satisfied, from everything I saw and heard, that all practicable steps were taken to this end. Some of these steps, such as the warnings given to the local population in advance of particular operations, increased the danger to the allied forces, but the risk was deliberately accepted.
The property damaged consisted, first, of part of the poorest quarter which consists of small and inflammable huts. Rocket launchers withdrew into this section of the town and it had to be attacked. It took fire and burned rapidly in a strong wind, and one-fourth of the section was destroyed. This is the only large area of destruction in the town. Secondly, a number of buildings, or groups of buildings, that had been converted into strong-points received heavy damage from rocket attacks, which were remarkably accurate. Thirdly, a large number of wooden beach huts, many containing stocks of ammunition, caught fire and were destroyed when the sea-borne forces landed. Finally, some other buildings received damage which was mainly superficial.
The vast majority of the buildings in the city were unharmed, as can be seen from the photographs. The fact that the damage is as small as it is in a city of the size of Port Said, captured after some protracted street fighting, provides the strongest evidence of the great care taken by the allied forces to minimise damage.
Whereas damage to property can be inspected and assessed, it is more difficult to obtain an accurate estimate of the numbers killed or even of those wounded, and within the limits imposed by the time and materials available to me I could not ascertain a really reliable figure. The information I obtained, however, leads me to believe that the estimate of 540 wounded, previously given, is reasonably near the mark.
It is more difficult to make any assessment of the numbers killed or died from wounds. The number of wounded in military operations is normally several times greater than the number killed, and a figure of the order of 540 wounded would lead one to expect a number of dead of approximately 100, as originally estimated, but various statements made


to me lead me to think, that it is at least possible that the figure may well have been higher. As I have said, however, it was impossible in the time available to arrive at a firm estimate. Inquiries are continuing with a view to arriving at as accurate a figure as possible.
The indiscriminate issue of arms by the Egyptian authorities to the local civilian population, including women and boys aged 12 and upwards, before the operations began, and the use of beach huts, flats, houses, police stations and even a hospital for storing ammunition and weapons, undoubtedly caused the damage and casualties to be greater than they need otherwise have been.
Full preparation had been made in advance by the British authorities to restore normal living conditions in Port Said as quickly as possible. Some of the preparations, such as the provision of food and water, fortunately proved unnecessary, and although during the first few days of the occupation water and electricity were short or cut off in some areas of the city, both were rapidly restored. By the time of my visit some shops and cafes had already reopened and the population were moving normally about the town.
It is safe to say that in no military operation of its kind has greater care been taken to protect the lives and property of the local population, and great credit is due to Her Majesty's forces for the care and restraint which they showed.
I met representatives of the Press during my visit whose main concern was that certain physical difficulties in the communications between Port Said and elsewhere should be overcome. I took steps both at Port Said and Cyprus to ensure that these difficulties should be reduced to a minimum.

Mr. Wigg: May I, on behalf of my right hon. Friend and my hon. Friends, express our sorrow at the bereavement suffered by the families of all those who have lost their lives, of whatever nationality, and say that, so far as we can, we shall do all in our power to see that nothing like this ever happens again?
May I say to the right hon. and learned Gentleman that we have established at least one fact, that the Minister of Defence did not give the House accurate

figures on 21st November—for whatever reason—and that the number of killed and wounded is certainly higher than the figures given by the Minister of Defence? Would the right hon. and learned Gentleman say whether, if he cannot give accurate figures, he agrees that the figure of 3,000 killed and wounded, given by Mr. Nehru, is much nearer the mark than the figures given by the Minister of Defence?

Sir W. Monckton: The result of going out there, and making such inquiries as I could, was to bring to light some information which had not been available to the Commander-in-Chief, and, therefore, had not been available to my right hon. Friend. As to the figures, I would only say that the older I grow the more reluctant I am to base firm conclusions on insufficient data. But when one is asked for an estimate, one gives the best one can and that is no doubt what the advisers of my right hon. Friend did on the earlier occasion. I have said that so far as the killed and those who died of wounds are concerned, I should not be surprised to find the number higher. I would say, with all reserve—because inquiries are still going on, and I do not pretend that they could be finished in as short a time as I had—that if the figure turned out to be 300 I should not be surprised; but if it turned out to be a 1,000 or more I should be greatly surprised.

Dr. Summerskill: As I put down a Question on this subject two weeks ago, and the Minister of Defence had not the details, may I ask whether the right hon. and learned Gentleman can confirm or deny that the bombing cut off the water and light supply from the general hospital, in consequence of which surgeons were unable adequately to operate on the injured?

Mr. Remnant: Which hospital?

Sir W. Monckton: There was no bombing in the ordinary way. What I was talking of was attacks by rockets on strong points during the operation. Whether, in the case of any hospital, it did result in the cutting off of power I could not say without notice.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: Can the right hon. and learned Gentleman tell us why, if he was satisfied that the Minister of Defence had given accurate figures, he went to Port Said to investigate? Can he


tell us what neutral Press correspondents he consulted? Did he consult the correspondent of the American Newsweek who estimated a figure of 2,000 and, also, the special correspondent of a Swedish news agency, who counted 257 deaths? Is there not also evidence to prove conclusively that the Minister of Defence deliberately underestimated these casualties?

Sir W. Monckton: I am quite satisfied that my right hon. Friend gave an estimate which he thought was right. I have said, I think, that there may have been more killed than the number of which I have spoken. In the course of my visit I did not have the opportunity of meeting all the representatives of the Press of all countries. I certainly did see those I could, both Egyptian and neutrals—

Mr. Lewis: Who were they?

Sir W. Monckton: —but I am not going to say who they were, because they particularly asked me not to, for reasons which I appreciate.

Mr. J. Eden: Is not it a fact that it is extremely difficult to establish figures of casualties among those who were opposed to our forces unless there is complete co-operation by them and careful documentation by them? Would my right hon. and learned Friend ask his right hon. Friend to emphasise to those of Her Majesty's Forces who took part in these operations that all right hon. and hon. Members on this side of the House are extremely grateful to them for the fact that they risked considerable danger to themselves by conducting these operations in such a humane manner?

Mr. G. Brown: Is the Paymaster-General aware that in pressing this matter none of us on this side of this House is criticising the forces or the precautions they took, but that the facts still need to be established? Some of the things said surprise some of us. Would the Minister say, first, how it came about that facts were available to him in a rushed 24-hour visit which had not been available to the Commander-in-Chief and the advisers of the Minister of Defence when he told us, on 21st November, not only that he reaffirmed the figures but, as he said dogmatically:
The British have a great reputation for truth in these matters."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 21st November, 1956; Vol. 560, c. 1750.]

thereby seeking to establish that he had the truth at his hand? What new facts came to light and why should they have come to light?
Secondly, does the right hon. and learned Gentleman not realise that this continual reference to the poor quarter of Port Said burning rapidly only heightens one's feeling that the figures are still wrong, because that is exactly where one would expect overcrowding and, therefore, heavier casualties? Thirdly, as he says that he did not really have time to do the job, and that inquiries are still proceeding, does he propose to make another statement on the subject later?

Sir W. Monckton: I do not know whether it will be for me to make another statement. I made this statement only because I had made the visit and I was asked about it. No doubt the appropriate Minister will give the figures when they are ascertained.
I was glad to hear what my hon. Friend said about the general view that the troops had behaved with great care to avoid loss. I am sure that we all agree. As to the other matter—the difference between the figures originally suggested and those I am suggesting today—surely we all agree that if one is out there well after the event and one can spend even a day, when one has some experience of making investigations, in seeing people who may not have been willing to see those who inquired previously, new facts may come to light. They came to light, and I have given them to the House.

Mr. Stokes: May I press the Paymaster-General on the question of the number of killed? I am puzzled by the fact that the major damage in Port Said was in what I call the hutment areas, the areas where bodies are not going to be lost. Is the Paymaster-General aware that there are particular regulations applying to the burial of bodies in Egypt? Surely it ought to be possible to ascertain the number of people killed. There ought not to be any real difficulty about it. There appears to be no mystery about the number of people wounded. Can the Paymaster-General tell us whether the figure of 100 is right or whether the figure is a great deal more?

Sir W. Monckton: I am sure that the right hon. Gentleman will do me the justice of assuming that I did try to see what records there were in writing and whether the normal records of people in hospital were kept in the ordinary way. I can only say that it did not help. Such records as I saw were not satisfactory and not kept in the normal way; it may well have been because of the events taking place. As to the shanty town, I thought it right to mention that that is where the most damage occurred, but I took into account such material as I had got about the number of people killed there.

Mr. P. Williams: In view of the propaganda efforts made by the Nasser régime to exaggerate the number of casualties, and of efforts made in other quarters, can my right hon. and learned Friend assure the House that the publicity and propaganda efforts of our Administration will be used to the utmost to convey the truth of the situation throughout the whole of the Middle East?

Mr. Hamilton: Can the right hon. and learned Gentleman explain whether there was any urgency about his return to this country if he were willing to establish the facts? Does he not think it rather unfortunate that, in attempting to romanticise the exercise, he referred to "knights errant" in what was blatantly an imperialist aggression?

Sir W. Monckton: I should like to say a word about the urgency of the exercise. Anyone who has had to investigate a matter of this kind, in the circumstances in which it would have had to be investigated now, would realise that it could not be done adequately in a short time. [HON. MEMBERS: "Why did the right hon. and learned Gentleman not stay?"] It would take a great deal of preparation and examination to do it. What I thought was desirable was that I should go out, see for myself what could be seen, gather what I could of the other information, and give it to the House. That is what I have done.

Mr. G. Brown: May I press the right hon. and learned Gentleman again on the question of a further report? Is he aware that the greatest propaganda effect against this country will be if facts were eventually established which we showed reluctance to establish ourselves? Would not

it therefore, from a propaganda point of view, if that is what we are concerned with, be better that we should seem willing to clear up the matter and give the fullest information ourselves before somebody else does?

Sir W. Monckton: I said that I had done my best. I have tried to keep to the material I have got and I have said that further inquiries were going on with a view to giving the facts. I am confident that the results will be given to the House and the country.

Mr. C. I. Orr-Ewing: If my right hon. and learned Friend is to make a further statement, will he also ask the Egyptian authorities how many Egyptian Army officers have been arrested and shot by Colonel Nasser, because the figure of 40 is generally believed to be an underestimate?

Mr. J. Hynd: Can the Minister tell us why the Commander-in-Chief, with the resources at his disposal, was unable to ascertain, at least approximately, the total number of casualties in what the Minister himself has said was a comparatively small area of destruction? Further, will he explain why, when the Minister of Defence was giving the figure of 100 killed to the House the other day, he insisted that that was the maximum figure and claimed that he had complete reliance on the information given him by the Commander-in-Chief?
Finally, will the Minister tell us why, in view of the difficulty of getting this information, foreign Press correspondents, including war correspondents, were excluded from the area of main damage by the military authorities, as we are assured by some of the neutral war correspondents?

Sir W. Monckton: As far as I know, they were not, but that is not my responsibility. As to whether the Commander-in-Chief would have got more accurate figures, I am sure that the House will realise that I went over—I will not say that I went over by choice—at a moment when things were much quieter. The Commander-in-Chief has a great many things to do, including the collecting of information of this sort. It is not unnatural that anyone going out as I did should have opportunities to add to the material available.

Mr. Wigg: In view of the unsatisfactory nature—

Mr. Warbey: On a point of order. I had a Question on this subject—Question No. 67—which I put to the Minister of Defence. He asked me to await the statement by the Paymaster-General. I awaited the statement. May I now put a supplementary question, Sir?

Mr. Speaker: I think that that is reasonable.

Mr. Warbey: As it is now already clear, as the truth begins to come out, that hundreds and possibly thousands of innocent people have suffered from the Government's so-called police action, can the Paymaster-General say whether it was really necessary that so many people should be butchered to make a Jamaican holiday?

Several Hon. Members: Several Hon. Members rose—

Mr. Speaker: Order.

Mr. Mikardo: On a point of order. May I direct your attention, Sir, to the fact that Question No. 41 on the Order Paper is in my name and that I, too, was asked by the Minister of Defence to await the reply of his right hon. and learned Friend. Being a good boy, I did so. I should now like to put a supplementary question. May I ask by what means within the rules of order I can shed the cloak which for long has made me an invisible man?

Mr. Speaker: The hon. Member is not at all invisible; I sometimes think that he is very obvious. On looking back, I understand that what the hon. Member said is quite true. A whole lot of Questions was answered together. I see the names of the hon. Members for Reading (Mr. Mikardo) and Dundee, East (Mr. G. M. Thomson). They can both ask supplementary questions, but no other hon. Members.

Mr. Mikardo: I am obliged, Mr. Speaker.
May I ask the Paymaster-General what was the point of his going on this investigation if he could not stay long enough to ascertain the facts? Was it necessary for him to go all the way to Port Said in order to come back and regale us with the answer to a simple proportion sum between the wounded and the dead?

Does he dismiss as "Nasser propaganda" the eye-witness account of the correspondent of the Daily Express, who said that he saw far more bodies than the number that the Minister of Defence gave to us?

Sir W. Monckton: As to the necessity for the journey, it was not merely to establish the number of casualties. I thought it was a very good thing to be sure of the damage, which could be inspected and assessed. As to the mere proportion sum, I have not said that the figure of 100 is necessarily wrong. I have said that I expected a figure of that order by the proportion sum to which the hon. Gentleman referred, but that my inquiries made me think that it might be higher. There is nothing wrong with that.

Mr. G. M. Thomson: Did the Minister meet the correspondent of The Times there? Is he aware that, on the day after the Minister of Defence categorically reaffirmed this figure of 100 dead, The Times correspondent at Port Said said that nobody in Port Said could understand where the Minister got his facts? Is he also aware that the French Foreign Secretary told the French Assembly that he estimated the number of dead as about 300? In view of the very imprecise nature of the report that has been given to us, and of its importance to the good name of Britain, will the right hon. Gentleman go back, or ensure that somebody else goes back, to continue the investigation?

The Minister of Defence (Mr. Antony Head): As these questions concern the facts which I stated, perhaps I might explain something to the House. Directly after the operation I gave an estimate of the casualties which was given to me of the dead and wounded. I then sent a signal back asking whether the figures could, so far as possible, be checked as I knew there was considerable interest in them and stories were already going around about the matter. I got a reaffirmation saying that, from all the data available, that was still the best estimate they could provide.
I know, from further correspondence with the Commander-in-Chief on this subject, that it is almost impossible to be precise on the number of casualties, partly because of the speed of burial and partly because in Egypt there is a rule


that no body may be exhumed after 24 hours of death, for health reasons. All my experience of war, which, I grant, is limited, shows that, after battle, the estimates of newspaper men and soldiers of the number of dead is likely to be tremendously in excess of the actual number.

Mr. Wigg: In view of the unsatisfactory nature of the reply, I beg to give notice that I will raise the matter on the Adjournment. I submit to you, Mr. Speaker, that it might be a suitable subject to raise on the Motion for the Adjournment for the Christmas Recess.

Mr. Speaker: We will see about that.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE

Proceedings of the Committee of Ways and Means exempted, at this day's Sitting, from the provisions of Standing Order No. 1 (Sittings of the House).—[Mr. R. A. Butler.]

MIDDLE EAST

3.56 p.m.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Selwyn Lloyd): I beg to move,
That this House supports the policy of Her Majesty's Government as outlined by the Foreign Secretary on 3rd December, which has prevented hostilities in the Middle East from spreading, has resulted in a United Nations Force being introduced into the area, and has created conditions under which progress can be made towards the peaceful settlement of outstanding issues.
I want to try to deal with certain matters which have been raised in the House about the past events and, first, with the questions which have been asked about the alleged collusion. I repeat the Answer which I gave to the House on 31st October:
Every time any incident has happened on the frontiers of Israel and the Arab States we have been accused of being in collusion with the Israelis about it. That allegation has been broadcast from Radio Cairo every time. It is quite wrong to state that Israel was incited to this action by Her Majesty's Government. There was no prior agreement between us about it."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 31st Oct., 1956; Vol. 558, c. 1573.]

Hon. Members: Knowledge.

Mr. Lloyd: It is true that we were well aware of the possibility of trouble. I would remind hon. Members of what had been happening during the months of September and October, because it is very frequently forgotten. I am not going to read out a list of every incident that took place on the Israel-Jordan frontier, but they had mounted in seriousness until, on 25th September, in an Israeli reprisal raid on Husan, about 39 Jordanians had been killed, and on 10th October, in an Israeli reprisal raid on a police post, 48 Jordanians had been killed. That last reprisal was the the heaviest that had ever been mounted.
These are the two principal incidents. I have a long list with me of occasions from 10th September onwards, when, at one time, the Israelis were condemned by the Armistice Commission and, at other times, the Jordanians were condemned. There had been a steadily mounting state of tension on that frontier up to that last incident in which, as I have said, 48 Jordanians were killed. That, without doubt, had created a very serious situation.
There had been incidents in August on the Israeli-Egyptian frontier and then there had been a period of quiet, but Fedayeen raids began again in October. On 20th October a number of Israeli soldiers had been killed and on 24th and 28th October further raids had taken place.
Two other events occurred during the end of October. On 21st October a general election took place in Jordan, as a result of which a more extreme Parliament had been elected. By "more extreme" I mean one with greater hostility towards Israel. Then, on 24th October, that election had been followed by a move of considerable import for Israel, in the formation of the Syrian-Egyptian-Jordanian joint command under the Egyptian Commander-in-Chief.
It therefore looked at that time as though, after Egypt had been protected by the Russian veto in the Security Council on 13th October, that there would be a resumption of active hostility by Egypt and her associates against Israel. That was the background at that date. Then, on 26th October, we heard from our representative in Tel Aviv—

Mr. Aneurin Bevan: I cannot quite follow this. What does the right hon. and learned Gentleman mean by "protected by the Russian veto"? In respect of what?

Mr. Lloyd: The right hon. Gentleman will recollect that the first part of the Resolution was unanimously carried. [HON. MEMBERS: "What Resolution?"] The Resolution dealing with the future of the Canal.

Mr. William Warbey: What has that to do with it?

Mr. Lloyd: If the hon. Member asks me that question he should examine how much knowledge he has. If he does not realise that a very important ingredient in this matter was Israel's feeling about what was going to happen over the future of the Canal, I despair even of him.

Mr. Philip Noel-Baker: Mr. Philip Noel-Baker (Derby, South) rose—

Mr. Lloyd: I really must ask right hon. and hon. Members to allow me to put the point of view I am putting forward on this extremely important matter.

Mr. Bevan: I am very sorry indeed to interrupt again, and I am grateful to the right hon. and learned Gentleman for giving way, but I should like to follow him on this matter. He said that Egypt had been protected by the Russian veto. We should like to know in what respect Egypt was protected.

Mr. Lloyd: In respect of Part II of the Resolution of that date. Part II of the Resolution of that date dealt with the future of the Canal, the 18-Power proposals or the equivalent. Because that Resolution was vetoed at that time it looked less likely that there was going to be an acceptable settlement of the Canal problem, in particular a settlement which would give Israel a right of passage for her ships. That was the matter which affected the Israeli point of view.
On 26th October, we heard from our representative in Tel Aviv—

Mr. Noel-Baker: Mr. Noel-Baker rose—

Hon. Members: Order.

Mr. Lloyd: On 26th October, we heard from our representative in Tel Aviv of the Israeli mobilisation. It was not known then whether it was partial or total, and instructions were sent on 27th October to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Tel Aviv to make representations to Israel on the matter. He pointed out that if there were an Israeli attack on Jordan, the United Kingdom would be bound to intervene in accordance with the Anglo-Jordan Treaty. He also urged restraint on Israel in other directions because it was quite obvious that if Israel did attack one of the other Arab countries there was the possibility of Jordan becoming involved and a difficult situation being created for the United Kingdom.
That was quite apart from the risk of general war which would have resulted from any such attack. Those were the facts, that was the extent of our knowledge. There was a critical and deteriorating situation which I believe anyone in possession of the facts would realise was likely to lead to something pretty drastic at any time.

Mr. Denis Healey: Mr. Denis Healey (Leeds, East) rose—

Hon. Members: Sit down.

Mr. Lloyd: I have a somewhat long speech to make and I think we shall get through it more quickly if I am not interrupted so much.
The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Derby, South (Mr. P. Noel-Baker) raised two questions on Monday. The first dealt with negotiations about the Canal settlement. I have checked my recollection on that matter. The position is that after our talks in New York—by that I mean the private talks with the Secretary-General, the Foreign Ministers of France and Egypt and myself—the Egyptian Foreign Minister stayed on in New York for some days and further discussions took place between him and the Secretary-General. It was on 19th October that the Secretary-General made a tentative suggestion for a meeting in Geneva on 29th October.
We pointed out, in fact I made the point in a public speech in this country on 20th October, that Egypt had been asked, in the Security Council Resolution, promptly to make known their proposals for a settlement. The onus was upon them and, so far as we were concerned, we were ready to meet with a representative of Egypt as soon as Egyptian proposals had been put forward in accordance with Part II of the Anglo-French Resolution before the Security Council. I stated that in answer to the suggestion of the Secretary-General. I think partly because I had said that, and in an endeavour to produce the basis for such a meeting, the Secretary-General on 24th October sent a letter to the Egyptian Foreign Minister, a copy of which is in the records of the United Nations.
That was on 24th October; by 29th October there had been no reply from the Egyptian Foreign Minister to that letter. Therefore, on that date there was no basis for a meeting in Geneva on 29th October.

Mr. P. Noel-Baker: I am much obliged to the Foreign Secretary for giving way. Is it not also a fact that Egypt proposed a meeting in Geneva on 29th October, which, obviously, must have been on the basis of the letter from the Secretary-General, as the proposal was made after he had read it?

Mr. Lloyd: The point is that we had said quite definitely we would not agree to a meeting until, in accordance with

the Part II of the Security Council Resolution, proposals had been put forward for us to consider. That was the position clearly understood and it was not until 2nd November—in answer to a supplementary question I said 3rd November, but I was wrong—that the Egyptians accepted the Secretary-General's memorandum as a basis for negotiation.
The next matter raised by the right hon. Member related to the cease-fire. The Egyptians, on 2nd November, did accept the Resolution for a cease-fire on the condition that operations were discontinued by the other three countries. On 3rd November, the Israeli Government handed to the Secretary-General an aide memoire containing the text of a declaration about Israel agreeing to an immediate cease-fire provided that a similar answer was forthcoming from Egypt.
It also included some observations on the questions then before the Emergency Special Session. That aide memoire was immediately followed by a letter on 4th November asking for clarification of five questions. The Secretary-General again got into touch with the Egyptian Government, as I understand, and received an answer on 4th November stating that Egypt was ready to bring to a halt all hostile military action in the area by 20.00 hours that night.
On 5th November, in the afternoon, the Secretary-General made a communication to our Permanent Representative stating that the Government of Egypt had, on 4th November, accepted the request for a cease-fire without any attached conditions and that the Government of Israel had handed in a clarification of its first reply to the request by the Secretary-General for a cease-fire, stating that in the light of Egypt's declaration of willingness to accept a cease-fire Israel confirmed its readiness to agree to a cease-fire.
The Secretary-General went on to say that the conditions for a cease-fire seemed, by those two communications, to be satisfied. That matter was considered by the Cabinet here on the morning of 6th November and Sir Pierson Dixon, because of that, handed to the Secretary-General a notification of the intention of Her Majesty's Government to order a cease-fire at midnight that night.

Mr. P. Noel-Baker: In other words, what I said the other day was perfectly accurate. Both sides had accepted the cease-fire before we made our landings on 5th November, and, in spite of that, we went on with our offensive until midnight on 6th November.

Mr. Lloyd: The right hon. Member should have waited for just a moment.
In the question he put to me last Monday, he left out from the chain of events which he described the communication of 4th November from the Israeli Government which put into doubt the question whether or not they had accepted a cease-fire. They put that into doubt—[Interruption]. There really is no dispute about this among those who are prepared to be fair-minded on this matter. It was in doubt as far as we were concerned, it was obviously in doubt as far as the Secretary-General was concerned, and in consequence of that he made his further communication to us on 5th November.
In my statement last Monday I claimed that certain results had flowed from the action of Her Majesty's Government, that we had stopped the war and prevented it spreading. That was greeted with a certain amount of hilarity by most hon. Members of the Opposition. As I listened, I could not help being reminded of the statement of the Leader of the Opposition on a previous occasion about the premature ending of hostilities. Is it the view of the Opposition that our action did not stop the war spreading through the Middle East? There is silence.

Mr. Healey: The right hon. and learned Gentleman used a rather equivocal phrase when he said that we warned the Israelis on 29th October against action in other directions. Can he tell the House whether, at any time after 27th October, we warned the Israelis unequivocally against an attack on Egypt? If we did not, the whole case of the Government falls to the ground.

Mr. Lloyd: The hon. Member has, very cleverly, tried to put another question to the question on which I gave way. [HON. MEMBERS: "Answer."] I will answer the question. Her Majesty's Ambassador in Tel Aviv warned the Israeli Government to use restraint and warned of the dangers if restraint were not

used. If the hon. Member thinks that that does not cover the question of hostilities against Egypt, he should examine the matter again.

Mr. Bevan: The right hon. and learned Gentleman asked a question and his Friends behind him took it up. I understand the question—the last sentence he uttered—to be what would we have done to prevent—[HON. MEMBERS: "No."]

Mr. Lloyd: May I repeat my question? Do the Opposition still dispute our contention that our action stopped the war spreading through the Middle East?

Mr. Bevan: If the right hon. Gentleman will glance over what he has read in the last five minutes he will see that Her Majesty's Government connived at the war.

Mr. Lloyd: That is very clever, but it is not an answer to my question. It is now quite plain that Her Majesty's Opposition are not prepared to face up to the question which I put, because they know quite well, in their heart of hearts, that what I have stated is the truth.
However, to fortify the conclusion which apparently they have reached, I do not think that I can do better than call in evidence a witness possibly more likely to convince them—the Commander-in-Chief of the Egyptian Army. He said, on 30th November, in a statement broadcast by Cairo Radio, that Egypt was bound by military agreements with Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria and the Yemen. In his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Arab Forces he issued instructions on the evening of 29th October to put into effect plans prepared to meet an Israeli attack. In consequence of those instructions, various military movements began. After the Anglo-French communication to Egypt on 30th October, he went on to say, the Egyptian Government decided not to involve the other Arab States in military operations. Orders were issued to commanders of joint forces to avoid taking part in military operations. I believe that that statement proves conclusively the accuracy of our claim that our action prevented the spread of hostilities and is, in fact, its basic justification. It is not easy to say how far the spread of hostilities would have gone, or in what the Middle East and the whole world might ultimately have been involved.
I also claimed, on Monday, that our action had revealed the extent of Soviet penetration into the area. That, again, was received with a certain amount of hilarity by hon. Members opposite. What are the facts about that? We had known of substantial sales to Egypt of Soviet arms. Before the operation they had been reckoned to be of the value of about £150 million.

Mr. Leslie Hale: What did we send?

Mr. Lloyd: As a result of the information now in our possession, it appears that Egypt had received 50 I.L. 28s, 100 M.I.G.s, 300 medium and heavy tanks, more than 100 self-propelled guns, 200 armoured personnel carriers, 500 pieces of artillery and a great variety of other military equipment, including rocket launchers, bazookas, plastic mines, small arms, radar, wireless, etc., 2 destroyers, 4 minesweepers, 20 motor torpedo boats and a number of smaller vessels. There was also the probability, or the possibility, that some small submarines were to be provided. It would appear that Egypt was being equipped by the Soviet Union for full-scale military operations.
As far as our deliveries of arms are concerned, they represent, as every hon, Member who knows anything about it recognises, only a trickle. That has been gone into before, and I am quite prepared to go into it again. This was the equipment by the Soviet Union of Egypt for full-scale military operations.
Certain information has been published from Israeli sources since these operations. They state that in Sinai they captured 1,500 military vehicles, more than 60 armoured personnel carriers, more than 250 pieces of artillery, 30 T.34 tanks, a number of self-propelled guns, 200 Czech anti-tank guns, and 7,000 tons of ammunition. This equipment was captured in a campaign which involved about one-third of the Egyptian Army. It takes no account of other Soviet equipment. In particular, we know that the 60 Josef Stalin heavy tanks were held back from the final battle in Sinai.
Another interesting factor is that much of the 7,000 tons of ammunition was for a type of Soviet gun none of which was captured in Sinai.

Mr. R. R. Stokes: What good was it?

Mr. Lloyd: I should have thought that even the right hon. Gentleman would have drawn the conclusion that the guns were to follow. I agree that the ammunition would have been no use without the guns.
We are told that great quantities of arms and equipment are still scattered throughout the desert. Some of the rifles and machine guns found were of the latest Soviet bloc models and were still packed in the grease in which they arrived.
In addition to these large dumps of ammunition there was a very curious find—over 1 million blankets. The Egyptian Army consisted, before the operation, of about 80,000 men. One wonders what was the purpose of these very large deliveries of equipment of one sort and another.

Mr. Stokes: May I ask a question?

Mr. Lloyd: I have not yet finished.
In our own restricted operations in Port Said, about 30 self-propelled Soviet guns were found, together with a considerable variety of other Soviet equipment. Large numbers of expert technicians had been sent from behind the Iron Curtain to Egypt. We believe that at least 1,000 technicians and instructors had come to Egypt for essential servicing and training. In addition, Egyptians had been sent to Czechoslovakia, Poland and the Soviet Union for technical training.

Mr. Stokes: This is very important. Will the Foreign Secretary say whether the amount of arms we discovered in the shape of heavy tanks and armoured vehicles was more than sufficient to arm more than four or five brigades? Does he say that it was more than that?

Mr. Lloyd: I agree with the right hon. Gentleman that it is a very important matter. Our information is that the amount of equipment found was far more than necessary to equip the Egyptian Army.
The broad outline of much of this was known to us or guessed by us before the operation took place. What has happened as a result of that operation is that the magnitude of the Soviet penetration has been revealed. It had


permeated every branch of the Egyptian armed forces, and, as Egypt is a military dictatorship, that meant that the Communist influence was in a position to have a dominating effect upon events. However right hon. and hon. Members opposite may try to get out of the matter, those are the facts of the situation which have been disclosed by our action.
I also claimed in my statement on Monday that a third result of our intervention had been the action taken by the United Nations. Some sensitivity has been shown to our claim that it was our action which forced the formation of the United Nations Emergency Force. I do not see how anyone can believe that this Force could have been created without our action—[Interruption.]—or without the suggestion put forward by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister in the House.
I will repeat to the House what I said to the General Assembly of the United Nations, on the Middle East, when I spoke in the debate on Friday week:
Over the past few years the United Nations, whether in the Assembly or the Security Council, has completely failed so far as the Middle East is concerned, either to keep the peace or to procure compliance with its own resolutions, or to pave the way for a settlement.
I said that in saying that I was not criticising—I was stating the fact. And that is known to right hon. Gentlemen opposite, who were in office before us, at a time when they had responsibility. Nevertheless, that is the record of the United Nations. I do not say that it was the United Nations' fault. We may very well say that it was the fault of member States, or of a conglomeration of member States but, in fact, United Nations progress in those matters had been blocked in that period.
I believe that it is that reason, the failure of the United Nations over those years, which is the basic reason for the events of 29th and 30th October. I believe that a solid advantage which has resulted from this action is the existence in Egypt of this United Nations Force to keep the peace. I believe that it is the desire of the great majority of the countries that this Force should be effective, that it should discharge its functions, and should be an element creating conditions

under which a final settlement may be possible.
I would add only this about the atmosphere of the United Nations as I saw it a fortnight ago. It was disturbing to note the comparative indifference about the situation in Hungary which was displayed by some of the countries which were most ready to condemn us.
I do not propose to say any more to the House today about the clearance arrangements for the Canal, or the basis of negotiations for a long-term settlement, because I dealt with those fully in my statement on Monday.
I want to come now, if I may, to the question of Anglo-American relations. The effect of these events upon Anglo-American relations has been much discussed. I do not think that it is profitable to talk in detail about the past. There have been differences of opinion, and I can assure the House that neither country thinks that it is the only one which believes that it has cause for complaint. There have been differences in the past, and I think it would be idle to attempt to disguise that fact. But I believe that what we now have to consider is the future, and upon what basis we can seek to co-operate in the Middle East.

Mrs. Jean Mann: Mrs. Jean Mann (Coatbridge and Airdrie) rose—

Mr. Lloyd: In a speech which I made in New York, to the English-Speaking Union, on 26th November—

Mrs. Mann: Before the right hon. and learned Gentleman goes on, would he explain why he kept it so very quiet from his great friend and ally, "Ike"?

Mr. Lloyd: I am not quite certain of the point of the hon. Lady's intervention. I think that the differences of opinion about action in the Middle East were very well known to many members of the Administration on that side of the Atlantic.
As I say, I do not think it profitable to seek to recriminate—I do not think that that is the right word—to be critical about the past.
What, I think, is much more important, is to see whether we can create an effective basis for working together in the future. I do not believe that an acute


difference necessarily makes it more difficult to associate together in the future. It may do a great deal to clear the air, and make possible closer alliance in the future, but the point is: upon what basis should we seek to co-operate?
In the speech which I made in New York to the English-Speaking Union, on 26th November, I indicated five points as a possible basis for this co-operation in the future. First, the prevention of further hostilities between Israel and the Arab States, and the fullest support of the United Nations Force to that end.
Secondly, the restoration of a permanent system for the Suez Canal, securing the international rights under the 1888 Convention, and in accordance with the six principles unanimously adopted by the Security Council last October.
Thirdly, the procurement of a permanent settlement between Israel and the Arab States which will include a just settlement of the problems of the unfortunate victims of the events of the past eight years—the Arab refugees.
Fourthly, the strengthening of the Bagdad Pact.
Fifthly, the tackling of the economic problems of the area with imagination and foresight so that there may be a steady lifting of the standards of living throughout the area as a whole. That seems to me to be a statement of the objectives upon which co-operation could well be based in the future.
I do not think that a statement reportedly approved personally by the President and by Mr. Dulles, and released by the State Department on the evening of 3rd December, has been adequately noticed in this country, because of the difference in the time of release. That statement, after welcoming the Anglo-French decision announced on Monday, went on to say:
The United States has repeatedly said, during this crisis in the Middle East that the United Nations cannot rightfully or prudently stop merely with maintaining peace Under its Charter it is obligated to deal with the basic sources of international friction and conflicts of interest. Only in this way can it attain the Charter's goal of peace with justice. In keeping with this obligation the United States will continue fully to support the measures required to make the United Nations Force adequate and effective for its mission. In carrying out his plan for this purpose, the Secretary-General can count on the unstinting co-operation of the United States.

As the United Nations Force replaces those of the United Kingdom and France, the clearance of the Canal becomes imperative. Every day of delay in restoring the Canal to normal use is a breach of the 1888 Treaty, and a wrong to the large number of nations throughout the world whose economies depend so heavily on its reliable operation. The United Nations and the interested States should, we believe, promptly direct their attention to the underlying Middle East problems.
The United States Government considers it essential that arrangements be worked out without delay to ensure the operation of the Canal in conformity with the six principles approved by the resolution of the Security Council of 13th October, 1956. The United States is equally determined, through the United Nations and in other useful ways, to assist in bringing about a permanent settlement of the other persistent conflicts which have plagued the Middle East over recent years.
Repeatedly, we have made clear our willingness to contribute for the purpose of bringing stability and a just peace to this area. The present crisis is a challenge to all nations to work to this end.
The House will notice that in the five points which I set forth in my speech to the English-Speaking Union, I mentioned the Bagdad Pact. In addition to the statement that I have just read out, I would remind the House of what the United States Government have said about the Bagdad Pact:
The United States reaffirms its support for the collective efforts of those nations"—
that is, the Bagdad countries—
to maintain their independence. A threat to the territorial integrity or political independence of the members, would be viewed by the United States with the utmost gravity.
It is well known that the view of Her Majesty's Government is that it was a step forward when the United States became a member of the Economic Committee. I think that that pronouncement is perhaps rather more important than some hon. Members who laugh at it may think.

Mr. M. Philips Price: Would the Secretary of State bear in mind that the Government of Iraq have said that they will not come to the Bagdad Pact if we are there? How does the right hon. and learned Gentleman propose to deal with that situation?

Mr. Lloyd: I think that that situation had better be allowed to work itself out. I am disappointed at the hon. Member for Gloucestershire, West (Mr. Philips Price) who, I know, is a very sincere supporter of friendship between us and


the Arab countries and who, I think, will be as anxious as anyone to see that the Bagdad Pact should develop and strengthen. I believe that what the hon. Gentleman has drawn attention to is a purely temporary phase.
I have been in close contact with the member Governments of the Bagdad Pact. I believe that this statement of the United States is of major importance, and I think that better service would have been done to the cause of restoring the situation of friendship between the Arab countries and ourselves if the hon. Gentleman had welcomed what I said without pointing out the other matter.
I believe that the Bagdad Pact will grow in strength with our membership, and, as I was going on to say, I hope that the United States will pass on from its membership of the Economic Committee, beyond its declaration to which I have referred today, to full membership of that Pact.
There is another matter, and that is the question of closer association between the countries of Western Europe. There is, I think, another line of development which becomes clear in consequence of what has happened in the Middle East and in consequence of the present situation in the United Nations. That is the need for a more efficient basis for co-operation between the nations of Western Europe. I believe that this can be achieved without impairing either our association with the Commonwealth or our alliance with the United States, and without creating new institutions. I go at the weekend to the meetings of the Western European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation with those considerations very much in mind.
I maintain—it has been my belief throughout and it is still my conviction—that out of this situation certain definite advantages have been achieved. [Laughter.] I really do not think that right hon. and hon. Members opposite do their country a service in seeking to make out that this whole business has been a disastrous failure, as in the words of their Amendment. I believe that what we did was right. I believe that we stopped a war. I believe—and, for once, an extraordinary fact, hon. Members opposite were almost reduced to silence

—that I proved, by my quotation from the Egyptian Commander-in-Chief, that we stopped the war from spreading in the Middle East.
I believe that we have now given this United Nations Force a task of the greatest responsibility. Those who criticise us so vocally and glibly—

Mr. William Ross: Which side?

Mr. Lloyd: —forget what would have been the consequences of inactivity. They forget completely the dangers which are existent in the area. They forget completely the steady deterioration which was taking place. They forget completely the mounting risk of war between Israel and the Arab States. They shut their eyes to all those things. We have shown in this country our will to act in a situation of crisis, and it is now for us all, I suggest, to bend our energies to see that the United Nations grasps this opportunity.

4.36 p.m.

Mr. Aneurin Bevan: I beg to move, to leave out from "House" to the end of the Question and to add instead thereof:
recognising the disastrous consequences of Her Majesty's Government's policy in the Middle East, calls upon Her Majesty's Government to take all possible steps to restore Commonwealth unity, recreate confidence between our allies and ourselves and strengthen the authority of the United Nations as the only way to achieve a lasting settlement in the Middle East.
The speech to which we have just listened is the last of a long succession that the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has made to the House in the last few months and, if I may be allowed to say so, I congratulate him upon having survived so far. He appears to be in possession of vigorous health, which is obviously not enjoyed by all his colleagues, and he appears also to be exempted from those Freudian lapses which have distinguished the speeches of the Lord Privy Seal, and therefore he has survived so far with complete vigour.
However, I am bound to say that the speech by the right hon. Gentleman today carries the least conviction of all.

Mr. Cyril Osborne: The right hon. Gentleman wrote that before he heard the speech.

Mr. Bevan: I have been looking through the various objectives and reasons that the Government have given to the House of Commons for making war on Egypt, and it really is desirable that when a nation makes war upon another nation it should be quite clear why it does so. It should not keep changing the reasons as time goes on. There is, in fact, no correspondence whatsoever between the reasons given today and the reasons set out by the Prime Minister at the beginning. The reasons have changed all the time. I have got a list of them here, and for the sake of the record I propose to read it. I admit that I found some difficulty in organising a speech with any coherence because of the incoherence of the reasons. They are very varied.
On 30th October, the Prime Minister said that the purpose was, first,
to seek to separate the combatants";
second,
to remove the risk to free passage through the Canal.
The speech we have heard today is the first speech in which that subject has been dropped. Every other statement made on this matter since the beginning has always contained a reference to the future of the Canal as one of Her Majesty's Government's objectives, in fact, as an object of war, to coerce Egypt. Indeed, that is exactly what hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite believed it was all about. [Interruption.] Hon. Members do not do themselves justice. One does not fire in order merely to have a cease-fire. One would have thought that the cease-fire was consequent upon having fired in the first place. It could have been accomplished without starting. The other objective set out on 30th October was
to reduce the risk … to those voyaging through the Canal."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 30th October, 1956; Vol. 558, c. 1347.]
We have heard from the right hon. and learned Gentleman today a statement which I am quite certain all the world will read with astonishment. He has said that when we landed in Port Said there was already every reason to believe that both Egypt and Israel had agreed to cease fire.

The Minister of Defence (Mr. Antony Head): The Minister of Defence (Mr. Antony Head) indicated dissent.

Mr. Bevan: The Minister shakes his head. If he will recollect what his right hon. and learned Friend said, it was that there was still a doubt about the Israeli reply. Are we really now telling this country and the world that all these calamitous consequences have been brought down upon us merely because of a doubt? That is what he said.
Surely, there was no need. We had, of course, done the bombing, but our ships were still going through the Mediterranean. We had not arrived at Port Said. The exertions of the United Nations had already gone far enough to be able to secure from Israel and Egypt a promise to cease fire, and all that remained to be cleared up was an ambiguity about the Israeli reply. In these conditions, and against the background of these events, the invasion of Egypt still continued.
In the history of nations, there is no example of such frivolity. When I have looked at this chronicle of events during the last few days, with every desire in the world to understand it, I just have not been able to understand, and do not yet understand, the mentality of the Government. If the right hon. and learned Gentleman wishes to deny what I have said, I will give him a chance of doing so. If his words remain as they are now, we are telling the nation and the world that, having decided upon the course, we went on with it despite the fact that the objective we had set ourselves had already been achieved, namely, the separation of the combatants.
As to the objective of removing the risk to free passage through the Canal, I must confess that I have been astonished at this also. We sent an ultimatum to Egypt by which we told her that unless she agreed to our landing in Ismailia, Suez and Port Said, we should make war upon her. We knew very well, did we not, that Nasser could not possibly comply? Did we really believe that Nasser was going to give in at once? Is our information from Egypt so bad that we did not know that an ultimatum of that sort was bound to consolidate his position in Egypt and in the whole Arab world?
We knew at that time, on 29th and 30th October, that long before we could have occupied Port Said, Ismailia and


Suez, Nasser would have been in a position to make his riposte. So wonderfully organised was this expedition—which, apparently, has been a miracle of military genius—that long after we had delivered our ultimatum and bombed Port Said, our ships were still ploughing through the Mediterranean, leaving the enemy still in possession of all the main objectives which we said we wanted.
Did we really believe that Nasser was going to wait for us to arrive? He did what anybody would have thought he would do, and if the Government did not think he would do it, on that account alone they ought to resign. He sank ships in the Canal, the wicked man. What did hon. Gentleman opposite expect him to do? The result is that, in fact, the first objective realised was the opposite of the one we set out to achieve; the Canal was blocked, and it is still blocked.
The only other interpretation of the Government's mind is that they expected, for some reason or other, that their ultimatum would bring about disorder in Egypt and the collapse of the Nasser regime. None of us believed that. If hon. Gentleman opposite would only reason about other people as they reason amongst themselves, they would realise that a Government cannot possibly surrender to a threat of that sort and keep any self-respect. We should not, should we? If somebody held a pistol at our heads and said, "You do this or we fire ", should we? Of course not. Why on earth do not hon. Members opposite sometimes believe that other people have the same courage and independence as they themselves possess? Nasser behaved exactly as any reasonable man would expect him to behave.
The other objective was
to reduce the risk … to those voyaging through the Canal.
That was a rhetorical statement, and one does not know what it means. I am sorry the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister is not here. I appreciate why he is not here, but it is very hard to reply to him when he is not in the House, and I hope hon. Members opposite will acquit me of trying to attack him in his absence.
On 31st October, the Prime Minister said that our object was to secure a lasting settlement and to protect our

nationals. What do we think of that? In the meantime, our nationals were living in Egypt while we were murdering Egyptians at Port Said. We left our nationals in Egypt at the mercy of what might have been merciless riots throughout the whole country, with no possibility whatever of our coming to their help. We were still voyaging through the Mediterranean, after having exposed them to risk by our own behaviour. What does the House believe that the country will think when it really comes to understand all this?
On 1st November, we were told the reason was
to stop hostilities
and
prevent a resumption of them."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 1st November, 1956; Vol. 558. c. 1653.]
But hostilities had already been practically stopped. On 3rd November, our objectives became much more ambitious—
to deal with all the outstanding problems in the Middle East."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 3rd November. 1956; Vol 558. c. 1867.]
In the famous book "Madame Bovary" there is a story of a woman who goes from one sin to another, a long story of moral decline. In this case, our ambitions soar the farther away we are from realising them. Our objective was,
to deal with all the outstanding problems in the Middle East.
After having outraged our friends, after having insulted the United States, after having affronted all our friends in the Commonwealth, after having driven the whole of the Arab world into one solid phalanx, at least for the moment, behind Nasser, we were then going to deal with all the outstanding problems in the Middle East.

Mr. Gilbert Longden: As this is going on the record, and as the Prime Minister is not here, I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will be fair enough not deliberately to mislead the House, as I am sure he would not wish to, but the Prime Minister never said that we alone could deal with all the problems of the Middle East. What the Prime Minister said on 1st November was:
We do not seek to impose by force a solution on the Israel-Egypt dispute, or the Suez Canal dispute, or any other dispute in the area."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 1st November, 1956; Vol.558, c. 1653.]


He said that if the United Nations would send forces to relieve us no one would be better pleased than we.

Mr. Bevan: The hon. Gentleman need not worry; I will deal with that quite soon; I am coming to that quite quickly. This is a new alibi. It was only a few weeks ago in this House that hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite sneered at every mention of the United Nations. We will deal with that.
The next objective of which we were told was to ensure, that the Israeli forces withdrew from Egyptian territory. That, I understand, is what we were there for. We went into Egyptian territory in order to establish our moral right to make the Israelis clear out of Egyptian territory. That is a remarkable war aim, is it not? In order that we might get Israel out, we went in. To establish our case before the eyes of the world, Israel being the wicked invader, we, of course, being the nice friend of Egypt, went to protect her from the Israelis, but, unfortunately, we had to bomb the Egyptians first.
On 6th November, the Prime Minister said:
The action we took has been an essential condition for … a United Nations Force to come into the Canal Zone itself."—[OFFICIAI. REPORT. 6th November. 1956; Vol. 559, c. 80.]
That is one of the most remarkable claims of all, and it is one of the main claims made by right hon. and hon. Members opposite. It is, of course, exactly the same claim which might have been made, if they had thought about it in time, by Mussolini and Hitler, that they made war on the world in order to call the United Nations into being. If it were possible for bacteria to argue with each other, they would be able to say that of course their chief justification was the advancement of medical science.
As The Times has pointed out, the arrival of the United Nations Force could not be regarded as a war aim by the Government; it called it, "an inadvertance." That is not my description: it is The Times. It was a by-product of the action not of Her Majesty's Government but of the United Nations itself.
Let me ask hon. Members opposite to listen to this case. The right hon. and learned Gentleman was spending most of his time in America trying to persuade the United States—that is after we were

in Egypt—to make the control of the Canal one of the conditions of our withdrawal. On Thursday last he himself said here:
I mention these facts to the House because, obviously, the build-up of this force must have an important relationship to a phased withdrawal of our own and the French troops. There are, however, other important matters to be considered, such as the speedy clearance of the Canal, and negotiation of a final settlement with regard to the operation of the Canal."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 29th November. 1956; Vol. 561, c. 582.]
On every single occasion—and hon. Members opposite expected this—when he went upstairs to tell his hon. Friends that he had come back empty-handed, what did they say? Why did we start this operation? We started this operation in order to give Nasser a black eye—if we could to overthrow him—but, in any case, to secure control of the Canal.

Viscount Hinchingbrooke: To stop the war.

Mr. Bevan: I have been dealing with that; the hon. Gentleman must catch up.
The United Nations Force was in Egypt as a result of a Resolution of the United Nations for the purposes of the Charter. All along, the United States and all the other nations attached to the United Nations resolutely refused to allow the future of the Canal to be tied up with the existence of the Force. But the right hon. and learned Gentleman, in order to have some trophy to wave in the faces of his hon. Friends, wanted to bring from across the Atlantic an undertaking which would have destroyed the United Nations, because if the United Nations had agreed that the future of the Canal should also be contingent upon the withdrawal of British troops, then the United Nations Force would no longer have been a United Nations Force but an instrument of the rump of the United Nations, that is, the Western Powers.
I put it again to the right hon. and learned Gentleman that if hon. Members opposite had succeeded in what they wanted to do, they would have ruined the United Nations, because the very essence of the United Nations Force is that it is not attempting to impose upon Egypt any settlement of the Canal.

Mr. Anthony Fell: It is a police force.

Mr. Bevan: I hope that hon. Members opposite will realise that the argument is a really serious one. It was seen to be so serious by the United States that, despite what I believe to be the desire on the part of a very large number of Americans to help us in these difficulties, it was clear to President Eisenhower, as it should be clear to anybody, that a settlement of that sort was bound to be resented by the whole of the Arab world and Egypt. It was bound to be resented by the Commonwealth because it would make it appear that Her Majesty's Government were using the United Nations to obtain an objective that we set ourselves as far back as last August. Therefore, if the right hon. and learned Gentleman had succeeded, if the future of the Canal had been tied up with our withdrawal, the United Nations Force in Egypt would no longer have been a police force for the world, but would have been a means of coercing Egypt to accept our terms about the Canal.

Mr. Fell: Surely the right hon. Gentleman would find it very difficult to imagine a United Nations Force that could, in fact, be a successful police force unless under certain circumstances it had the right to infringe—

Mr. Bevan: The hon. Member is not meeting my point. The point that the Government spokesmen are making here and in the country is that they have been responsible for calling the United Nations Force into existence. My answer is that by attaching to the United Nations Force a persistent attempt to secure the future of the Canal in order to satisfy hon. Members opposite they are, in fact, sabotaging the United Nations.

Mr. K. Zilliacus: Is it not a fact that the Government voted against the Security Council Resolution calling the General Assembly and then abstained on the vote creating the United Nations Force?

Mr. Bevan: This, of course, is known to hon. Members in all parts of the House. They may have their own explanations for it, but I was not anxious to add to the burden of my argument. That fact is known. Of course, the Government did not support the United Nations Force—we all know that. Nevertheless, in this retrospective exercise that we are having from the other side of the

House, it is possible for us to deal with the seriousness of the whole case.
The right hon. and learned Gentleman is sufficiently aware of the seriousness of it to start his speech today with collusion. If collusion can be established, the whole fabric of the Government's case falls to the ground, and they know this. It is the most serious of all the charges. It is believed in the United States and it is believed by large numbers of people in Great Britain that we were well aware that Israel was going to make the attack on Egypt. In fact, very few of the activities at the beginning of October are credible except upon the assumption that the French and British Governments knew that something was going to happen in Egypt.
Indeed, the right hon. and learned Gentleman has not been frank with the House. We have asked him over and over again. He has said, "Ah, we did not conspire with France and Israel." We never said that the Government might have conspired. What we said was that they might have known about it. The right hon. and learned Gentleman gave the House the impression that at no time had he ever warned Israel against attacking Egypt. Even today, he hinged the warning we gave to Jordan on the possibility of the other Arab States being involved in any attack on Jordan.
We understand from the right hon. and learned Gentleman that at no time did the Government warn Israel against an attack on Egypt. If we apprehend trouble of these dimensions—we are not dealing with small matters—if we apprehend that the opening phases of a third world war might start or turn upon an attack by Israel on anyone, why did we not make it quite clear to Israel that we would take the same view of an attack on Egypt as we took of an attack on Jordan?
The fact is that all these long telephone conversations and conferences between M. Guy Mollet, M. Pineau and the Prime Minister are intelligible only on the assumption that something was being cooked up. All that was left to do, as far as we knew from the facts at that time, was to pick up negotiations at Geneva about the future of the Canal, as had been arranged by the United Nations. But all the time there was this coming and going between ourselves and the French Government.
Did the French know? It is believed in France that the French knew about the Israeli intention. If the French knew, did they tell the British Government? We would like to know. Did M. Guy Mollet, on 16th October, tell the British Prime Minister that he expected that there was to be an attack on Egypt? Every circumstantial fact that we know points to that conclusion. For instance, Mr. Ben Gurion, the Israeli Prime Minister, had already made it clear in the Knesset on several occasions that Israel regarded Egypt as the real enemy, and not Jordan. Therefore, a warning not to attack Jordan was not relevant. At the same time, many Israelis were saying that at last Israel had got a reliable friend.
What happened? Did Marianne take John Bull to an unknown rendezvous? Did Marianne say to John Bull that there was a forest fire going to start, and did John Bull then say, "We ought to put it out," but Marianne said, "No, let us warm our hands by it. It is a nice fire"? Did Marianne deceive John Bull or seduce him?
Now, of course, we come to the ultimate end. It is at the end of all these discussions that the war aim of the Government now becomes known. Of course, we knew it all the time. We knew where they would land. After this long voyaging, getting almost wrecked several times, they have come to safe harbour. It was a red peril all the time. It was Russia all the time. It was not to save the Canal. The hon. Member who interjected has been deceived all the time. It was not the Canal, it was the red peril which they had unmasked. The Government suspected it before, said the right hon. and learned Gentleman, about the arms to Egypt. We on this side knew it—we did not suspect it—but the right hon. and learned Gentleman suspected it, so he said, at the very time when he was informing the House that he thought there was a proper balance of arms between Egypt and Israel.
What will the Israelis think of this when they read the right hon. and learned Gentleman's words, or are we to understand that the Israelis have got as many arms as the Egyptians have? We understand that they were fully armed all the time, because the right hon. and learned Gentleman suspected that the Egyptians had these arms.
I am not in the least surprised by this situation. That the Russians have provided these arms to the Egyptians we accept—of course they did. It is a curious thing—I may be frivolous, but I am not frightened by it—and I will tell the House why. The Russians have a habit, curiously enough, it seems to me, of not knowing what is happening in other nations. They do not even know what is happening in Poland or Hungary, and it does not seem to have occurred to the Russians that there was no military advantage in providing weapons that the Egyptians could not use.
The fact of the matter is that these great modern weapons are practically useless in the hands of backward nations. [HON. MEMBERS: "There were the volunteers."] But there were no volunteers. Do not, however, let hon. Members push the argument too far. I am not for one moment seeking to justify the Russian supply of arms to Egypt. I think it was a wicked thing to do and I think it is an equally wicked thing for us to supply arms. That area is much too combustible, far too inflammatory. This is now the end of 1956, when very many things have happened in the Middle East, when it is more dangerous than ever. I think that the Russians ought not to have done it and I will say further that I think that Nasser ought not to have invited them.
It seems to me—and here I probably shall carry hon. Members opposite with me—that Nasser has not been behaving in the spirit of the Bandoeng Conference which he joined, because what he did was not to try to reduce the temperature of the cold war: what he did was to exploit it for Egyptian purposes. Therefore, Nasser's hands are not clean by any means. I have said this before. I said it in Trafalgar Square. We must not believe that because the Prime Minister is wrong Nasser is right. That is not the view on this side of the House.
What has deeply offended us is that such wrongs as Nasser has done and such faults as he has have been covered by the bigger blunders of the British Government. That is what vexes us. We are satisfied that the arts of diplomacy would have brought Nasser to where we wanted to get him, which was to agree about the free passage of ships through the Canal, on the civilised ground that a riparian


nation has got no absolute rights over a great waterway like the Canal. That is a principle which has been accepted by India and by America and by most other nations. We have never taken the position that in the exercise of sovereign rights Egypt has the right to inflict a mortal wound upon the commerce of the world.

Mr. Osborne: Will not the right hon. Gentleman agree that six years of patient negotiation had not caused Nasser to allow the passage of Israeli ships?

Mr. Bevan: Do not let hon. Members now bring to the forefront of the argument the fact that Egypt had not been allowing Israeli ships to go through the Canal. If they thought so much of the seriousness of that, why did they not even invite Israel to the conference? It is not good enough to bring these things forward all the time as though they were the main objectives. Of course, we take the view that Egypt should permit the ships of all nations to pass through the Canal, and we hope that that objective will still be insisted upon. We are satisfied that those objectives could have been realised by negotiation. Not only have they not been realised by the action taken by the Government, but the opposite has been realised.
It has been clear to us, and it is now becoming clear to the nation, that for many months past hon. Members opposite have been harbouring designs of this sort. One of the reasons why we could not get a civilised solution of the Cyprus problem was that the Government were harbouring designs to use Cyprus in the Middle East, unilaterally or in conjunction with France. Whenever we put in this House Questions to the right hon. Gentleman asking him why he did not answer whether he wanted a base on Cyprus or Cyprus as a base, he answered quite frankly that we might want to activate the base on Cyprus independently of our allies. That was the answer. Well, we have activated it—and look at us. We have had all these murders and all this terror, we have had all this unfriendship over Cyprus between ourselves and Greece, and we have been held up to derision in all the world merely because we contemplated using Cyprus as a base for going it alone in the Middle East

And we did go it alone. Look at the result.
Was it not obvious to hon. Members opposite that Great Britain could not possibly engage in a major military adventure without involving our N.A.T.O. allies? Was it not very clear, if we did contemplate any adventure at all, that it would have to be in conjunction with them? No. It is a sad and a bitter story. We hope that at least one beneficial byproduct of it will be a settlement of the Cyprus question very soon indeed.
Now I would conclude by saying this. I do not believe that any of us yet—I say any of us yet—have realised the complete change that has taken place in the relationship between nations and between Governments and peoples. These were objectives, I do beg hon. Members to reflect, that were not realisable by the means that we adopted. These civil, social and political objectives in modern society are not attainable by armed force.
Even if we had occupied Egypt by armed force we could not have secured the freedom of passage through the Canal. It is clear that there is such xenophobia, that there is such passion, that there is such bitter feeling against Western imperialism—rightly or wrongly: I am not arguing the merits at the moment—among millions of people that they are not prepared to keep the arteries of European commerce alive and intact if they themselves want to cut them. We could not keep ships going through the Canal. The Canal is too easily sabotaged, if Egypt wants to sabotage it. Why on earth did we imagine that the objectives could be realised in that way in the middle of the twentieth century?

Viscount Hinchingbrooke: Would the right hon. Gentleman apply the same argument to Germany at the end of the last war? It seems to me that the Germans showed great willingness to open the Kiel Canal.

Mr. Bevan: That is not really a parallel at all. The noble Lord does not face the argument. We should be imposing our will upon Egypt against the bitter opposition of the whole population there.

Viscount Hinchingbrooke: Not necessarily.

Mr. Bevan: It is necessarily so. If the noble Lord does not understand that, then he is in the eighteenth and not even the nineteenth century.
Exactly the same thing is true of the Russians in Hungary. The Russians in Hungary are attempting to achieve civil, social and political objectives by tanks and guns, and the Hungarian people are demonstrating that it cannot be done.
The social furniture of modern society is so complicated and fragile that it cannot support the jackboot. We cannot run the processes of modern society by attempting to impose our will upon nations by armed force. If we have not learned that we have learned nothing. Therefore, from our point of view here, whatever may have been the morality of the Government's action—and about that there is no doubt—there is no doubt about its imbecility. There is not the slightest shadow of doubt that we have attempted to use mehods which were bound to destroy the objectives we had, and, of course, this is what we have discovered.
I commend to hon. Members, if they have not seen it, a very fine cartoon in Punch by Illingworth and called "Desert Victory." There we see a black, ominous, sinister background and a pipeline broken, pouring oil into the desert sands. How on earth do hon. Members opposite imagine that hundreds of miles of pipeline can be kept open if the Arabs do not want it to be kept open? It is not enough to say that there are large numbers of Arabs who want the pipeline to be kept open because they live by it.
It has been proved over and over again now in the modern world that men and women are often prepared to put up with material losses for things that they really think worth while. It has been shown in Budapest, and it could be shown in the Middle East. That is why I beg hon. Members to turn their backs on this most ugly chapter and realise that if we are to live in the world and are to be regarded as a decent nation, decent citizens in the world, we have to act up to different standards than the one that we have been following in the last few weeks.
I resent most bitterly this unconcern for the lives of innocent men and women. It may be that the dead in Port Said

are 100, 200 or 300. If it is only one, we had no business to take it. Do hon. Members begin to realise how this is going to revolt the world when it passes into the imagination of men and women everywhere, and in this country, that we, with eight million here in London, the biggest single civilian target in the world, with our crowded island exposed, as no nation in the world is exposed, to the barbarism of modern weapons, we ourselves set the example.
We ourselves conscript our boys and put guns and aeroplanes in their hands and say, "Bomb there." Really, this is so appalling that human language can hardly describe it. And for what? The Government resorted to epic weapons for squalid and trivial ends, and that is why all through this unhappy period Ministers—all of them—have spoken and argued and debated well below their proper form—because they have been synthetic villains. They are not really villains. They have only set off on a villainous course, and they cannot even use the language of villainy.
Therefore, in conclusion, I say that it is no use hon. Members consoling themselves that they have more support in the country than many of them feared they might have. Of course they have support in the country. They have support among many of the unthinking and unreflective who still react to traditional values, who still think that we can solve all these problems in the old ways. Of course they have. Not all the human race has grown to adult state yet. But do not let them take comfort in that thought. The right hon. Member for Woodford (Sir W. Churchill) has warned them before. In the first volume of his Second World War, he writes about the situation before the war and he says this:
Thus an Administration more disastrous than any in our history saw all its errors and shortcomings acclaimed by the nation. There was however a bill to be paid, and it took the new House of Commons nearly ten years to pay it.

Mr. Charles Ian Orr-Ewing: Was not that after appeasement?

Mr. Bevan: No, this was before. In any case, the words are apposite. It will take us very many years to live down what we have done. It will take us many years to pay the price. I know that tomorrow evening hon. and right hon.


Members will probably, as they have done before, give the Government a vote of confidence, but they know in their heart of hearts that it is a vote which the Government do not deserve.

5.25 p.m.

Mr. R. Brooman-White: The right hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan) has made a speech which in skill of debating in the House rates undoubtedly very high. I am glad to follow him because, during the early exchanges in these discussions, and during some of the chronology of events which he recited to the House, I was myself in the Middle East. On reflection, I think the right hon. Gentleman will realise that the language of debate which is so effective in this Chamber sounds very different among the nations and looks very different in relation to the course of events out there when seen from the Middle East.
Before I come to the main burden of what I have to say about the Middle East, I should like to make one or two comments on certain points in the right hon. Gentleman's remarks which I noted while he was speaking. He said that my right hon. Friends on the Front Bench might not be happy with the type of language they have been using. No one would accuse the right hon. Gentleman of being deficient in linguistic abilities. He said that we had been unconcerned about the loss of life, that we had shown a lack of concern about the casualties suffered.

Mr. Bevan: I really was referring to the original decision to send out bombers at all, because one cannot send bombers out without killing people, which seems to me to show a lack of concern for ordinary men and women.

Mr. Brooman-White: I am glad that the right hon. Gentleman bears out that point, to which I wanted to refer. This House has been sitting, perhaps concerned, but utterly impotent, as the United Nations and the world have been siting, during a long category of incidents and a long list of casualties mounting steadily during the weeks, months and years which preceded this episode. The right hon. Gentleman has been in Israel; I do not know whether he has also been in Jordan. He has probably seen the burned villages and the dead, as so many of us have. We heard from the Foreign

Secretary of the casualties in even the most recent border raids—50 here and 40 there. If I had had the time to check the facts before being called so early in the debate, I should have liked to total up the number of casualties along the Arab-Israeli frontiers in the few weeks immediately preceding our operation and compare them with the casualties occasioned at Port Said.
One of the justifications in the long run of our actions will be if, by the casualties regrettably but inevitably incurred in our operations in Port Said, that long, lamentable, melancholy toll of suffering and of loss of life between the Arabs and Israeli States should have at last been brought to a close.
The second point, on which the right hon. Member for Ebbw Vale was perhaps not doing himself full justice was in his reference to the British attitude to the original Israeli incursion. This was possibly, or so one hopes, a last shot fired at a target of collusion which is rapidly vanishing into a mirage. [HON. MEMBERS: "No."] If hon. Members opposite hope to find something more substantial, the right hon. Gentleman's argument is even weaker. He was implying that we had in some sinister way tended to condone or encourage Israeli action against Egypt because we did not speak against it in exactly the same phraseology that we had used in relation to possible action against Jordan.
The right hon. Gentleman should make allowance for the difference of language customary in diplomacy and in the House of Commons. With all his great experience, the right hon. Gentleman has not yet perhaps delved deeply into the affairs of official diplomacy, but no doubt he is doing some homework on it now.

Mr. Bevan: We can all see how wonderfully the experts have been performing on the subject.

Mr. Brooman-White: The right hon. Gentleman cannot ride out of it that way. The implication of his remarks was that we had gone to the Israelis and said, "If you take action against Jordan this will be an unfriendly act against a Power with which we are in treaty relations." That was a perfectly clear point, and we would have been bound to intervene. We then said, "If you take action against Egypt we must urge restraint in that


direction." [Laughter.] The hon. Member for Gorton (Mr. Zilliacus) laughs, but he knows something about diplomacy. Does he or any other hon. Gentleman imagine that this statement, in the phraseology of diplomacy, and relating to a Power with which we are not in treaty relations, and which had itself said that it did not wish to be associated with the Tripartite Declaration, was not about as strong and firm a warning as could be given? It is not usual to say in diplomatic language, "If you go into Egypt we will bang you on the nose." That is not the usual way these things are said, and that is well known to anyone with any experience in these matters.

Mr. Zilliacus: I would have expected that, if we really meant business, the Government would have warned Israel that if she went to war against Egypt we would immediately call for action both through the Tripartite Declaration and through the Security Council, and that we would have joined the representations of the United States President on 27th October instead of maintaining an eloquent silence.

Mr. Brooman-White: It would have been a little difficult to impress the Israelis by saying that we would call for action through the Tripartite Declaration, which the Egyptians had said previously they did not wish to implement. But let us leave that point and take the final point made by the right hon. Gentleman before I make one or two remarks of my own.
In the final stage of his speech the right hon. Gentleman said that it was a deplorable use of our base in Cyprus, and that this really showed that we had no justification for claiming that we should maintain our base there under conditions which gave us freedom of action. I wonder if he would not think about that one again, particularly in relation to our warning over the Jordan Treaty?
If we had not had a base in Cyprus, if we had not had freedom of action, does he imagine that our warning to Israel to hold back on the Jordan frontier and not to go up to the river line—as she could easily have done probably in 24 hours—would have any validity or would have checked the Israelis in winning the obvious strategic advantage which lay easily within their grasp?

Mr. Bevan: If I may answer that point, I think that any future warnings we give will not have any effect at all.

Mr. Brooman-White: That is extremely hypothetical. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] Extremely hypothetical. My point is that the warning we gave to Jordan in substance stopped the Israelis extending the war on that front, which they could easily have done, and which would have scored them a substantial strategic success. Indeed, they had been carrying out reprisal raids, probing deep into Jordan territory during previous weeks, and they must have known from their own staff appreciations how very vulnerable was that territory.

Mr. A. Woodburn: I have been following the argument of the hon. Gentleman, and I would like to clear up a point here. He said that because we were in treaty relations and were going to the assistance of Jordan we gave a strong warning in the case of Jordan but that in the case of Egypt we did not give such a strong warning. Was not that misleading the Egyptians when it became clear in that case that we meant immediately to bomb Egypt to separate the combatants? Did we not mislead them by not warning them what would happen?

Mr. Brooman-White: I think that the Israelis, to whom this statement was made, had little doubt about its full implication.
The right hon. Gentleman today has made a most eloquent speech, but it will be within the recollection of the House that he has made many eloquent speeches which, though in retrospect their verbal pyrotechnics may be equally attractive, perhaps do not seem to contain quite the same content of wisdom and historic perspective as they may have done at the time of delivery. Prior to coming into this debate I was looking back on the debates at the time of the British intervention in Greece in January, 1945. I hope the House will bear with me because I do not think that the parallel is too far-fetched. The right hon. Gentleman was particularly vigorous in castigating the Government of that day for the intervention. He said:
We are now starting wars of intervention in Europe by the British Tories."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 19th January, 1945; Vol. 407, c. 574.]


And he made great play with what he called a "ridiculous piece of Churchillian rubbish", in suggesting that the Communist forces in Greece might move into Athens and might carry out considerable slaughter. The subsequent course of events in Eastern Europe, leading up to the appalling events of recent dates, shows up that story in a very different light.

Mr. Bevan: But the hon. Gentleman is telescoping a whole period of history. The fact is that at that time the result of our intervention in Greece was completely to destroy the central and Liberal parties in Greece which might have governed. I am prepared to stand by that. Afterwards, as the hon. Gentleman knows very well, most of the assistance given to the Communists in Greece came from Yugoslavia.

Mr. Brooman-White: I think that the right hon. Gentleman would have greater difficulty in explaining that in Athens than in the House of Commons.

Mr. A. J. Irvine: Will the hon. Gentleman allow me to mention a fact on that point? I was in Athens at the time of the 1944–45 civil war. I observed the circumstances that the Greek Liberals, the Greek central forces and the Greek Socialists were welcoming British arms with great enthusiasm because they believed that they were at the commencement of a period in which they could develop democratic and liberal institutions, and the intervention of British force at this stage did more to put power and force into Communism in Greece than anything else that could be devised.

Mr. Brooman-White: I do not want to be drawn into a long discussion on that, but I will make a final point upon it. Everybody who has knowledge of Greece will realise that the outcome of that event was a stable democratic Government in Greece which has existed until now, and that other countries where we did not intervene or were not in a position to intervene, such as Czechoslovakia, and now Hungary, are in a very sorry state. Even at that time the right hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan) was castigating General Plastiras in terms almost equal to those more recently used by the

hon. Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman), and in referring to General Nuries-Said, and perhaps equally ill justified.
I believe the corollary in Greece was that our intervention prevented a Communist victory there and the collapse of democracy in that part of South-East Europe. Other hon. Gentlemen may take a different view. However, after having taken that initial action and accepted the responsibility, and after having suffered casualties, we then struggled to stabilise the position. By degrees, the United States took over a great part of the burden, and it was necessary that that should happen, because the economic strain of supporting Greece was too great for this country. The inevitable development of history led the United States to commit itself fully in that area, and Greece has greatly benefited thereby. That is why I say that I do not think the parallel, apart from debating points, with circumstances in the Middle East today is too far drawn.
There is one general argument that I want to put to the House about the Opposition's case in relation to the Middle East situation. The Opposition castigates the Government and points out various contradictions, or apparent contradictions, in statements by our Government and makes references to paragraphs and sub-paragraphs of United Nations Resolutions and so on. All that seems terribly unreal when one is in the Middle East. What the Opposition never shows is any serious appreciation of what would have happened if we had done nothing. What do hon. Gentlemen opposite really assume would have happened?

Mr. Stokes: The Canal would still be open.

Mr. Brooman-White: That is hypothetical. Very much worse things than the blocking of the Canal might have occurred. It seems to me that certain things would almost inevitably have happened. The Israeli Army would have advanced victoriously a very long way, how far we do not know, perhaps only to the Canal but perhaps beyond it. Indeed, the rate of the advance makes a certain amount of nonsense of the constant previous badgering of the Government by the Opposition about giving more arms to Israel to restore the balance. The


Israelis walloped the Egyptian Army in little over 48 hours, in spite of all the aid the Egyptians had in the way of Russian arms.
It was, incidentally, perhaps a little disingenuous of the right hon. Member for Ebbw Vale to state that the Egyptians had been equipped with a lot of Soviet arms which they could not possibly use. The corollary to that must be sufficiently obvious. Surely the Russians sent such arms with the intention of following up with personnel who could use them in Egypt, or with instructors who could teach the Egyptians how to use them.
If the Israeli Army had continued advancing victoriously and routing the Egyptians, do hon. Gentlemen opposite believe that the other Arab States—quite apart from what the Egyptians themselves have said about it, as quoted by my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary—would have held back? They may not have wanted to intervene—I am certain that many of them would not have wished to do so—but anybody who has any contact with the feeling of the mobs, the tribes, the younger army officers and all the people who go to make up such public opinion as there is in the Arab States will realise that the pressure on the Governments of these States to intervene would have become irresistible. It seems to me inevitable that at any rate before long that the other Arab States would have been drawn in. They might not have been very successful. The Jordanians, if they had tried to intervene, would probably have taken an equal walloping with the Egyptians.
But what would have happened then? Where would the Arabs have gone for help? Where could they have gone, except to the people ready to offer them help, as it was offered to the Egyptians, and perhaps ready to thrust help upon them, in certain circumstances into perhaps not too willing hands? Syria is a case in point.
Hon. Gentlemen opposite cannot say that if we had done nothing, or if we had gone to the United Nations and it had followed its usual course of passing resolutions in the way it has passed them quite vainly about Hungary, border incidents and the earlier blockading of the Canal and so on, there would not have been very widespread violence in the Middle East with the virtual certainty of

Soviet intervention. Can any hon. Gentleman opposite argue that any other course of events was likely?

Dr. Barnett Stross: Has the hon. Gentleman taken into consideration how long Colonel Nasser would have lasted before he was deposed by his own people if we and the French had not intervened?

Mr. Brooman-White: Even if Nasser had been deposed, would he have been succeeded by a Government prepared to come to unconditional surrender terms with the Israelis and to reject the Russian aid which was being offered? That is extremely unlikely. Maybe Nasser would have been shot, but there are plenty of people in most Middle Eastern capitals who would like to take office if they could shoot up the people already filling the offices, and they quite frequently manage it.

Hon. Members: Like hon. Gentlemen on the Government benches.

Mr. Brooman-White: Hon. Gentlemen opposite have had certain experience in such matters, quite a long experience.
Even if none of these circumstances had occurred, and even if the Israelis had not attacked, anyone who has bean in the Middle East during the last year or two must be conscious of the degree to which our position has been undermined, and anyone who has been there recently must be conscious of the acceleration of the trend of events against us. There is, for instance, the Cairo propaganda. Nothing is more frightening than to find Bedouin goatskin tents out in the desert fitted with little sticks from which wire runs inside to wireless sets from which the poison is dripping.
With regard to education, British advisers in the Arab States along the Gulf and elsewhere face an appalling dilemma, on which I am sure they have been taking the right decision. If one advised the Governments against a too rapid educational advance, it would be bad. If one advises them in favour of a rapid educational advance, and to use the oil revenues freely for that purpose, as our people have been doing, one does so in the full knowledge that 80–90 per cent of the teachers will be Palestinian Arabs and Egyptians, each with a propaganda brief aimed deliberately at the objective


of seeing us off, even if nothing worse, such as seeing the Soviets in.
All who have seen those areas know also the extraordinary political confusions and tensions created by the vast injection of wealth from oil, which has suddenly changed the whole pattern of life, attracting people into industrial centres. This means shanty towns. It means Bedouins leaving the discipline and traditions of their tribal life and living in shacks made of odds and ends of boards, bits of petrol tins and a goatskin or two, in shanty towns around the cities. Instead of being disciplined tribesmen living in a primitive but dignified society under their chiefs, these Bedouins are becoming highly inflammable city mobs. All these things are bound to be unsettling.
We are all conscious of the fact that the interests of the Western world in those areas are peace, stability and progress, and it is clear that, with the development of those areas, the inevitable tensions and changes were pulling rapidly towards instability, lack of cohesion and lack of peace. It is all very well for hon. Members opposite to talk about economic aid as though economic aid were the immediate solution. It is not. It is the long-term solution, but an immediate acceleration of the economic tempo automatically increases the sociological and political tensions. Hon. Gentlemen opposite tend too often to see these people as though they were in our own image. They talk as though, for instance, a little more education in the Gulf States would rapidly produce something like the atmosphere of a Fabian debating society in Welwyn Garden City. It may not be sufficiently recognised that many of these people are not yet mildly interested in social security; they would really prefer to have a few more cartridges.
That was the situation in the area, and it was becoming increasingly difficult. Because the natural tendency was in many places towards disruption rather than consolidation, with our limited resources we were finding it a desperately uphill battle. The natural run of events tended to benefit the people who benefit by disruption, the Soviet Union. And it was almost impossible to see how we could reverse this course of events while the Arab-Israeli tension persisted.
There has been jeering in the House when people said that this situation was a challenge to the United Nations, but that is true. It is a challenge to the United Nations. For better or worse, this action has projected the whole weight of the Western world into that area. Whether it will make a go of it, we do not know, but the fate of the Western world will depend on the outcome. Some people have laughed at the United Nations Force, the "bluebells," and perhaps they would look more satisfying if they had a few white helmets of the American forces—"snowdrops"—among them. But the great thing is that a United Nations force is there.
The United Nations has been called on to meet this desperate problem of the Arab-Israel dispute. The future depends very largely on whether the Israelis will be exalted by victory to become more intransigent, or may have gained assurance and so be prepared to make concessions; or whether the Arabs will be chastened by defeat into some greater realism, or made more bitter and more vindictive.
This is the problem Britain has been trying to solve. Although technically we gave up responsibility for it with the Palestine mandate, in practice we have continued to bear it with limited resources and beyond the limit of our resources. We were unable to carry it further. That led us to the tragic action which we have had to take. Nobody has liked the action. One can criticise the method or the timing and many aspects of its execution, but it cannot be maintained, as many Opposition speakers have tried to maintain, that it would have been all right if we had not acted, or that there would have been immeasurable benefit if we had pulled out almost as soon as we had gone in, without getting the best conditions and getting the United Nations involved.
I hope that we can treat at least some of the discussion not as a searching back into the records at the end of a phase, because this is not the end of a phase, but the beginning of an enormous struggle in which the stakes are the whole future of the Middle East and the bulk of the fuel reserves of the industrial West. Either the West or the Soviet Union will come out the winner. This was bound to happen sooner or later. The Government's action has precipitated it.


I most profoundly believe that the House of Commons should direct itself towards doing everything that lies within its power to see that the final outcome is in the interests of the Middle Eastern States, the British Commonwealth and the West as a whole.

Mr. Hugh Dalton: We are holding today and tomorrow a Parliamentary inquest into the misdeeds of Ministers, which have, indeed, been many and grievous. Many deserve the epithet of "unforgiveable". Among the most unforgiveable misdeeds of Ministers in recent months has been their treatment of their fellows in the Commonwealth. That must not be passed by in silence today.
Is "unforgiveable" too harsh a word? I desire to get on to the record of our proceedings part of a letter written by a great Conservative historian, Professor Keith Feiling, the official historian of the Conservative Party, the sympathetic biographer of Neville Chamberlain, an Oxford historian of eminence, who has also seen service in several parts of the Commonwealth overseas. In a letter to The Times, published on 6th November, he said:
Ministers have acted as though the Commonwealth were negligible. They have brushed aside its doubts and taken life and death decisions without consultation. Most unforgiveable of all, to my mind … has been their treatment of Canada and India. Canada, oldest and most wisely governed of Dominions, our link with America, whose measureless sacrifices for us in two world wars gained our lasting gratitude, has been excluded from vital consultations, and had her counsels rejected until they were forced upon us by world opinion.
India,… our bridge to the millions of Asia, with a fund of good will that to the other day was not exhausted,… has been cold-shouldered … and her reasonable proffers of mediation cast aside.… It does not seem beyond the bounds of historical accuracy to describe such a Commonwealth policy as short-sighted, ungrateful, and politically imbecile.
I trust that someone who will speak later will not dodge an answer to the historical mentor of their party.
It has been a sorry story. After all, at the end of it all, the Government have not brought down Nasser. That, I think, in the mind of the Prime Minister—he made little secret of it—was one of

the purposes of the whole exercise. But they have not brought down Nasser. On the contrary, he has been allowed to win a great political victory in New York which will obscure his great military defeat in Sinai. It has not been clever.
I wonder whether the hon. Member for Rutherglen (Mr. Brooman-White), who touched on this matter, appreciates that. I do not want to pursue it at length. Has it ever crossed the minds of Ministers, during these last weeks, that perhaps it might have been better to leave Nasser to the Israelis? They were doing very well.
At the pace they were travelling, in the last week before our intervention, they would have been at the Canal, occupying the whole of the eastern bank effectively, in another 24 hours. They might perhaps have crossed it, and I estimate that before long there would have been such a state of panic in Cairo that Colonel Nasser, one way or another, dead or alive, would have vanished in a dust storm of defeat. That is my guess.
If the Prime Minister thought that Nasser was the great obstacle to harmony and good will in that area, at least the Prime Minister's immediate objective might have been fulfilled without our needing to intervene. I will come in a moment to the point to which the hon. Member for Rutherglen referred, a very important point, about what the other Arab States might have done.

The Joint Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. David Ormsby-Gore): Does the right hon. Gentleman think that that policy would have caused more casualties, or fewer casualties?

Mr. Dalton: It would have caused no British casualties at all. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] I am answering the question. It would have caused no British casualties at all. Is that a matter of indifference to hon. Members opposite? It would also have caused no civilian casualties in Port Said. [HON. MEMBERS: "Why?"] Hon. Members opposite seem to be unwilling to face one or two very commonsense observations. My argument is that it might well have been advisable, if Britain had laid off and allowed the Israelis to finish the job which they had begun.

Mr. John Harvey: I am much obliged to the right hon. Gentleman for giving way. That would have been one half of my question. His advocacy did not seem to show the same concern for Egyptian civil life as has been shown by his Front Bench. He has skated over the fact that Nasser's own chief of staff has made it quite clear that Syria and Jordan would have come into this thing but for the action that we took.

Mr. Dalton: I will come to that. I have already promised to do so, in response to what was said by the hon. Member for Rutherglen. To my answer about casualties, I do not think that the hon. Member for Walthamstow, East (Mr. J. Harvey) has much of a "come-back".
The hon. Member for Rutherglen referred a good deal to the Israelis, and I wish to do so for a few moments in order to try to get the background of the Israeli relationship to this matter filled in a little better than it has been up to now in our discussions, which have extended over many weeks. I am able to speak more freely about this because I am not a Jew. But I am a very warm admirer of the achievements of the State of Israel. In this I am in the main stream of thought and sympathy of the British Labour Party, which has always been very friendly to the State of Israel, as the resolutions passed at its annual conferences have frequently demonstrated.
I know that I am also speaking in sympathy with many persons in this country, not necessarily Jewish and not necessarily members of the Labour Party. It is a very fine thing that has been done out there in that little country, barely the size of Wales, with fewer than 2 million people, many of them recently brought in as refugees and exiles from many lands all over the world. They have done a very fine job with very sparse natural resources and, although this is not an argument which will carry weight, except with my right hon. and hon. Friends, I would add that one reason why many of us feel very warmly towards them, is that they have been able to do this largely because they have set up as near an approach to a democratic Socialist State as can be found anywhere in the world today. For these reasons we look upon their achievements with admiration, and we look to their future with confidence and with a desire that

they shall prosper in this difficult Middle Eastern world.
Lawyers may argue this way and that, but, facing all the facts and going back over the eight years during which Israel has been a State, and taking account of all the things done against her and threatened against her, I find it difficult to say that in this latest phase of the affair Israel is a wicked aggressor and Egypt an innocent victim of aggression. I will not argue that at length, but in this last miserable month or more about the only act performed by Ministers with which I find myself in agreement was their refusal to accept a declaration by the Security Council that Israel was the aggressor. That is the one good mark I can give them through all this. I think it is desirable that this view should be expressed. We must not let the lawyers get away with it too easily.
Among other achievements, this little country of Israel has created a very efficient defence force. It is remarkable that, in spite of the loud declarations of the Arab League, in spite of the creation, at any rate on paper, of a joint military command under an Egyptian general—including the armed forces of Saudi Arabia together with those of Syria and Jordan—when the fighting began not one Arab State moved to the assistance of Egypt. During the five days when the Israelis swept the Egyptians out of Sinai not one Arab soldier on any other frontier fired a shot in support of Egypt. It may be that prudence prevailed over valour.
If the Israeli campaign had been carried to its further stages, and had resulted—as, I believe, it quickly would have done—in the collapse of Nasser through counter-movements in Cairo, I do not believe that, having lost an admirable opportunity to intervene earlier, the Arab States would then have rushed forward to the aid of the vanquished.

Mr. Eric Johnson: The right hon. Gentleman knows that I agree with much of what he has been saying, but does he think that the Soviet Union would have stood aside and let her Egyptian satellite be overwhelmed by the Israelis?

Mr. Dalton: That very nearly happened, whether or not they stood


aside. It was a little too late for effective Soviet intervention to prevent that. I think too well of the Israeli Army for that.
Behind all these events there is the threat of a third world war, and it must be our aim to seek a final settlement of the Middle East so that this horror is warded off from mankind. When we study the warmongering and bloodthirsty public public declarations made by Nasser for a long time past I cannot be astonished that at a certain moment, after he had been saying for years that he was perpetually in a state of war with Israel—and that was the excuse he put forward for not allowing Israeli ships to pass through the Canal and, more impudent still, not allowing them to go up the Gulf of Aqaba—the Israelis said, "We have had enough of this. We will take him at his word." They took Nasser at his word, and his reaction was undistinguished and inglorious.
I have tried to balance the disposal of praise and blame in this affair and I hope that out of it, now that the bubble of Egyptian military might has been pricked—no one can believe any more the balderdash about the new Egypt which has grown up; the Egyptians fought no better under Nasser than they fought under Farouk—we may obtain a certain reorientation of judgments in that part of the world. Nobody will now take very seriously the notion that Nasser will be another Alexander the Great in the Arab World and will unite all Arabs from the Atlantic to the Persian Gulf. I hope that his reputation has now been properly chalked down. My regret is that the Government have given him so much help of another kind in the United Nations.
I move forward from that to the prospects for the future. It is very evident that the Middle East continues to fester. I am not one of those who think that recent decisive events in the military field will necessarily make matters worse in the near future. Perhaps, for the reasons I have given, they may get better, because certain things will be more clearly understood. But, looking forward, it is essential that we should try to get a wide-ranging settlement of the whole of these economic and political differences. It will not be got, I am quite sure, by going back—as did the Prime Minister, in that most

unhappy Guildhall speech—to totally outworn and outmoded and inappropriate Resolutions passed by the United Nations eight years ago, the application of which now would mean tearing away from Israel one-third of her present territory.
I doubt whether the leaders of Israel today will be more in the mood, after their military triumphs, to listen to that sort of basis for future peace than, quite reasonably, they have been in the past. It appears to me that we must be prepared to accept—subject to minor modifications of the frontiers on which both sides agree, and which would be reasonable, because the Israeli frontiers are still only armistice lines—that subject to these agreed minor adjustments, the present frontiers of Israel shall be accepted and adopted as part of any future settlement.
This leads me to say a word about the Gaza Strip. I hope that it will be agreed that the Egyptians should not go back into the Gaza Strip. They have no right there. It never was Egyptian territory; it was part of Palestine, and they grabbed it in 1948. They have no business there. Before it was part of Palestine it was, of course, part of Turkey. I hope that there will be no question of the Egyptians being permitted to go back into the Gaza Strip. They have played a most evil part in their relations with those unhappy refugees. They have used them for evil purposes, for murder gangs and disturbers of the peace, and it is high time that this opportunity was taken from them.
I think the possibility of it becoming a United Nations base is worthy of sympathetic consideration. There is much to be said for it being administered by some of those detached, neutral-minded people, some of whom are serving now in the United Nations Force; and it would be an interesting first experiment which might later be taken a good deal further.
There is much to be said for the proposal which was mentioned by the hon. Member for Hendon, North (Mr. C. I. Orr-Ewing) at Question Time yesterday, and which has also been advocated by the Economist, namely, that we might consider the possibility of having a whole strip of United Nations territory running between the Egyptian and the Israeli frontiers through the Sinai region; possibly even running along the other frontiers with Syria and Jordan also, although that would be a larger affair.


I think that all these ideas should be studied with sympathy. They are imaginative projects for the geographical future of that part of the world.
But we should also demilitarise the rest of Sinai. The evidence of the necessity for that is clear from the wonderful haul of weapons which the Israelis have got—and they will know how to use them. I am glad that they have got them. I think that in future the Russians will not send out these complicated machines without people to work them—and that is a very serious thought for the future. Lloyd George—the great Lloyd George—once made the unkind remark, when it was proposed that a certain State should have a new frontier within which there were rich industrial resources, that this would be like giving a clock to a monkey—and the Russians will see the sense of that now.
The Egyptians must not be allowed to re-accumulate in Sinai—behind a relatively narrow strip which might be flown over or shot over in the event of trouble—masses of weapons of war, or to create bases such as the Israelis recently discovered. In my view, Sinai should be demilitarised. How much further we can get in that part of the world in making frontier changes, I do not know. But we must seek to get a plan by which these unhappy Arab refugees may be resettled. There is no room for them in Israel, that is clear. Their place has been taken by other refugees, by Jewish refugees, in a large measure from Arab lands, and we cannot keep turning people round and round.
The great difference is that whereas, in Israel, they have to fight with their backs to the sea, because they have nowhere to retreat, in the Arab lands there are vast desert territories which could be fertilised, irrigated and settled if only the will to do it were there. The greatest indictment of all against the Egyptians is that they have exploited these unhappy people and done everything to prevent plans for their settlement through the United Nations and the American dollars which were available at one stage for that purpose. They have kept these people in a state of misery and destitution, feeding on false hopes and hatred of their neighbours. In any future settlement we must absorb

the Arab refugees back into a settled life in the wide areas of the Arab lands where water could make the land blossom like the rose.
In the great schemes which are now to be worked out for the future, if we are to avoid continuing strife and a third world war, and deal with the dangers which overhang the world, I say frankly I do not believe that the discredited occupants of the Government Front Bench can do it. I speak with complete sincerity and conviction when I say that. So much has gone so wrong so lately. There is the hard fact that the Commonwealth was nearly split wide open, brought, as Mr. Lester Pearson said, to the verge of dissolution; never, as was said by Mr. St. Laurent, subjected to such strains before; and all by the conduct of Her Majesty's present Government. Can we really hope that these Ministers, who have done so ill, can change their whole nature and be the framers of this new world policy? I say, "No". If this work is to be done—as I hope, in the interests of our country and the world, it will be done—we need new men on that Front Bench to make the great world settlement which we await.

6.18 p.m.

Captain Charles Waterhouse: The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bishop Auckland (Mr. Dalton) has said some things with which I definitely agree. For example, I share his opinion of Colonel Nasser. To a very large extent, I share in the interesting remarks he made about the possibilities in Sinai. In fact, I made them myself. If the right hon. Gentleman cares to look back at the record he will find that about six weeks ago I pointed out that the Sinai Peninsula had never properly been part of Egypt at all; that it would be well worth considering that the whole of that territory might be put under some international control and thus form a barrier between Egypt and Israel.
I did not much like the remarks of the right hon. Gentleman about leaving Nasser to Israel. That seemed to accord ill with the high humanitarian principles expounded by his right hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan). The right hon. Gentleman said it in an acid tone; let dog eat dog, what does it


matter what happens to them? I do not think that that is really to the advantage of that part of the world. I do not agree with his general argument that because not a single Arab soldier moved, either in Jordan or Syria, during the initial stage, none would have moved at all if things had been otherwise and we had allowed Nasser to be dealt with by Israel. The right hon. Gentleman must remember that during these critical five days other things were happening, that there were the British and French forces sailing towards Port Said, which made everybody very cautious for the time being.
The right hon. Gentleman said, too, that the British Labour Party always feels deep friendship for the Jews. The Jews must have been extremely grateful for the friendship which they have had from right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite during these last most critical weeks as well as during eight or ten years while, as he said, they have been struggling for their existence. It is all very well for the right hon. Gentleman to say this now, when everything is over. It is all very well for him to say, "Ah, but these are fine people, these poor people. Let us support them." Why did not he support them when they were in trouble? I will tell him why, if he does not know. It was because if he had supported them then he would have had to support us now and he was more determined to down Her Majesty's Government than to uphold his Jewish friends.
I turn to another and less congenial part of my remarks. I had better tell the House straight away, if it is interested to know it, that I regret to find myself still out of sympathy with the policy of Her Majesty's Government in Middle Eastern affairs. No one realises better than I do the value of party unity. I have not spent almost all my working life fighting for the Conservative Party, and fighting a series of General Elections, one with an Election petition, without fully understanding the meaning of the word "loyalty."
Therefore, in taking a line contrary to that of the Government Front Bench I fully realise the responsibility which rests upon me. It is my intention to abstain from voting in the Division tomorrow. I intend to abstain because it seems to me to be the clearest and most

emphatic way, within our Parliamentary system, of showing my disagreement with this particular aspect of the Government's policy. I admit that it is a clumsy way and I say straight away that if I thought that by my abstention there was any chance of putting the party opposite in power, I should no more think of abstaining than I should think of singing a song instead of making a speech in this House.
I attribute such faults as I believe I see in the Government's policy here to the fact that they have in certain degrees followed on, continued, the policy of right hon. Gentlemen opposite. In so far as I disagree with my right hon. and hon. Friends, it is because they appear to me to have agreed with what was done before. I make it absolutely clear, too, that my complaint is not primarily against what has happened this autumn. I definitely welcomed the action taken at the beginning of last month by Her Majesty's Government. In that action they had my complete support. I thought that the Prime Minister's statement at that time, that he was going in to separate the belligerents and to guarantee freedom of transport through the Canal by ships of all nations, was an action which was justified by the inner spirit of the Charter, although it was not perhaps justified by the actual words. I support Her Majesty's Government in that.
My protest is against the grave errors of the preceding years which, in my view, encouraged Nasser to seize the Canal and, therefore, directly led to our present distress. When in opposition my right hon. Friends took a strong line. They objected to the holding up of the Israeli ships in the Canal. It was said that a gunboat ought to be sent to let them through. That was a fairly drastic remark. Still in opposition they objected strenuously to the surrender of Abadan. I am not blaming my right hon. Friends for not reversing those two policies when they came back to office, because there are many actions which, to be effective, must be taken immediately.
What I say is that the same tendencies which lay behind those two actions seemed to me to continue in the further handling of the Middle Eastern problem. Shortly after we signed our Treaty with


Nasser, in 1954—and I am not discussing the merits of that Treaty at all—Nasser started a vigorous anti-British and anti-French propaganda throughout the whole of the area. In my opinion, Her Majesty's Government took no effective steps to counteract that propaganda.
One of the reasons for the signing of that Treaty was that it would enable the setting up of a strategic reserve, in part here and in part in the Middle East, which could be used with decision and effect and which would not be tied down, as it was then said, in the defence of this rambling base which straggled from Port Said to Port Suez. Nothing was done at all when the base was dismantled and the troops withdrawn. No strategic force was set up anywhere, as far as any of us know or can see. What is more, no real effort was seen to be made to reorganise our system of defence by conventional arms.
No Ministers have been changed so often as have the Ministers of Defence. There are two or three former Ministers of Defence on the Front Bench at this moment. They sail in and out so quickly that one wonders why they were put there. One wonders whether this most important Ministry was just being used to find Cabinet posts for most desirable right hon. Gentlemen to occupy.
I understand that the Service Departments—that is to say, the Service Ministers, the Secretary of State for War, the First Lord of the Admiralty and the Secretary of State for Air—are no longer responsible for strategic planning, but that planning is in the hands of the Minister of Defence. I should like to know whether that is true. If it is true it would explain why, in fact, no plan was made. It may be that Ministers were moving on so fast—and planning is not easy, I am not pretending that—that no Minister really had time to get down to the essentials of strategic or even tactical planning.
The fact remains that when this crisis came we had no plan, no ships, no aeroplanes and no men available in sufficient quantities to hit quickly. If we had been able to hit quickly on those first days of Nasser's aggression in seizing the Canal, we would have had a very different picture today both there and here, because do not forget that at that time the right

hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition was on our side.

Hon. Members: No.

Captain Waterhouse: Twelve months—or perhaps eighteen months—ago, Nasser announced his intention of getting arms from the Russians and the Russian satellites. Surely that was a sufficiently clear red light for everybody to see. Nobody could imagine that the Russians would supply Nasser with arms because they loved him, or because they happened to have them lying about. They were obviously supplying arms to Nasser with a purpose.
I want to state this very clearly. I strongly object to the fact that Her Majesty's Government took no exception at all to this build-up of a great mass of Russian arms in Egypt. Rather the contrary. They fished out Sir Brian Robertson from his railway and asked him to go there on a courtesy visit to see these Russian arms paraded through the streets. That burnt hard into my soul. I raised the question in the House at the time. It has been a thing that I have never been able to explain to myself satisfactorily.
The Egyptians were said to be going to have two destroyers from one of the Iron Curtain countries. A Question was asked. I think it was in June, of my right hon. Friend Mr. Nutting, who was then Minister of State for Foreign Affairs. He said that he did not know. He was not able to tell us whether or not those gunboats had arrived in Egyptian waters or ports. That, again, shook me very much indeed. If Nasser was really a danger, as we knew he was and we know he will continue to be until we debunk him, we ought to have been able to know the rate of the entry of arms into his country.
Even after the dismissal of General Glubb what steps, I should like to ask, were taken to alert friendly countries? What steps were then taken to go to our friends in the Commonwealth and in Europe and to say to them, "We are alarmed by what is happening. We do not like this influx of arms into this hostile country "? I believe that if we had done that we should have had a sympathetic hearing, and we would probably have had a very different reception when this trouble blew up and we


had to go for support to, what we found to be, a hostile United Nations. Surely, everything then pointed to what we now know to be the fact, that Egypt was being used to accommodate a vast Communist build-up in a part of the world on which Communist Russia has always cast a jealous eye.
Now what is the position? Nasser's Army has twice, in a short while, been completely routed by the Israelis. British soldiers, sailors and airmen have carried out a difficult operation bravely and skilfully, and, despite everything that has been said, mercifully. That has to be emphasised by all of us. These soldiers were obliged to place themselves in jeopardy in order to carry out this operation with very few civilian casualties. I strongly deprecate the sort of attack which was made at Question Time today.

Mr. John Strachey: The attack made by my right hon. Friends at Question Time was specifically on the policy of the Government and specifically paid tribute to the action of our Armed Forces for their conduct.

Captain Waterhouse: It did not appear so to me. It appeared to me that hon. Gentleman, and some right hon. Gentlemen, too, were doing what they could to give the impression that Egyptian civilian casualties were very heavy. They were pressing my right hon. and learned Friend, trying to trap him into an admission that he did not give sufficient facts about the matter.
What a tragedy that in this hour of effort and of triumph—not triumph in the military sense but of definite achievement—just at that moment, we had such a very poor response from our friends, our erstwhile friends, in the United States. We have lost face in the Middle East—we have to admit it—by failing to enforce our will and to fulfil our clearly expressed intentions, but I submit that the United States Government have lost face and prestige throughout the whole world by their vicious attacks upon this country and France and by their alignment with our Communist enemies. I believe that this needs to be said. It ought to be clearly understood in the United States that those of us who, throughout, have looked to them as our brothers-in-arms—rather tardily in arms on certain occasions—are deeply disappointed and hurt by the fact

that they appear wilfully to have misunderstood our position at that particular moment.
Communist Russia, if we can believe the news that is coming out of Communist Russia, is in very great difficulty at home. There may be possibilities of a major crack, possibly the break up of a part of the Communist State. What a tragedy it is that just at this moment this cleavage has been made by the United States—

Mr. B. T. Parkin: They will not let us off the interest if the right hon. and gallant Gentleman talks like that.

Captain Waterhouse: —and has given the Russians an encouragement which they do not deserve.

Lieut.-Colonel Marcus Lipton: We shall have to pay the interest now.

Captain Waterhouse: That is a different matter. If we could have been victorious we could have paid the interest and paid it gladly.
The Foreign Secretary has said, and I agree with him, that some definite advantages have been gained, I know full well that all the account is not on one side, principally that the action taken has prevented the spread of hostilities throughout the Middle East. That, certainly, is a big advantage in justification of this action, but unhappily, the threat of hostilities still remains in Syria.
My conclusion is that though something has been done, something has been attained, the progress of events during the last four years has been so unfortunate, and the mistakes made so definite and so glaring, that I cannot support Her Majesty's Government in the Division Lobby tomorrow evening.

6.38 p.m.

Mr. J. Grimond: I do not think that anyone in the House doubts the courage or the consistency of the right hon. and gallant Member for Leicester, South-East (Captain Waterhouse), but I must confess I was a little disappointed that he did not tell us in more detail what he and his hon. Friends really want the Government to do in this matter.


The right hon. and gallant Gentleman developed a case against the Government's military planning and their Middle Eastern policy over the last few years. I do not think that we have time now to go into all this, but I take it that the right hon. and learned Member and his hon. Friends are disappointed that we did not go right down the Canal, and possibly into Cairo. When he said that if we had been victorious we would have paid the loan he must have meant victorious against the Egyptians. Surely that is to hark back to a policy which has been long abandoned.
We surely know now that we cannot possibly reoccupy Egypt, but I do not see what, short of that, the right hon. and gallant Gentleman would have recommended to the Government. Once that had been firmly condemned by the great majority of the United Nations, once hostilities had ceased between Egypt and Israel, the only remaining one of the many reasons which the Government gave for going into the war was clearly at an end. I would, however, like to take up one or two points made by the right hon. and gallant Gentleman, and deal with them in the course of my speech.
The Foreign Secretary again told us tonight, and told us quite distinctly, that on 26th October the Government knew that there was mobilisation in Israel. This was not an unseen event; on the contrary, it had been pointed out again and again that there was a danger of war between Israel and Egypt. When this had been put to the Government they, in their turn, told us again and again that they relied on the Tripartite Declaration. There was no gloss put on this to the effect that the Egyptians or the Israelis must accept it.
Further, it was put to the Government that Communist arms were pouring into Egypt, and they said that they were aware of that but they were not frightened of it. Now we know that in four days, between 26th and 30th October, the Government took no steps to consult the other guarantors under the Tripartite Declaration, nor did they consult with the Commonwealth. It is not a question of suggesting that they should have done nothing. They had their own policy, which they had explained to the House under the Tripartite Declaration,

but they made no effort whatever to put it into operation.
The Government told us, in fact, that, in their view, a very dangerous Russian conspiracy was building up in Egypt. The first thing I should like to ask is: is it their case that they did not know about those Communist arms? A great many details appeared in The Times. Apart from that, one would have thought that their intelligence service in Egypt would have kept them informed about this building up of Egyptian forces. If it is their case that they intervened purely because they foresaw the start of a third world war that makes it all the more extraordinary that they took no step at all to consult with the United States or any of our allies in N.A.T.O., or under the Tripartite Declaration. It seems to me quite incredible to think that they had knowledge of this dangerous conspiracy—presumably they would have knowledge if our intelligence service was doing its job—and did not consult.
It has appeared in public that, apparently, they did not even inform or consult our Ambassador in Cairo. Is that true? I do not know, but it has appeared that he did not know about the ultimatum until it was given. Is it conceivable that we were really taking action to stop what might have amounted to a third world war and did not have consultations with our senior representatives in the area, or give them notice about our fears and what we intended to do?
I have some reservations about what the Russians were trying to do there. It is quite true, as the right hon. and gallant Member for Leicester, South-East said, that we had known for a long time that they were putting in arms, but it is well to remind ourselves that they were getting cotton against those arms deliveries. There might have been a commercial element in it, apart from stirring up trouble. We had been told that things had been getting better between the West and Russia and that the dangers of a third world war were receding. Have we an intelligence service or not? If it is true that this conspiracy was building up, we were successfully misled by the Russians when the cold war appeared to be getting less acute.
I do not know whether hon. Members have read a rather light-hearted but, I


think, quite interesting article by "Stryx" in the Spectator, in which he refers to the difficulty of the Russians mounting a massive attack in Egypt. It seems to me that, like many other European nations, they have been selling a lot of arms to Middle Eastern countries, partly to create trouble, but also to improve their commercial and other interests. We sold the Egyptians a lot of Valentine tanks. I had the painful experience of operating Valentine tanks and I know that unless there were volunteers of a particularly ripe vintage sent to drive those tanks they were not the slightest use. Either ourselves or the Belgians sold them.
I regret that a lot of this debate has been an attempt, as I see it, to justify the course of events which very few hon. Members feel would have turned out well. Certainly, the right hon. and gallant Member for Leicester, South-East—and, for various reasons, most hon. Members—feel that a new start has to be made in British foreign policy, and the sooner it is made the better. We did not gather from the speech of the Foreign Secretary what everyone I meet believes—I may be wrong—that our interests and prestige are at a new low ebb and that in this country we are facing an obviously extremely serious economic situation which can be met and survived only by a united effort, a united effort in which the Government must play not an apologetic part, as no one expects to apologise, but perhaps a rather more tactful part than they have played up to now in this debate.
I should like to say a few words about what I think now follows from the forward-looking part of the statement of the Foreign Secretary last Monday. I should say, first, particularly to the right hon. and gallant Member for Leicester, South-East, that I do not think we can job backwards to what would have happened if we had not left the Canal, or if we had had a better Defence Minister, and so on. The fact is that, for better or worse, for a great many purposes we are committed to the United Nations. The right hon. and gallant Member admitted that.
What I think we must realise is that there are certain tasks which it is fair to ask the United Nations to discharge and which it may be able to discharge, but there are other tasks which it is not fair to ask it to discharge. Even those which it is fair to put upon the United

Nations it can only discharge if it has the wholehearted co-operation not only of ourselves but of a united Western bloc, including the European countries and the Commonwealth.
I do not mean that we should press our nationalistic views at the United Nations, but we have a point of view to put to the United Nations. We are not only entitled as Europeans, but have an obligation, to give a lead. One task which the United Nations will have to tackle is a settlement of the future of the Canal. We have been told by the Foreign Secretary that negotiations are to start again on the six points adopted by the Security Council on 13th October. I agree; I think it must start from there, but it will be remembered that that Resolution did not provide a clear basis for the settlement of the Canal. It spoke about the Canal Company, respecting the sovereignty of Egypt, and that the operation of the Canal should be isolated from the politics of any country and disputes over its operation go to arbitration.
I believe it is now clear that if there is to be any confidence in the future of the Canal there has to be an international body, other than the Canal Company, which will co-operate with the Egyptians over the running of the Canal. We particularly, and most of the Western world, must face the fact that if the Egyptians were hostile before they will be doubly and trebly hostile now. The sooner we agree on a policy with the other people who use the Canal and are likely to be dependent on it the better. Such a policy must allow for Egyptian sovereignty—for the Canal is in Egyptian territory—but there must also be an international body to guarantee free passage through the Canal, particularly to the Israelis.
The United Nations has ordered everyone behind the armistice lines. The Israelis are far from being behind the armistice lines; on the contrary, I understand that they are not far from the Canal. I do not think that anything has been said about settling of the frontiers once they have withdrawn. The right hon. Member for Bishop Auckland (Mr. Dalton) quite rightly said that it was desirable that the United Nations should promptly occupy the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula. It may be that Egypt


should be given some payment for the Peninsula which should become an international area, but we shall delude ourselves if we think that the United Nations has accepted anything like that. It has not considered the matter and, unless with our friends we can get together, it will not consider this matter.
Further, and this follows on the question of frontiers, it is absolutely essential to make a start with the resettlement of the refugees. It has been said that some refugees could be settled eventually in Sinai itself. I believe that if a sufficiently attractive proposal were made, a few could be sent to Iraq. Once we have started a trickle of refugees away from the camps, we might find it much easier to get the rest away. But I find nothing in the United Nations Resolution which suggests that the United Nations is giving any attention to this problem. Of course, the United Nations set up U.N.W.R.A. and took responsibility for feeding and looking after the refugees, but there has been no discussion in the Commonwealth countries, in European countries, or at the United Nations itself, on a practical proposal for settling these refugees.
Next I come to the trouble which is reported in Syria. I think that the reports ought to be treated with some caution; few come from Syria itself, most from Iraq. If there is a serious Communist penetration in Syria, is not this, again, a case in which the United Nations should be asked if it might send observers to the Syria-Iraq and Syria-Turkey frontiers, and, for once, step in before trouble blows up?
I believe that those are the main tasks which can be placed fairly directly and immediately on the United Nations—but only if it is given a lead by the European countries and the Commonwealth. Inevitably, there are in the United Nations many countries, such as the South American countries, who are deeply disinterested in the Middle East and fairly disinterested in the Suez Canal. It is not sufficient for people in this country to say that the United Nations is on trial, the implication being that we shall sit back and see what happens.
There is the further point of the position of the United Nations Force. From reading the Resolution of 15th November,

it appears clear that the Force is there to supervise the cessation of hostilities. The Resolution referred to the establishment of the United Nations Command and the international Force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities in accordance with the terms of the Resolution of the General Assembly of 2nd November.
The Foreign Secretary has rightly pointed out that other things are mentioned in that Resolution of 2nd November, such as the settlement of the area and free passage through the Canal, but T think he will agree that the United Nations Force has gone to the Middle East to primarily supervise the truce or restore peace and that it has not gone there—I regret this—to supervise the settling of the Israeli frontiers or the settling of the refugees or the future of the Canal. I imagine that the Force will soon move to the frontiers of Israel and leave the Canal. I do not know whether I am right, but that seems to be in accordance with the Resolution. It is in the interest of the free world as a whole that the United Nations Force should remain in the area until these longer-term settlements have been made, but I do not think that that is clear as the matter stands at present.
I turn now to some tasks which I do not think can be laid directly on the United Nations. The first, surely, is the defence and stabilisation of some of the countries in the Middle East. There. I think, the main burden falls upon us and the Americans, with the help of the European nations and the Commonwealth. Here, like other hon. Members, I should like to say a word about our relations with the Americans. I must say, much as I like him, that I thought the speech of the First Lord of the Admiralty was deplorable. We know, of course, that he is what would be described, in the words of his American mother, as a "crazy, mixed-up kid," but fond of him as we are, this may not be widely appreciated in America. For him to make such a speech and then, four days later, for the Chancellor of the Exchequer to come to the House and state that we are to ask the Americans to let us off the interest on the American Loan is not only ludicrous but degrading.
It is no good blaming everything in the Middle East on the Americans. Of course, they have made mistakes. The


fundamental mistake which we, and they, made perhaps was in the setting up of Israel and the Arab States; to the Arab States in their present forms—that is where the whole difficulty arose. But it is not only in places where the Americans have had influence that trouble has arisen. The Americans have done nothing in Jordan. We have made a complete hash of Jordan all of our own, without any American assistance whatever. Nor have the Americans widely interfered in Syria.
Where, I believe, there is genuine disagreement between this country and America is over the way in which we should treat backward countries in which we have big trading operations. We take the view that if we upset the form of society of those countries by the development of oil, for example, we must take some responsibility for it and guide them into the sort of new life which they have to lead. As I understand, the Americans do not take that view; they regard that view as colonialism and they believe that we must not interfere, even with the best intentions, in the government of those countries, but should simply pay them their oil royalties, or whatever it is, and leave them to develop according to their own devices.
Some accommodation must be reached between those points of view. Personally, I believe that the truth is nearer to our point of view than to the American point of view, but there is a clear disagreement between the two points of view which ought to be settled.
The most important country to us now in the Arab world is almost certainly Iraq. I do not believe that she is threatened by immediate Russian aggression. I cannot think why Russia should want to invade the Middle East to try to conquer these countries. The Russians must know how difficult the Arabs are to rule. Nor do they want the Middle East oil for themselves, although they may well want to create trouble there and to deny us the oil. They are much more likely to work on nationalism and discontent.
Our business, I believe, is to give a guarantee against agression through the Bagdad Pact. It must be through the Bagdad Pact, I think, and not through the United Nations. Further, and much more important, we should try to reestablish general Western influence and

prestige in the Middle Eastern counties. It seems to me that the first things we must do is to work on this, again with our European and American friends, because there is no doubt that at the moment we ourselves are to a large extent bound to be discredited.
We want a line of propaganda—propaganda is very important—which will show to these people the dangers of Communism and will try to persuade the Arabs that the Egyptians are not Arabs and that Nasser is not their friend. Are we doing that? Have we a powerful propaganda machine working in the Middle East? Of course not. Everybody knows that we have not. But surely it is the first essential to have a solid, effective propaganda machine for the West, to send our best men to the embassies and other British institutions in the Middle East, and to persuade other European nations to do the same.
It is also of great importance that we should persuade the Americans to tide Iraq over her economic difficulties. Presumably, we cannot do this ourselves. The Iraqis will obviously be very much in difficulty as a result of the cutting of the oil pipeline through Syria, and it would be disastrous to this country if there were a revolution or its equivalent in Iraq at the present time.
Like other hon. Members, I do not believe that our status in the Middle East will ultimately depend either upon our particular cleverness or upon force. I am sure that the right hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan) is right; in the modern age it is simply not possible to march about places with large armies, enforcing the British point of view. I believe that the Arabs are still anxious to have Western help, to trade with the West and to model their institutions on the West, if they are given a chance.
I do not know whether we can start on such a programme at present. As I have said, I believe that our position throughout the world, particularly in the Middle East, has been made extremely difficult. All hon. Members know it to be difficult. Whether, before we can start a new programme, some changes will have to be made in the Government here is not for me to say, but I do not believe that time is on our side, and I very much agree at least with the sentiments of the right hon. and gallant Member for


Leicester, South-East, that what is essential now is to have a consistent policy, a policy which will stand up to the shocks which it will meet, a policy in which other nations in the world have confidence.
That is what has gone wrong. We kept on saying things like, "The basis of our policy is the Tripartite Declaration and the Bagdad Pact". The Prime Minister himself used to come to the House and tell us that Nasser's Government was the best Government we could get in Egypt. We all know that he hoped that Nasser would be a friend of this country. It all fell to pieces and collapsed—and it collapsed because no one had any confidence in it. I am very much afraid that the same thing may happen if we all begin paying lip service to the United Nations. Do Ministers really believe in it, or not?
The United Nations on its own has no more blood in it than had the Tripartite Declaration. It is for the Western world, for ourselves, for Europe and for the Commonwealth to put our own house in order and then to put some life and reality into international institutions.

6.59 p.m.

Mr. F. M. Bennett: In this House we have all grown used to hearing moderate and sensible speeches from the hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr. Grimond), and I do not intend to follow him at any length, except to add, perhaps, this gentle word of criticism. Although there was much with which one could agree in what he said, his speech, in general, portrayed the view taken through rosy-tinted spectacles that makes it all sound so easy and which, inevitably, comes to someone representing a party—and I do not say this unkindly—which has had no recent experience and which has no immediate or foreseeable prospect of bearing the responsibilities in the Middle East which has borne so hardly on both the major parties since the war.
Listening to all the debates that have taken place since the Israeli-Egyptian war broke out, one is left with not the slightest doubt that one principal feature of criticism from hon. Members opposite has run throughout them all. That, I could sum up in this way. In attacking various aspects of Her Majesty's Government's policy, there has been throughout a complete ignoring of what might have

happened if, in fact, the action taken by the Government had not been taken. It is always very easy when a Government that is faced with two appalling dilemmas makes a choice which subsequently does not turn out exactly as was hoped to attack and kick holes in the policy adopted, ignoring absolutely what might have happened if no action had been taken.
It is most difficult to surmise accurately what would have happened, but, attacked and criticised as they have been recently, if the Government had taken no action and had left things to the United Nations—as many sincere as well as insincere persons have advocated—can anyone put his hand on his heart and say that things would be better today? Can hon. Members be sure that things would be better—absolutely sure that Iraq, Jordan, Syria and Saudi Arabia would not have crossed the frontiers, as at one time seemed likely, and have thus started a wholesale conflagration in the Middle East?

Mr. Michael Stewart: When the hon. Member uses such phrases as, "if things had been left to the United Nations," it shows how completely he fails to realise what was required of the Government. It was not that they should have left things to the United Nations, but that they should constructively have used their membership of the United Nations instead of deliberately frustrating it by the use of the veto and then using that frustration as an excuse for single-handed aggression.

Mr. Bennett: When I said "leave it to the United Nations," I did not mean to suggest that we should just sit back and leave it to the United Nations and take no part in the proceedings, but rigorously to have followed it and done everything we could, as in the case of Hungary. But, though we did make use of all the possibilities open to us in the United Nations, how has it helped the men, women and children butchered in Hungary?

Mr. Arthur Lewis: Why the difference?

Mr. Bennett: The hon. Member spends much more time on his feet than do I or many other hon. Members. I have no intention of giving way; he should seek an opportunity to speak and cease muttering.
What has also been shown by many hon. Members of the party opposite has been a total misinterpretation of our aims. They have then gone on to say that these alleged aims of the Government have not been achieved. But it is the oldest political game in the world to set up Aunt Sallies and then to knock them down. Allegation after allegation has been made that it was our intention in landing our forces to drive Nasser out of the country, to bring him down in ruins and so on. Not one speech opposite has been able to quote one of our Front Bench spokesmen as evidence to show that those were the Government's aims and, on that assumption, to show that we have not succeeded in achieving them.
So far as the record goes—and that is all that anyone speaking in this House ought to go by—our first aim was to stop the war before it spread. I do not think anyone can deny that our action did bring an end to hostilities. For that I have the authority of no less a person than the Leader of the Opposition, who admitted that we had, in fact, brought about a cease-fire—although it is true that he added the rather odd word that we had done it "prematurely." We have not since had an explanation of the use of that word.
A second aim was to stop the war from spreading. A question which I asked my right hon. and learned Friend the Foreign Secretary on Monday has been mentioned several times in this debate. I should have thought that the best evidence in support of our assertion that our action did stop the war from spreading is the broadcast from Cairo on Sunday by the Egyptian War Minister. In that broadcast he said, directly and unequivocally, that the troops of Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia were mobilised and ready to cross the frontiers when the British and French threatened action stopped them in their tracks. Whatever else may be said of the Egyptian Minister of War and of the Cairo broadcast, no one could say that he is a "stooge" of the Tory Party. That was a direct Cairo broadcast and, I should have thought, the best possible evidence.
Our other two aims were to safeguard the Canal and to produce a general settlement in the Middle East. I frankly admit, of course, that as yet neither aim has been achieved. I do not pretend that

either has. In response to pressure from many countries of the world—which themselves have not borne the responsibility—and from hon. Members opposite, we have now handed over those two outstanding jobs to the United Nations in what my right hon. and learned Friend admitted was an act of faith.
In all humility, I would say that the time to decide whether or not that was the right policy is when we have seen whether or not the United Nations is capable of implementing that act of faith. Hon. Members in all parts of the House may be singing far too loudly if they think that by that act of faith our essential economic and strategic interests have already been secured. The act of faith is on our side. Before we crow too loudly, let us see if the United Nations is capable of carrying out the responsibility which we have put on its shoulders.
One other aspect of these debates has borne particularly hardly on me. In the criticism we have had in this country and from all over the world—and we know that there has been a volume of it—there has doubtless been much that was sincere, but I must confess that I believe that a great deal of the criticism we have had both abroad and at home has been overhung by a really distasteful mantle of hypocrisy. Much as I value our relations with our great Atlantic ally and with our friends in the Commonwealth, I could not stand here now and allow to go unportrayed these examples of hypocrisy which have been evident in the attacks made upon us in the last month.
I take, first of all, our friends in the United States of America. I should like to point out that, in contradistinction to many critics, I do not believe that the Administration in the U.S.A. has been at all interpreting the popular will of a very large section of the American public. Hon. Gentlemen opposite ought particularly to have taken note yesterday morning of a report, published in the Daily Telegraph, of a communiqué issued by the combined trade union organisations of A.F.L. and C.I.O.—including the American For Democratic Action organisation—which could not be said to represent any pro-Conservative element in the United States. The communiqué came out openly in support of British


action, saying that those bodies understood that action and the reasons that had impelled it.
Therefore, in criticising the U.S.A.—and I speak here as I hope a proved personal friend of that country—one should be careful to admit at once that one's attacks are not directed towards the country as a whole, but that one is saying that the Administration has not been living up to the standards of fairness of a great number of the people in that country. I have had many letters from people over there bearing out what I have said. But, honestly, when I remember what the Americans did in Guatemala—when I was fool enough in this House loyally to defend their action because they were our allies and I thought that friendship came before other considerations—and then I think of their donning a white sheet and talking sanctimoniously about interference in other people's national concerns, I feel nearly sick.
When I remember too that, at the same time as the President, dealing with our action in Suez, made this unequivocal and solemn renunciation of the use of force in all circumstances in the settlement of international disputes, orders are still in being to the 7th Fleet in the Formosa Straits to open fire at once if trouble starts—without reference to the United Nations—I feel even more sick.
Then we come back to Korea. I know that owing to the Soviet Union walking out from the Security Council the Western world got the Security Council to vote in favour of what we did in Korea. But does anybody believe that if the Soviet Union had been there and had used the veto the United States would have turned her ships round and would have called away her troops? If we believe that, we are simpletons. The party opposite was in power in those days and, although I was not in the House then, I certainly supported the Government's attitude to Korea.
Does anybody really believe that if the Soviet Union had applied the veto the United States would not have gone ahead with her intervention? Are hon. Members opposite saying—I ask the right hon. Member for Grimsby (Mr. Younger)—that Earl Attlee would not have taken this country into Korea because a Russian veto alone had gone against intervention?

Mr. Kenneth Younger: I am being asked about an entirely hypothetical situation. I would merely say that the hon. Member will be aware that because we appreciated after the event what a very difficult question that was likely to prove if anything were to happen again, we did sponsor the alternative procedure. It was argued at the time when this alternative procedure of taking matters to the Assembly was devised that, in fact, it was no more than a declaration of what was implicit in the Charter. My own view is that we would undoubtedly have gone to the Assembly, and had there been a very large majority, as I am sure there would have been, we would have regarded it as a moral authority. But the exact analogy no longer applies in modern circumstances.

Mr. Bennett: I admit that the situation was hypothetical, although it is not as hypothetical as all that. The right hon. Gentleman was in office at the time. The plain question was: If the veto had been applied at that time, would we have gone ahead? I am not blaming anybody who says that we would, because I think everybody would have supported such an attitude. In those days the new two-thirds General Assembly arrangement did not exist, and therefore it would have had to be done despite the Security Council.

Mr. Younger: I hoped I had made myself clear. When we were putting through the uniting for peace Resolution, which made abundantly clear what alternative procedure could be followed, one of the arguments was that this was something already implicit which only required to be made clear as a warning to aggressors.

Mr. Bennett: This is an extremely interesting point, but it does not get away from the act that at the time that those circumstances existed everybody in this House would have done exactly what I said and would have backed up the United States in her action in Korea.
I have mentioned three examples of the United States Administration hypocrisy. Now I must say a word about one of our Commonwealth countries which has been most virulent in its attacks on us—India.

Mr. William Hamilton: Canada.

Mr. Bennett: Some have appeared in white sheets, some more entitled to do so than others, but I am mentioning only those whose sheets are not white. In this case India is certainly high on the list. Let hon. Members recall what happened in Hyderabad. I do not remember that case being taken to the United Nations. An armoured division walked into a sovereign country before anything could be done. If India did anything different than our Government have done, it was that she acted more quickly. Also there is the small State of Junagadh which opted to join Pakistan. There was no reference either to the United Nations in that case.
Then again there was Kashmir. I have gone to the trouble to ascertain that there are no less than six United Nations Resolutions outstanding at the moment calling for Indian co-operation in holding a plebiscite and all of them have been constantly disregarded. No country has the right to attack us in the United Nations with the virulence which has been used by the Indians when they themselves stand in default of no less than half a dozen United Nations Resolutions.
What about the Indian attitude in the United Nations with reference to Hungary? On one occasion they actually went in with the Soviet bloc to vote against a Resolution, largely sponsored by other Asian nations, openly condemning Russian action in Hungary. This morning, too, I read in The Times a report of a speech by Mr. Nehru in which he referred to the fact that during the long negotiations connected with the passage of resolutions before the United Nations General Assembly he regarded as a triumph of his statesmanship the fact that he had succeeded in keeping the question of Hungary in the background and preventing the United Nations from harping on that because he thought it was more important to deal with Egypt. I wonder how much pleasure that expression of preventing harping on Hungary brings to the relatives of those people who have been butchered, imprisoned and deported in that country.
Even if my country has done something which is not in accordance with the highest moral precepts—and I am not arguing that case here today—I say that I am not prepared as an Englishman in

this House to listen to other people attacking us unless they are able to do so with cleaner hands than some countries which I have mentioned.
Now I should like to turn to the subject of hypocrisy at home. Before the war broke out in the Middle East in November, we had during the Recess a constant stream of attack from certain hon. Members opposite about our "sabre rattling" arising from our having taken certain military precautions. Is that really fair in view of what the Labour Party did at the time of Abadan? I can remember the right hon. Member for Lewisham, South (Mr. H. Morrison), when he was Foreign Secretary, taking steps which earned commendation everywhere when he sent forces to the Middle East. I do not remember hon. Members on these benches trying to make party political capital at that time. [An HON. MEMBER: "The hon. Gentleman was not here."] It is no use saying that because one is not in this House one cannot read HANSARD.

Mr. Philips Price: Is it not a fact that hon. Members opposite accused us of scuttling because we did not occupy Abadan and try to work the oilfields?

Mr. Bennett: Exactly my point. I said that when the party opposite were for once trying to pursue, with the aid of the right hon. Member for Lewisham, South, a strong policy, they had support from hon. Members on these benches. That is the parallel which has to be taken into account.

Mr. Younger: The hon. Gentleman may quote things which he may or may not have read in HANSARD, but is he not aware that the preparations were made specifically in order, if necessary—which did not prove to be the case—to take off British personnel, and this was made clear in the speech of my right hon. Friend and also in the statement issued by the Labour Party about three weeks later?

Mr. Bennett: When the right hon. Member for Lewisham, South came to this House at the beginning of the crisis, he said that he did not blame Her Majesty's Government for taking the military precautions which we had taken. If the right hon. Gentleman is trying to make the point that there was no resort


to force at that time, I would say that there was no effective protection of British property and that we lost the Abadan refineries. We did not get them back until this party came into power. The activities of the party opposite turned out to be an absolute failure.
There was another way, I think, in which hypocrisy has reached a nadir in the words of hon. Members opposite. It was particularly noticeable in the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bishop Auckland (Mr. Dalton), with much of which I agree when it dealt with an analysis of the degrees of aggression between Israel and the Arab States; but I did not hear one word of condemnation for the action of Israel either in going into the Sinai Peninsula in the first place or in staying in now in defiance of the Resolution of the United Nations.
When it is alleged against us, as it is in this House, that we are very wrong because we have disregarded or delayed obeying the Resolutions of the United Nations, why is not the same standard applied to Israel? I notice all along that pressure by those opposite is put upon these benches, alleging that it is Britain and France who ought to get out, but there is singularly little pressure directed at Israel to tell the Israelis to get out. Yet there ought logically to be the same insistence that Israel should go.
I do not blame hon. Gentlemen for not urging this but if it is logical that Britain and France should get out because they have been condemned by the United Nations, the same should apply to Israel. If we have been condemned as aggressors, so has Israel; and when it came to voting at the United Nations, Israel was in the small minority which voted with us against the rest. If we are guilty of all these crimes in the eyes of the United Nations, so is Israel, up to the hilt. It would be much more honest if certain hon. Gentlemen opposite took up that point in their speeches instead of wasting so much of their venom on their own country.

Mr. Frederick Lee: Government, not country.

Mr. Bennett: The Government and great majority of the country. [An HON. MEMBER: "The hon. Gentleman should ask the country ".] It is not for me to

arrange for a General Election; that is not a responsibility for me to assert. Actually, if there were a General Election, I should probably not be affected, because I happen to sit in such a seat which it would take a very major reverse to lose; so I personally am not seriously worried about the prospects of a General Election; so I have no personal axe to grind in what I say.
As to the future, many people have tried to make constructive suggestions in their speeches, and I will try to end on that note today. One of the long-term features which will come out of this operation, the benefit of which will be seen in years to come but not at the moment, is this. It may receive some condemnation in the House, but we should surely have all come to realise that there are distinct limitations, more than we had realised, to the value to this country in the American Alliance and what we have thought it brings.
I do not for a moment mean that I do not believe that America will live up to its absolute word in N.A.T.O. or the Atlantic Alliance. That is one thing; I know she will do it there because it suits her interest that she should support us in the Atlantic. But from this moment, let us get over the old conception that because we have some cousins, because we speak the same language, and every now and again someone comes to this country whose grandfather was born at Stratford-on-Avon, that because there are all those charming social and cultural links, we can depend on America to spring to our side all over the world. That may be a very valuable lesson for us to learn. It will operate both ways. If we are to have this sort of patchwork partnership when the alliance works in one section of the world but not in another, then we too must look to our own interests.
That is particularly so in the Far East. I am not saying what line we ought to take over Red China or Formosa or trading with that country or that country's admission to the United Nations. That is not my purpose, and were I to develop the matter I should probably be out of order. But those things should henceforth be considered in relation to the interests of this country and not an alliance which is so clearly limited at present in its geographical context by United States design.
What follows from what I have said? First of all, we have seen the very great value of what I call the loyal members of the Commonwealth. I am anxious not to be invidious as regards particular members of the Commonwealth, but let us remember that at a time when we were cursed and vilified throughout the world, Australia and New Zealand have stood by us, rightly as we think, wrongly as hon. Gentlemen opposite think. Pakistan too has played a particularly gallant part in view of her difficulties and her Muslem population, and is doing so in the Middle East at the present time.
As regards Canada, although we did not agree with what she did at a certain time, I do not think anybody here would be so foolish as not to believe that Canada played a very difficult rôle in working with us and with the United States. Nobody could be foolish enough to condemn Canada as non-loyal, because she has shown an astonishing loyalty in difficult circumstances, particularly difficult economic and political circumstances vis-à-vis the United States and ourselves.
Let us remember henceforth what the real values of the Commonwealth are and just how far they do extend—the values of standing by ones own friends even when they have their backs to the wall. Moreover, we should bear in mind the very helpful part which has been and is being played by certain Western European countries during these days. Again, at a time when we were being vilified, the actions of Belgium and Holland, quite apart from France, have been extremely gallant towards us, and such things do for me strengthen the case in a cause which I have always advanced and in which I have believed, namely, that of a Western Europe much more united than we find it today. I hope one of the long term lessons we shall all learn from these events is the value of strengthening our ties with free Europe, not that it shall interfere with our partnership with the United States, but that, as a much stronger entity together than we are separately, we shall then be able to make our voice heard with much more reality as a partner and not as a subordinate member.
Finally, may I make some small practical suggestions? The suggestion has been made that we should have a United Nations zone in the Sinai Desert from

Aquaba to the Gaza Strip. I endorse that recommendation that we should, in some way, establish an international zone there. I should like also to consider what the possibilities are of building a pipeline through to the Mediterranean there so that, if despite all attempts by the United Nations or anyone else the Canal should ever again be thrown into jeopardy, there is an alternative method by which oil can be rushed to this country other than the route round the Cape.
There is a pipeline under construction, I believe, which I would suggest this Government should consider most seriously, namely that from the Northern Iraq oifields through Turkey straight through to the Mediterranean. Let us remember that one of our most gallant friends is Iraq, who has, despite all that has been said, played her part very well with us in face of obvious great difficulties. We should make certain that the actions of Egypt or anyone else in the Canal Zone do not reduce her to poverty: there should be this other means of getting her oil through to Turkey, reliable Turkey—and to the Mediterranean so that it is kept flowing in the event of future interruption of the Canal.
We should not start now merely talking about building bigger tankers, because talk will not build tankers. My one fear is that if the Canal gets cleared reasonably quickly, as we all must hope it will, we shall tend to go to sleep on this project and let it go by until another interruption comes upon us, when we shall be too late. Let us take more definite action about tankers now, just in case the United Nations does not do all that we expect it to do.
The other lesson which we must learn is that we must realise the limitations of the United Nations. All hon. Members have expressed themselves on this point. Some of them think that our claim to have instilled some life and force into the United Nations is wrong. I do not think one can take very seriously that rather stupid Opposition analogy about the burglar claiming to be responsible for the police force. If hon. Gentlemen will look into the history of the police force, they will find that it came into being because householders were being forced when there were no police to take the law into their own hands. That is


really a much closer analogy with what we have had to do in the world as it is today.
The United Nations, with its little force which it has sent to the Middle East, has very serious limitations. I believe it would be folly for this country to rely too much upon it for safeguarding our interests today. There is the example of Hungary, which we all have very much in our minds at this time. Not long ago the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Derby, South (Mr. P. Noel-Baker) said, when several hon. Members from this side were casting doubts on his assertion that the United Nations was quite capable of bringing about a settlement in the Middle East:
If they had not"—
that is, if the aggressors had not obeyed—
what would have been the next step under the Charter? It is all laid down. We should have withdrawn our ambassadors. [Laughter.] Hon. Members laugh, but the departure of all the ambassadors from Tel Aviv would have been no laughing matter to the Israelis. If that had not made them stop, we could, under the Charter, have cut all sea, rail, air, postal and telegraphic communications. If that had not brought results, we could have imposed a blockade. Is there any hon. Member opposite who really believes that the Israelis are so mad that they would have resisted the whole United Nations imposing a blockade? That could have been followed by a naval demonstration."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 31st October, 1956; Vol. 558. c. 1565.]
I close by asking this question. What help do hon. Gentlemen really think would be brought to the people of Hungary at this moment by a naval demonstration or cutting off air, sea and rail communications?

7.30 p.m.

Mr. Frederick Lee: The issues contained in this broad subject matter are certainly very wide. I should not have thought that the hon. Member for Torquay (Mr. Bennett), speaking from the Government back benches today, would have chosen the theme of hypocrisy as being the most suitable. As he was proceeding with his indictment of the members of the Commonwealth, I could not help thinking that before he concluded we might have had a change of time from Mr. Lester Pearson's statement that the Commonwealth was on the verge of dissolution. Although he made very belated apologies to some members of the Commonwealth, it was a very deplorable indictment of people who had stood by

us through thick and thin, through two World Wars, through depressions and in a way that none of us really had the right to expect.
The hon. Member was not doing the Chancellor of the Exchequer's case very much good either at a time when he is suggesting that the United States might agree to a waiver of interest rates. The complete paradox that we see in the conduct of hon. Members opposite now makes us wonder whether, even if the Government are determined to try to carry on, they will not in a short time disintegrate and leave the nation without a Government at all.
One of the outstanding pronouncements we have heard tonight has been the death knell of the Suez Group. We had a speech from the right hon. and gallant Member for Leicester, South-East (Captain Waterhouse), who announced that tomorrow he will abstain—he will not support the Government—and the reason he gave is that he is fairly certain that in doing so he will not bring down the Government. It follows, of course, that had the Government pursued this policy in the last Parliament when they had a very small majority the right hon. and gallant Gentleman would have had to stomach the Government's policy no matter what his principles might be because otherwise he would have brought down the Government. Therefore, he places himself in the dilemma that the Government having now a large enough majority to sustain themselves, despite anything that he can do about it, can snap their fingers at the Suez Group and do exactly what they like. From any angle we care to look, I should have thought that we have witnessed the end of the Suez Group about which we have heard so much.
One of the points of the right hon. and gallant Gentleman's speech was his attempt to assert that this side of the House were in some way trying to suggest that in their actions in the invasion of Egypt there was something dishonourable attached to the conduct of the British troops. That is a most deplorable line for anyone in this House to try to take. British soldiers, sailors and airmen do not need to prove every five minutes their valour and capacity. We take that for granted. Our case is that these able men should never have been asked to undertake such a dishonourable action as the


Government forced upon them. Of course, we know that, irrespective of their own thoughts, they have to carry out the decisions of the Government. That does not exonerate the Government which makes the decisions.
The hon. Member for Torquay spoke about the hypocrisy which he found in the conduct of the American Government. Would he address himself to the fact that, upon the very day upon which the Prime Minister announced his ultimatum here, the American Ambassador actually met the British Foreign Secretary? There was no reference whatever by the Foreign Secretary to the fact that the Prime Minister would shortly announce that ultimatum. [An HON. MEMBER: "That was not hypocrisy."] If that was not hypocrisy, then I do not know the meaning of it. Here we are supposed to be in close alliance with the United States. At top levels there can be meetings between the Foreign Secretary and the American Ambassador at which an issue as momentous as this cannot even be mentioned to the Ambassador.

Mr. Lewis: Is my hon. Friend aware of the fact that it was reported in the New York Times on 6th September that the Prime Minister wrote to the President of the United States informing him that it was the intention of Her Majesty's Government to "go it alone" and the President of the United States then warned the Prime Minister that he should not do it?

Mr. Lee: That is all evidence to the point that I am making. I understand that on the same day there were in fact discussions between the three parties to the Tripartite Declaration, that these discussions were going on in Washington, and again no announcement of this fact was made to the United States representative. When these sort of issues can be posed here, I suggest that for an hon. Member to talk about hypocrisy is just about boxing the compass.

The Joint Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. A. E. Dodds-Parker): I cannot, of course, accept newspaper reports which have been mentioned by the hon. Member as being in any way correct.

Mr. Lee: Will the hon. Gentleman deny that such conferences took place?

Mr. Dodds-Parker: I am not going to confirm or deny what hon. Members opposite produce from newspapers.

Mr. Lee: That intervention leaves us precisely where we were.
During the course of his speech today, the Foreign Secretary read out a long statement, which he said had been issued by the United States Government on 3rd November, dealing with action through the United Nations. He had the effrontery to say how much he agreed with that. A constitutional document, deploying the same sort of argument within the Charter of the United Nations, was issued on 3rd November and he tells us today how much he agreed with it, having done in the meantime all that he could to controvert the basis of the whole Charter itself. I should have thought that on the theme of hypocrisy that sort of thinking takes quite a bit of believing.
In the course of Question Time hon. Members opposite have mentioned the actions of my hon. Friends. I thought we came precious near to admissions that, at any rate, if there had not been collusion there was a substantial degree of what we might call fore-knowledge of what was going to happen. [An HON. MEMBER: "Mutual understanding."] Indeed, the Minister of Defence himself, in replying to a supplementary question which I put to him, appeared to me and, I think, to most hon. Members on this side of the House to agree that the Cabinet knew full well that there was imminent danger of Egypt being attacked. The question which I posed was broadly this: Why did we, if the Cabinet knew all this, seek an assurance that Jordan would not be attacked? Why did not we also get an assurance that Egypt would not be attacked? We have had no reply to that from the Minister of Defence at Question Time or from the Foreign Secretary in his speech this afternoon.
Until such time as we get a direct answer to that question, we are entitled to believe what the rest of the world already believe, that in any event there was already fore-knowledge of what was about to take place. The Foreign Secretary told us that there had already been border incidents involving Jordan and also involving Egypt, and it seems to us under those conditions that if assurances were to be demanded for one of the nations, unless we had reason not to


oppose action against Egypt, we could have asked for the same assurances in that case too.
We have had the repetition of what has been said so often about the attitude of the Opposition in all this. We have been told that we on this side have been gloating over the defeat which the Government have sustained in this matter. When one sees the leading article in the Daily Telegraph yesterday, it really gets a little beyond the pale. I quote:
The ordinary decencies of relations between Government and Opposition have not been observed by the latter. From the demeanour of at least the Socialist back benches yesterday, it looks as if the Opposition intended to gloat over this humiliation.
[HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] Hon. Members opposite agree that there is humiliation, do they? [HON. MEMBERS: "Yes."] This article continues:
But there are going to be serious repercussions both in the economic and in the foreign fields. In the times which lie ahead, gloating will be singularly out of place. It could only intensify that decline in the reputation of the House of Commons which its conduct during the crisis has begun.
I suggest to the party opposite and to its mouthpiece that it is not for the only party in this country which has been guilty of shouting down a Prime Minister and of refusing to allow an announcement of serious Government policy in this House—I go back to the days when the then Mr. Asquith was not permitted to make his statement on the Government's attitude towards the House of Lords—to talk in terms of the party to which I am proud to belong lowering the dignity of the House of Commons. It has certainly never degenerated to that level.

Mr. M. Stewart: Is it not particularly remarkable and interesting that an accusation of that kind should be made by the Daily Telegraph, a paper out of the same stable as the Sunday Graphic, whose contributions to public morality in this respect are so well-known?

Mr. Lee: As usual, I am in complete agreement with my hon. Friend.
So far as we see it, the question is certainly not one of gloating, but of investigating where lies the blame for this great and unnecessary tragedy. That is the duty of this House. Now that this unnecessary tragedy has brought us to

a position of economic insecurity, I am utterly certain that though we will continue in every way to resist the policies which brought it about, economically and industrially we will do what we can to pull the nation through. Much now depends upon the attitude of organised labour.
This silly attitude of the Government, the outlook that the Opposition must not oppose, takes one back almost to the days of Duke of Newcastle, who used to look upon opposition to Ministers as opposition to Royalty. I believe it was in those days that a ditty came into being which started by describing the Opposition as
pests of human kind whom Royal bounty cannot bind.
We have moved a long way since those days. In a great tragedy of this kind, it is the duty of the Opposition to outline to the nation as a whole that the background against which this tragedy has arisen is the bankruptcy and the ineptitude of the party who are now in government.
One recalls that this began when the Chairman of the Conservative Party, whom one remembers as a Member of this House, issued his circular from the Tory Central Office telling the members of his party that it was the attitude of the Opposition which had ruined or undermined the Prime Minister's health. The Lord Privy Seal, for reasons which I do not understand, rather spoilt that picture at Cambridge the day that the Prime Minister went away by assuring us all that the Prime Minister was not even ill.
I do not wish to be as vicious about this as the hon. Member for Oldham, East (Sir I. Horobin) was the other day, but I suggest that when we see the nation without a Prime Minister in this country, or without a deputy appointed to do his job at such a time of crisis, the dilemma of the Tory Party in being unable to select a deputy in the Prime Minister's absence cannot be excused, especially when we know that the only reason is that there would be resignations in the Cabinet if a deputy were selected. Therefore, the nation, with this great crisis on its hands, is, for the first time, I think, since democratic government first came, completely bereft of any chief advisers to the Crown.

Mr. Hamilton: Would my hon. Friend agree that the Prime Minister is now the best Prime Minister we have not got?

Mr. Lee: I say reluctantly that as a result of this escapade, our power in the Middle East has now ended. Our main concern must be with the vacuum which is thus created and the manner in which it will be filled. We are already seeing the cold war sweep along again, and it could be that when a vacuum is established in a most vulnerable strategic area like the Middle East, the cold war could turn into a hot war. Therefore, we must examine the outlook in the light of the present position of the United Nations.
I recall a few words which my right hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan) gave to the House in his speech of 1st November. He tried to argue that none of us had as yet managed to assess the difficulties which have entered into foreign policy because of the existence in the world of the hydrogen bomb. One of the most remarkable phenomena attached to the coming of the hydrogen bomb is that the great Powers no longer dare to fight among each other. Instead of the spectacle, which we have always seen in times of trouble, of small nations having to run for shelter under the wings of great Powers, the very immobility of the great Powers now gives the small nations greater licence to war among themselves. That is one of the things that we must all try to assess in our determination of what shall be the future of the United Nations.
The Government Front Bench have told us that one of the good things to come out of this tragedy is the creation of an international force. If the Government went into Egypt, as they assert, to stop the fighting, why choose Egypt instead of Hungary? I do not want to enter into the merits of who was the aggressor, but it happened to be the fact that the Israeli forces were standing 100 miles inside Egypt. Nevertheless, in pursuit, apparently, of the philanthropic idea of stopping the fighting, we attacked those who had been attacked. The Foreign Secretary said this afternoon that there was some doubt as to the intentions of the Israeli Government in accepting a cease-fire. He agreed that Egypt had accepted the cease-fire. Now, the right hon. and learned Gentleman says that there was a doubt concerning

the Israelis and he asks what we should have done. What we did was to attack Port Said. Do we take it from that that if the doubt had been as to whether the Egyptians had accepted the ceasefire, we would have attacked Tel Aviv? That is the logic of the argument. As we saw this afternoon, the hypocrisy of the whole thing is shown clearly when we know that both sides had agreed to stop fighting 24 hours before the first British paratroops landed on Egyptian soil.
I want to relate to this the issue of why we chose Egypt. Both the warring Powers, Egypt and Israel, are relatively small Powers. Neither had the strength to return our assault upon them in kind. In other words, there was no fear of rockets over London, or any other part of Britain, in stopping a war in Egypt. There was some doubt about who was the aggressor. Is there any doubt about who was the aggressor in Hungary? None of us has any doubt. Why did we not do the same thing in Hungary?

Mr. Patrick Maitland: Does the hon. Member want to go?

Mr. Lee: I do not, but I did not talk about going to Egypt and the hon. Member did. Why did we not do it in Hungary? The answer is that one of the Powers engaged is one of the great Powers which could have replied in kind. We should have produced a jungle where the weaker animals are eaten by the great animals and we dared not mete out the same sort of treatment as we decided to mete out in Egypt.

Mr. Douglas Glover: Does the hon. Member think that the Austrian Government would have given us permission to take troops into Austria to go to the help of the Hungarians?

Mr. Lee: If the hon. Member can tell me what neutral Powers we asked for permission to go into Egypt, I will be able to see some sense in his interjection.
It is not now sufficient to talk of collective security in the sense that we used to talk of it through the United Nations. We must consider the sort of world organisation, and the type of power that organisation must have, which the new situation has made necessary. The only guarantee now lies in the complete inability of any nation to fight. I do not


know how one can otherwise possibly relax to take the word of any Power that it has no intention of committing aggression against some other Power.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale, in a brilliant speech this afternoon, pointed out that force itself is now finished and can no longer be used to solve the problems of the second half of the twentieth century. I agree, but if that is so, is it not logical to suggest that that means not a particular type of force, but all types of force? If that is so, it is no answer to the problem to say that we have created an international force which in the last analysis, on the old basis of collective security, can stop an aggressor by the use of force. What we now mean is that force, either national or international, cannot be used in future.
The past is passed and we have to look now to the future and to what sort of authority we ought to vest in the United Nations. I cannot believe that the creation of this small force in the Middle East means that it has to stay there indefinitely. I cannot believe that because we have a situation in which nations are in danger of fighting for some precious material, whether oil or some metal, the people who are cursed by the presence of such precious materials shall have to endure military occupation, either national or international, for the rest of their lives.
The only answer now is the surrender by all nations of a greater degree of economic power to the United Nations itself. In other words, we have not only to make it impossible for nations to fight, but to discover the causes which bring about war and place those causes soundly in the hands of an international authority, the United Nations. The control of scarce raw materials comes very largely into this argument. In the years ahead, the danger of war lies in the desperate scramble for scarce raw materials, oil, nickel and so on.
I should like to see a lead given by the British Commonwealth which could invite the United Nations to share with us the responsibility of exploiting on a far greater scale the scarce raw materials in the Commonwealth. We know those materials are there, but we are incapable of getting them, because we do not have

the facilities—the export of capital and so on is now beyond us.
If we are to make an international authority the alternative to war, all nations must be represented on it. I put that idea very seriously to those who until now have opposed it. I say to our friends in the United States that their opposition of the entry of Red China into the United Nations now assumes a far greater importance even than it had before. The keeping out of any nation merely because one does not like the colour of its Government is to deny it the use of the alternative to war itself If we are to get round a conference table to resolve the problems which loom so large, it is essential that we should drop the thought that some nation or other, because of the complexion of its Government, is not sufficiently decent to sit at the conference table of the United Nations.
Our power and authority in the Middle East have gone and we must face up to the logic of that. Our withdrawal from the Middle East must be recognised in a new outlook towards the burden of defence which we now undertake. Our economic problems cannot be solved while we continue with the great burden of armaments at its present rate. If I am right in my view about the future of international authority, we can now give a lead in the way I have suggested in the Commonwealth and by drastically cutting our own re-armament programme, by trying to show other nations that we believe force can no longer be used, that from now on we will concentrate what we still have in bringing to the world a new appreciation of what international amity really means.
We have a background of having done a great job of pioneering. With the new conception looming before mankind, this nation, although no longer a great military Power, can give a lead which can stir the minds and imaginations of men and get away from the whole basis of war to bring a new decency and culture to mankind.

7.58 p.m.

Sir Patrick Spens: This is the first time, during our series of debates in the last four months, that I have attempted to address the House. I have spent days hearing, sometimes with


great difficulty, what was said by hon. Members. Tonight, I do not want to deal so much with the past as with the present and the future, but I should not be honest with the House if I did not say that throughout I have endorsed every step taken by Her Majesty's Government. I shall endorse the latest step—including the withdrawal of our troops from Port Said, as demanded by hon. and right hon. Members opposite—by my vote tomorrow night.
The real difference between the parties seems to me to be not really upon matters of principle, but on what facts they believe. I believe that it was absolutely certain that on the afternoon when the ultimatum was given—Israel having broken into Egypt in enormous strength—there was every likelihood that Colonel Nasser would press the button and order his commander-in-chief to move the whole of the Arab forces, and that within a matter of hours there would have been a flare-up in the Middle East. In my view, that would have spread from the Persian Gulf to the West Coast of Africa within a matter of days.
That is what I believe, on all the information that I have. I realise that hon. Members opposite do not believe it. If I am right, however, it explains all the difficulties which hon. Members opposite have discovered. It explains the difficulty of communication both with the United States of America—and here there was the other very great difficulty, that this happened six days before the Presidential election; a very difficult concatenation of circumstances—and with the Commonwealth. Believing that, I am quite certain that the ultimatum did have the effect that it was intended to have, of stopping the war, and that the other steps followed logically, one by one.
All through our early debates I was distressed to find that so little emphasis was put upon the vital necessity of our obtaining oil from the Persian Gulf. Not until the last fortnight have a great many Members, and, certainly, millions of our people, realised to what an extent our industry is dependent upon the oil which comes from the Persian Gulf. It was not until I heard the recent speech of the hon. Member for Rotherham (Mr. Jack Jones) that I realised to what a tremendous extent our steel industry depends upon oil.
Rightly or wrongly, for reasons which many of us know, in recent years we have switched our industry from coal to oil and now, as an industrial country, we, together with the whole of Western Europe, depend upon the oil which comes through the Canal from the Persian Gulf. That brings out the fact that the Canal is of absolutely vital interest to us, not only for the supply of oil but also because it is the great trade route between us and all trade east of Suez. Our country cannot live unless the Canal is working and we are receiving those oil supplies.
I accept the view, with which I know hon. Members opposite, certainly the right hon. Member for Derby, South (Mr. P. Noel-Baker), do not agree, that where vital interests are concerned the Charter of the United Nations does not forbid the use of force.

Mr. John Hynd: Would the right hon. and learned Member agree that the Rhine, as an international waterway, was no less vital to the economy of Hitler's Germany than the Suez Canal is to ours?

Sir P. Spens: I do not agree. That is an utterly untrue comparison. Anybody who knows the trading position of this country realises how utterly vital the Suez Canal is to us at present.
I need say no more than that I entirely accept the views expressed by my colleague and superior, Professor Goodhart, the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the International Law Association, of which I have the honour to be a member. I accept his interpretation of the Charter and I say that it is unrealistic at present—I do not say that it is hopeless, because I am always an optimist—to think that there will not be occasions when force will occur in this world. The hon. Member for Newton (Mr. Lee) talked of the danger of war. That presupposes that someone will be mad enough to use force. Our problem is how to stop another war. My view is that it can be done only by the use of force when it is necessary to protect a vital interest.

Mr. Lee: Are we to determine what are our own vital interests?

Sir P. Spens: In my view, yes.

Mr. P. Noel-Baker: When the right hon. and learned Gentleman was considering the international law of the matter,


did he also consider the arguments put forward by Lord McNair, an ex-President of the International Court of Justice, in another place?

Sir P. Spens: As the right hon. Gentleman knows, there are two views as to the international law in this matter, and I have not the slightest doubt that they will be argued for two generations. All I say—and I say it with great respect—is that I am on the side of Professor Goodhart. I believe that his is the true and real view.
I want to challenge one remark made by the hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr. Grimond). He said that the Russians did not want the oil in the Middle East. From the time that I left India in 1948 I formed the view, which I have never altered, that Russia wants the greatest possible influence in Asia and throughout the Middle East.
I do not know what are the Russian supplies of oil; I very much doubt whether anybody in the country knows what they are. But what we do know is that world reserves of oil, so far as they have been explored, are in the Persian Gulf. America has oil, and we have some oil, but that oil will all be used up within a generation or so. The world's reserves are in the Persian Gulf, and we must have them if we are to survive until atomic energy removes the need for them. America must have them if she is to survive, and I very much doubt whether Russia, also, does not have to have them.
Whether or not Russia requires those oil supplies, however, I should have thought that anybody who believes in the existence, or the possible existence, of the cold war would realise that there are two perfectly simple ways by which Russia can control the whole of Western Europe. One is by, obtaining possession of this vital oil, and the other is by controlling, directly or indirectly, the passage through the Suez Canal. If she stops that passage and deprives us of our oil Western Europe will be in a very sorry position—as, indeed, it is at the moment, when it has to go to America to buy oil and lose a percentage of its needs through the stoppage of traffic through the Canal.
I believe that all this trouble has arisen from the inability of the United Nations to make up its mind how to deal with

the situation in Egypt and Israel, after all the months of discussion. I believe that the trouble arises from the fact that during all this time nothing has come out of the United Nations. For that fact I must put a great deal of the blame upon the misfortune that this event occurred during a period immediately preceding the election of a President in the United States. Under their Constitution the six months before and the three months after are the most dangerous times for the world at present, because politics is being played in the United States—and politics, local politics, come before everything else.
At any rate, there it was. I, with great regret—because I have many friends, legal and otherwise, in the United States—think that the United States has to bear a great deal of the responsibility for what has happened—[HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] I mean in the conditions which led up to the trouble. That is what I am saying. I am not saying anything about the action we were taking but, as I have said, in the conditions which led up to the trouble and made it possible for Israel to do what she did. That is all I am saying.
Now I turn—

Mr. P. Noel-Baker: Mr. P. Noel-Baker rose—

Sir P. Spens: —if the right hon. Gentleman will allow me, to what I think is the present situation. I think that the United States is realising how serious is the position in the Middle East—[HON. MEMBERS: "So are we."]—and so are all of us. I rejoice that the Canal is to be cleared by an organisation which is to be in charge of two very distinguished Americans. As I understand, they are not representing the United States, but are working under the directions of the United Nations. But, at any rate, they are two distinguished Americans who are now pledged "up to the neck"—if I may say so—to get the Canal cleared with the least possible delay. That is one of the best things that has happened.
The next best thing that has happened is that during the past few days the President has directed that arrangements shall be made without delay for emergency oil supplies to go to Europe. That is an enormous change on the part of the United States. It is due, no doubt—

Mr. Noel-Baker: Mr. Noel-Baker rose—

Sir P. Spens: No. I will give way in a moment. It is very difficult to make a speech if the right hon. Gentleman interrupts every single sentence. I know that he does not agree with what I am saying, but he will have the opportunity of castigating me ad infinitum before the end of the debate if he wants to.
I welcome very much this change in the attitude of the United States during the last five or six days. But I want to go on to what is a much more difficult question, that of the United Nations Force. It is perfectly true that we should not have seen a United Nations Force in Egypt, or anywhere else in the Middle East, but for the events of the last three weeks. There is no question about that. It is a tremendous step forward that, for the first time in history, there should be a true United Nations Force, doing something. I am not going to discuss what it is there to do, but I think we have all to direct our minds—

Mr. Ellis Smith: Has the right hon. and learned Gentleman forgotten Korea?

Sir P. Spens: That was not really quite the same.
I should like to have seen them build up a United Nations Force out of our forces and the forces of France. I think that that would have been the right way to do it, following the Korean example. But they would not do that—[HON. MEMBERS: "Who would not?"] Certainly, right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite would not have supported that step, or anything of that sort happening. Otherwise, the United Nations might have followed the example of Korea, and built up the British and French forces. I believe that that would have been the best thing to do, but they have not done it. They said, "No, you are to go, and we are going to build up a pure United Nations Force instead."
Yesterday, I met a very distinguished American, and discussed this matter with him. He was delighted, he is as much an idealist about the United Nations as is the right hon. Member for Derby, South and I admire that point of view. But I put this question to him. I said, "Suppose fighting broke out in South America, and the United Nations decided to send in a United Nations Force, and that Force came from Europe. Would

you agree with that?" He said, "My nation would not have that at all." Well, there we are. We have this great difficulty, and I am very doubtful whether we can rely on the fact that the United Nations could raise a force from a number of nations and send it into any area where the world was at trouble.
I do not believe that it is possible. I do not believe that the time factor makes it possible. I believe—I think it an admission of the weakness of the United Nations—in arrangements like N.A.T.O. Of course, N.A.T.O. is an admission that, in an emergency, the United Nations cannot deal with a violent situation. We have to have a force which is organised and in position. We must have a commander who can go into action without asking the permission of anybody at all. I understand that the Commander of N.A.T.O. is in a position to take immediate action.
The weakness of N.A.T.O. is the Middle East and North Africa, and I should like to see this Middle East problem linked up with N.A.T.O, so that it shall be a real resistance to what obviously has been happening, namely, the infiltration of Russian influence into that area. I believe that Russia intends to cause as much trouble in that area as she can, and I believe that the answer to the problem is to strengthen N.A.T.O. so as to protect its right flank. If we can do that, we shall have something which will stop Russian infiltration, maintain peace between Jew and Arab, and get rid of the threat to peace in the future.
I put that forward, but I wish to conclude by going back to something legal. I wish to point out that in these last weeks the original sin of Nasser has been forgotten. That original sin was the nationalisation by force of the assets of the old Suez Canal Company.

Air Commodore A. V. Harvey: Just force.

Sir P. Spens: Speaking for myself—I have no right to speak for anybody else—I wish to make it clear that I do not agree that any right of sovereignty or anything else justified Nasser in doing what he did.
There is an enormous difference between nationalising either a company or the assets of a company by the ordinary, decent process of the law, and stepping


in with armed police, throwing out the executives of a company and ordering the workmen to go on working under threat of imprisonment. There is a great difference between that and doing it in the decent way that civilised nations understand. Therefore, even though I am the only voice in this House to say so, I wish to say that I do not recognise that as a legitimate form of nationalisation whatsoever, and that those people who say it is should think again.
There is a very different problem, from my point of view, in the attitude of India. India is nationalising as much as she possibly can and in my opinion, the Indians, without thinking very much, have said that Nasser had every right to nationalise in the way he did. The Indians have not nationalised in that way. They have nationalised much more as we did in this country. It is true that they have taken up certain assets of companies, but they have proceeded to bring in a law to justify what they did and put it through their Parliament. They have never been guilty of anything like this brutal theft of the assets of a company which Nasser has committed. I think, also, that India is in the position that she cannot, even now, admit the right of any United Nations Force, or anybody else, to go in to restore a position which she is in in dereliction of a direction of the United Nations.
Therefore, I can understand the attitude that she has had to take up during this episode; but, apart from India, everybody else realises that there was no justification for Nasser's action in the way in which he did it originally. In my view, in no circumstances whatever should the United Nations allow him to get away with the result of his brazen theft.

8.21 p.m.

Mr. Charles Pannell: I should like to say straight away to the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Kensington, South (Sir P. Spens) that, broadly, I agree with the case he has put on the original nationalisation proposals of Nasser. A landlord is no less objectionable to me because he happens to be an Egyptian landlord, and if he forecloses on a lease 14 years before the agreement is due to end, it is still a dereliction of legal duty. We on this side of the House have fought over the major

principle of compensation against confiscation, and certainly no social democrat can agree with expropriation.
I want to make it perfectly clear that I do not agree with the attack against the leader of my party in connection with part of his speech of 3rd August, which was a condemnation of Nasser on this point. I do not agree with what has been said, not by the right hon. and learned Gentleman but by other hon. Members, because the other part of my right hon. Friend's speech made it perfectly clear what his view was. That speech is perfectly consistent with his attitude that this is a matter for the United Nations.
I will speak about N.A.T.O. later in my speech, because I was a member of the recent Conference of N.A.T.O. Parliamentarians and I want to say something about its rôle in this incident. It is common in all parts of the House that we meet in an atmosphere of shock. Yesterday's announcement about costs was a shock, but far more a shock was the lost prestige and the lost integrity of the Tory Party. Hon. Gentlemen opposite cannot deny that. There is deep unhappiness in the party opposite because they no longer believe in their leader; they no longer believe in themselves.
We are in a position where we as a country have been condemned by the world. Mr. Deputy-Speaker, may I ask that there should be less noise from the direction of the Chair occupied by the Serjeant at Arms? I can hardly speak against the noise that is taking place behind the Bar. There is so much infernal noise that I cannot hear myself speak.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker (Sir Gordon Touche): I am sorry if there has been some noise. I did not hear it myself.

Mr. Pannell: At this time we go cap in hand to the Americans who last week were reviled in a Motion signed by over 120 hon. Members from the other side of the House—
[That this House congratulates the Foreign Secretary on his efforts to secure international control of the Suez Canal, and deplores both the Resolution of the General Assembly calling for immediate and unconditional withdrawal of British and French troops from Egypt, and the attitude of the United States of America which is gravely endangering the Atlantic alliance.]
They are Members of the party which the Chancellor of the Exchequer represents. Our name and our credit is to be dragged through Congress. I hark back to the time when the right hon. Member for Woodford (Sir W. Churchill) was talking about American charity. He did not use the word in the way St. Paul used it, as something that "suffereth long, and is kind." He used it rather in the way of saying that we, as a Labour Government, were asking America for something which a Tory Government would have had to ask for either way, but it was somehow foul for us to do it and praiseworthy for hon. Gentlemen opposite.
In fact, even during all our difficulties in 1951, we never asked for a waiver; but we have been brought to the position of a mendicant by the deliberate policy of hon. Gentlemen opposite who have not counted the economic cost in any way whatever but have proceeded on a project where they considered neither the consequences nor what Mr. Ramsay MacDonald used to call the consequences of the consequences.
I want to put in a word for America here. I think that America has been a good friend of this country throughout the whole of this business. Our action occurred in the last days of the Presidential election. I have spent three months in America this year, so I know all that a Presidential election means. President Eisenhower, who, in some ways, has been alleged by the Democrats to be a weak President, was an extremely strong President in those last days at a time when he was most vulnerable. We should not forget the assertion which has been put out that the Summit Talks at Geneva were somehow contrived to give the Tory Party a fillip for last year's General Election. Probably President Eisenhower has asked what gratitude he has received for that when, on the very last days of a Presidential election, with New York State and the Jewish vote and all that that means, his friends, his faithful friends, his most devoted allies, did this.
We have all fought elections. We are all professionals in this way, and I can imagine what our reactions would have been in circumstances such as that. But there was another thing about it. We may remember that at that critical time Messrs. B. and K. indicated that they

were going to send over guided missiles and put volunteers in the Middle East. There was an American reaction. Can anybody doubt where General Gruenther got his instructions from when he said, "As sure as the dawn breaks tomorrow, we will throw them all back again"? That was a deterrent, a massive deterrent. We heard no more about volunteers in the Middle East, because Nasser and company immediately reacted and said that they did not want volunteers at the price of a third world war.
It has been said—I have heard the suggestion from the other side of the House—that somehow the fact that America walked out on the Aswan Dam was the thing that precipitated Nasser's action. I should like to ask the Foreign Secretary whether he can give an assurance that, before the United States withdrew their offer in connection with the Aswan Dam, he did not recommend them to do so, either formally or informally. Does anyone doubt that before that was done there were consultations? Of course not. Generally speaking, I think that the Americans have acted firmly in this matter.
It is rather curious in view of what was said by my right hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan) about the Canal having hagridden these proceedings from first to last. I remember what the Minister of Education, a member of the Cabinet, said on 27th November. He set out the five aims of the Conservative Government, and he must have been in their confidence because he was a member of the Cabinet. He said: One, clear the Canal. Two, put the Canal under international control. Three, settle the Arab-Israel dispute. Four, prevent any part of the Middle East being a Moscow satellite. Five, help the peoples of the Middle East to raise their standard of living. If he had put the last one first, he would have had more chance with the others. These things were said on 27th November.
One of the curious things that happened came from the hon. Member for Oldham, East (Sir I. Horobin). He is not in his place at the moment, but I gave him notice that I would mention this. He intervened on Monday and asked the Foreign Secretary—I will not repeat his


back-hander at our absent Prime Minister—
Can my right hon. and learned Friend say—and he is one of the few people we can believe at the moment—."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 3rd December, 1956; Vol. 561, c. 893.]
What did he mean? We know what he meant, and so do hon. Members on Government benches. He meant that the Government, from first to last, did not come clean with their own supporters. I recall the words in Carpenter's "England Arise":
Over your face a web of lies is woven.
We must first find out who the liars were.
Another thing which the Foreign Secretary said was:
The arguments of certain right hon. Gentlemen opposite are very present on the lips of the enemies of this country."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 3rd December, 1956; Vol. 561, c. 889.]
We want to know who the enemies are. We want to know whom the hon. Member for Oldham, East considers are our enemies. He will not tell us. He might do so in the Lobby, but he will not do it here. He is too honest for that. Whom does the Foreign Secretary mean are the enemies of this country in this context, when by 64 votes to five we were branded as aggressors at the United Nations?
Are all the 64 nations enemies? Australia could not be an enemy of this country, but the most remarkable thing about Mr. Menzies is that publicly he has supported us while privately he has torn more strips off the Prime Minister than anybody else. Canada has condemned us; is she an enemy of this country? After all, this United Nations Force which has saved the face of Government supporters is the brain-child of Mr. Pearson. The Government never thought of it from first to last, and actually voted against the calling of that meeting and abstained from voting on the proposals.
There is deep unhappiness amongst Government supporters at the loss of integrity of the Conservative Party. They are continually upbraiding us. The right hon. and gallant Member for Leicester, South-East (Captain Waterhouse) said that in so far as the Government's policy had not succeeded the responsibility belonged to the Opposition. We did not hear much about that when the right hon. and gallant Gentleman spoke this evening.
It is nonsense. We did not determine the course of events. That was said by the right hon. and gallant Gentleman to salve his conscience, because he is only going to abstain from voting and is not going into the other Lobby. He considers the continuance in office of the Tory Party as the most important thing, as he told us, and I can accept that point of view, but he need not pass the responsibility over to the Opposition.
The hon. Member for Preston, North (Mr. J. Amery) referred to the
humiliating withdrawal"—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 3rd December, 1956; Vol. 561, cc. 893, 889 and 891.]
He condemned the United States. Presumably he considers her an enemy. He said that she was condemned by Government supporters. He condemned us for the course which we took and which we believe was the right one. He also condemned certain weakminded people—as he might describe them—on his own side; more enemies.
The core of the unhappiness among Government supporters is that they believe we should have gone the whole length of the Canal. I can only say that in that case our humiliation at the end would have been greater than it was, and that we should have had to retreat further. The members of the Suez Group were not betrayed by hon. Members on this side of the House. We knew where we stood. They were betrayed in the "house of their friends," and they know it. The hon. Member for Ealing, South (Mr. Maude) has gone on record as saying so.

Mr. Maude: No.

Mr. Pannell: I listened to the speech of the hon. Gentleman with sympathy. We need not argue on the literal interpretation of the speech, but it was not intended to be friendly to the Government.
Let us take this whole business. Let us see what happened- on 30th October, in connection with this condemnation of America. What was the record? At 9.30 in the morning the Foreign Secretary saw the American Ambassador and they discussed certain things. They did not say anything about the sort of thing that was to happen five hours later, but five hours later the British and French Ministers agreed on the invasion of Egypt.
No attempt was made to inform the Americans who, after all, were the senior partner in this and would have to back anything with force only after the decision was taken. It surely must have been the most humiliating and wounding thing for the President that he actually got the news, only through the Press. I can understand him preferring to meet Mr. Bandaranaike, the Prime Minister of Ceylon, and refusing to meet the Foreign Secretary, after being played a dirty trick of that sort. After five hours the British Cabinet met and decided on this action.
It did not consult the Leader of the Opposition. It is reasonable to suppose that if one is going into a war one should consult a party which is almost half the State. Even Neville Chamberlain would not make that mistake and certainly not the right hon. Member for Woodford. We have heard what Mr. Pearson said about the effect on the Commonwealth, "almost rending it asunder" and, although Australia and certain others have come in behind us afterwards, there is no doubt that they were deeply wounded at the time.
Although the hon. Member for Torquay (Mr. F. M. Bennett) said something about India, he did not refer to Pakistan, which had a "Hate Britain Day". There was the continual obsession of our absent friend the Prime Minister. He was hagridden by wounded vanity about the Canal and only the Canal—not Israel, his whole record showed that he had very little interest in that. In effect we were taken into a war by a man three weeks off a nervous breakdown. I have a list of all the statements of the Prime Minister, but I will not deal with them here. All the other arguments and alibis cropped up later. Suffice it to say that on 31st October he was still on the subject of the Canal, but on 1st November the idea of the United Nations stepping in cropped up. There was never any thought of it before that. As a matter of fact, it was not until 8th November, as he was in the middle of one of his purple passages and as a sort of parenthesis in his peroration, that the President of the Board of Trade—whom we recognise as the Prince Rupert of debate—mentioned the Russian plot. On the same day the Minister of Defence said:
The whole point of this is that the Canal cannot and must not be solely the concern of

the Egyptian Government. That is what all this has been about."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 8th November, 1956; Vol. 560, c. 262.]
Of course honest hon. Members opposite know that is what it bas been all about and all they care about. The rest has been façade. As to separating the combatants, one does not get 100 miles behind the line of one of them to do that.
Let us try to estimate the cost—279 million dollars—approximately £100 million—petrol up 1s. 5d. and Income Tax will be up next year, we are promised. The Chancellor of the Exchequer said yesterday:
The effect upon the cost of living is calculated to be less than one-third of one point. The extra duty will put between one-fifth and one-quarter of 1d. on a 3d. bus fare."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 4th December, 1956; Vol. 561, c. 1061.]
The charge on industry would not be crushing and would have a very small effect on prices. I seem to have recognised all that before. As one who has spent his life in transport before coming here, I know that increased transport charges have a most inflationary effect on the economy. If we can get down transport costs, which are the conveyor belt of industry, we may be able to pay our way, but no one is going to get away with the idea that by sticking 1s. 5d. on petrol we have done a good turn for this country in the markets of the world. The increased costs will affect exports. If anyone wishes for evidence of that he should read the strong speeches by hon. Members opposite when the Labour Government put up the price of petrol—a much smaller increase than this. Incidentally, they quickly forgot it, because a year afterwards they put the price up by twice as much.
Nobody has so far mentioned the cost of American oil. Of course, this is a cash transaction and not a credit transaction. I understand that it will cost £800,000 a day for oil. It will be a cash deal and we cannot expect the United States, after all they have put up with, to give us the terms that they promised at the London conference on Suez. They will not do it.
What about the effect on our friends? I was recently at a N.A.T.O. conference. What about the effect of our policy ore Belgium, Italy and the Scandinavian; countries, whose economies have been wrecked by our irresponsible action? I notice that the right hon. and learned


Member for Chertsey (Sir L. Heald), the former Attorney-General, wrote to the Sunday Times saying how friendly the Americans were when he met them at N.A.T.O.; but in conversation they drew a very sharp line between the guilty and the guiltless in Europe and were most sorry for those who were the victims of our action. The N.A.T.O. Council had no warning of our action, although N.A.T.O. is supposed to be the great defence apparatus of Europe. They had no notice, and it must have been very embarrassing for the Secretary-General to have had no warning.
At present we are bereft of a Prime Minister. All I will say about that is that, we on this side of the House have been rather kinder than were hon. Members opposite when the late Ernest Bevin was dying. We have been rather more tolerant. After all, the "shadow" Prime Minister, if that is the correct term, himself said of the Prime Minister "He is not ill. He is only tired. He has had a hell of a time." I have the Press cutting here somewhere. The most remarkable thing on Monday was the alacrity with which the Leader of the House jumped to his feet to assure the House that the Prime Minister had been consulted, because he did not want the medal pinned on his chest.
Who are the casualties? They are the Suez pilots, who used to get £6,000 a year. Their jobs have gone. They are the British nationals, cruelly expropriated by the Egyptians; they all have our great sympathy. It is the little people who always suffer in this sort of thing. But apart from all that, we have seen in our time the bankruptcy of force. This Government have staggered on with no glimpse of the consequences. We have to learn the lesson that in the future the Middle East will not be settled unless we have the Asian Powers on our side.
A most remarkable thing—nobody has mentioned it yet—is that when Earl Attlee went to India he was received with enthusiasm as the man who had set India free and received on a style which B and K never saw; but when he got to Pakistan, he was asked to proceed no further, so great had been the reaction because of the action of Her Majesty's Government.
All this has weakened the West. The greatest struggle of all is the struggle between the West and the powers of Communism. Hon. Members opposite always think that they understand Communism. I know they do not. It is only the Left that understands the nature and purpose of Communism. The Communists know full well that the forces of Tory reaction are too embattled and stupid to understand, and they never try to work on them. They always attempt to fragment the forces of progress in all countries. The Communists do not try to infiltrate into the gin trade. They attempt to infiltrate into the trade unions.
Where does this Suez adventure leave us in the battle between East and West? It is not a victory for us against Russia, as the Foreign Secretary so ineptly said. It is a defeat for us. I would give only one statistic, but it is worth remembering that the increase in production in Russia since 1948 has been twice as great as that of the N.A.T.O. countries. That is the measure of her progress.
No wonder that Khrushchev says that they do not need a war to ensure the victory of Socialism; that peaceful competition is enough. He did not even need to rely on the Conservative Government, which made his job easier for him. In saying that, he has in mind the appeal of Communism to the underdeveloped territories. Russia has not suffered a reverse in the East, as the Foreign Secretary has said. The rest of the West, outside this country and outside of the Tory Party in this country, recognises this as Russia's victory. We are out of the East, now and for all time. The United Nations must go in and establish the rule of law. This, in the day of the hydrogen bomb, must now be the aim and purpose of all intelligent political endeavour.

8.45 p.m.

Mr. Angus Maude: In his intervention earlier, the Leader of the Liberal Party said that there was little purpose now in jobbing backwards. That is, of course, true to the extent that there are an enormous number of questions which will need answering for the future. Nevertheless, the Motion before the House requests us to approve the policy of Her Majesty's Government as outlined by the Foreign Secretary the day before


yesterday—a policy which must, I think, be looked at as a whole; that is to say, from its inception up to present. One can scarcely be asked to give a vote of confidence to the Government without considering their policy as a whole.
There is, however, one kind of jobbing backwards in which, unlike hon. Members opposite, I do not propose to indulge. I refer to the question whether or not there was collusion between the British, French and Israeli Governments. Not that I believe that there was collusion—I am quite sure that there was not. I realise that to say that there was is a good political line to follow if one is trying to appeal to the sort of people who raise their hands in outraged morality at the idea; but I think that the Opposition are wasting time on it, because I am sure that the reaction of 95 per cent. of the people in this country is not to be morally horrified at the idea at all, but to ask why, if there was collusion, it did not work better.
It is not possible now to work up a scare among our people about collusion. The dates, the times, the conduct of the operation, all suggest most strongly, in fact, that there was not collusion, and a great amount of time is wasted in discussing who did not talk to whom at what cocktail party—so reminiscent of the stories of who did or did not meet the Italian Ambassador, Count Grandi, in a taxicab in 1935, or whenever it was—when we really ought to be considering whether there are not more serious things to debate at this time.
As I say, one must take the Government's policy as a whole. I hope that hon. Members on both sides will do me the kindness to believe that I have tried to be consistent and honest in my views, and that I have not at any time tried to hide what I thought about the policy of my own Government or that of the Labour Party.
Ever since Britain withdrew her troops from the Suez Canal base under the Agreement signed two years ago, it has seemed to me inevitable that we have been working up for precisely the kind of trouble which we now have. It was a question which was much argued at the time; whether if we had, in fact, stayed there it would have been possible to have reached a better Agreement; whether, in fact, it was possible to stay there;

whether it was necessary to have a base of that size to keep 80,000 troops in defence of the Canal. My own belief is that had we not, from the very beginning—and before the negotiations ever started—announced that we certainly meant to go away, we should have got better terms in the end if we did go.
I also believe that had we had the nerve—and lack of nerve is becoming a distressingly familiar complaint of this country nowadays—to stick it out there for perhaps another three, four or six months, it would have been more likely that General Neguib and Colonel Nasser would have been the casualties than the British. We might then have avoided the situation of creating a power vacuum in the Middle East, with the inevitable result that if America was not willing to fill it, Russia would. That, of course, is what has happened, and it is from that that so much of the trouble stems.
The Government, having allowed that to happen, followed what was their best policy in the circumstances—to try to build up a stable régime in Egypt and make a friend of Colonel Nasser, to believe that they could stabilise the extremely tricky situation in the Middle East round this new rising figure in the Afro-Asian world. In my view, the cardinal mistake that they made was that when a dictator is in an insecure position he is always bound to turn to some form of xenophobia to buttress his position.
As with Hitler and the Jews, so with Nasser and the Jews, and with Britain, the alleged colonial Power. He could never afford to be openly friendly with us at any time. The relations, however much one might have succeeded in buttressing them by practical or economic means, were always bound to be overtly unfriendly because he could never afford to be overtly friendly. At last, it became obvious that that was the position, and it was not to be expected that Nasser would become a reliable ally, a friend in the Middle East.
At that point the Government again, with no alternative at that stage, switched their policy and decided to try to isolate Colonel Nasser from the other countries in the Middle East, to try to ensure that he did not become the great figure, the ruler of a new Arab empire, to see that the Saudi Arabians, the Jordanians, the Lebanese, and so forth, did not look to


him and would not move with him in carrying out his future schemes. Again, that was a reasonable policy to pursue because there was no other policy left at that stage. But, obviously, there should have gone with it some preparedness for the sort of situation which arose when Nasser reacted swiftly and devastatingly, as it turned out, to the withdrawal of British and American support for the building of the Aswan Dam.
I do not suggest for a moment that it was not right to withdraw that support, because in my view the situation had completely changed. From the moment that Nasser indulged in large arms purchases from behind the Iron Curtain, and mortgaged his cotton crop and his future economic resources to pay for them, it became perfectly clear that his ability to service the debt on the Aswan Dam and, indeed, to improve the conditions of his people at all were very seriously compromised.
But at least one should have been prepared for what happened, instead of which, neither in the development of Cyprus as a base and in the development of a strategic reserve, as my right hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Leicester, South-East (Captain Water-house) said, nor in any of the other preparations which we might have expected to be carried out after our withdrawal from the Suez Canal base, was there any sign that we had prepared for the sort of reaction which we got.
I entirely agree that had it been possible to have taken quick, sure action in the early days of this affair, the situation would have been much better. Indeed, the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Lewisham, South (Mr. H. Morrison) urged us to do that in his speech in the House on 2nd August, saying that he had some experience of not doing it when he was Foreign Secretary at the time of the Abadan trouble.
However, we were in no position to do that. This is throughout a story of lagging behind, turning, after one failure, to another line of policy and always lagging behind and trying to catch up with the consequences. It is not government by planning or forethought; it is government by afterthought, than which there is nothing more disastrous.
I do not myself feel that I can possibly give an unqualified vote of confidence to Her Majesty's Government as a result of what has happened over the last two years. I have never attempted to disguise my feeling; I have not been one who has cheered unconditionally at everything which took place, and I did not stand up and wave an Order Paper when the cease-fire was announced. Nobody can, I think, accuse me of being inconsistent.
I believe that we had the right to intervene in Egypt after the nationalisation of the Canal because, under Article 3 of the 1888 Convention, the forcible occupation of the buildings and works of the Canal constituted, in my view, a clear breach of the Convention and, therefore, by implication, of the 1954 Treaty. However, that is by the way. We did not.
Having waited two to three months, we had, in my view, got into a position where, other things being equal, it was morally totally unjustifiable to act in Egypt at all by force. I always held that view. It was a thing which one could have done quickly, but, having entered into negotiations, having started discussions and having been consistently checkmated by the efforts of Mr. Dulles, Mr. Nehru and Mr. Menon, then a totally different situation had to arise to justify the use of force at all.
The Israeli intervention provided, it is true, a dramatic change in the situation; but, in my view, it provided a good reason for intervening only on the assumption that we were going to do the job properly and genuinely settle the problems which have been the bone of contention in the past and which have exercised this country and all other countries of the Middle East during the preceding months and years.
I cannot see that there was good reason for taking the appalling risks which we took in invading Egypt at that time, after five days of bombing, during which the opinion of the world was given time to crystalise against us, and then stopping. It is true that the combatants had ceased fighting, but it is also true that the objectives which we had laid down for ourselves had not been achieved.
We are left, it seems to me, with almost the worst of all possible worlds. We have lost the chance to act properly,


either militarily or in any other way, if a similar situation arises again in Egypt, Syria, Jordan, or wherever it may be. The future of the Bagdad Pact, certainly as far as we are concerned, is extremely gloomy.
I will conclude by asking one or two questions about the future, and putting one or two considerations to the Government. The leader of the Liberal Party, at the end of his speech, put his finger on one of the main problems when he said there is far too much talk about leaving things to the United Nations, as if the United Nations could, of itself, in some strange abstract way, solve the problems of the world. Of course it cannot.
What is the United Nations? We know what happens in the Security Council, and we know that so long as the interests of the great Powers who are permanent members of the Security Council conflict, the veto, which it is true recognises the practical realities of the situation, does, in fact, stultify the Security Council as a means of solving any problems.
If the right hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan), whose speech I listened to with admiration, in total silence, would restrain himself from conversing with his neighbour, it would enable me to try to maintain the threads of my argument for the next four or five minutes.
Hon. Members opposite really ought to realise that the General Assembly of the United Nations is now, in the circumstances in which we are, building into itself precisely the same sort of permanent frustration as there has been in the Security Council. We just cannot say that the General Assembly has a sort of magic system for solving the problems of the world. The General Assembly is a collection of heterogeneous countries, some large, some small, mostly organised in satellite groups which will act according to their own interests or according to the interests of the leaders of their bloc, and which will by no means act on the merits of the particular case under discussion. For example, India will try to prevent Hungary from being discussed because it produces a precedent for dealing with Pakistan and Kashmir. So that sort of consideration comes in all the time.
We cannot really base a future policy on that. We are entitled to ask: what is

the precise policy that we have left? There is the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East. What is it to do? Who is to tell it what to do? The General Assembly cannot of itself order the infringement of the sovereignty of another State, or can it? I should like to know; I do not myself believe that it can. It has certainly made quite clear that it has no intention of infringing Egypt's sovereignty, because it is asking, with great completeness, for authority from Colonel Nasser for everything it does.
What one has to realise is that the General Assembly now has become, almost by accident, an almost perfect system for preventing us from doing anything that is in our interest and preventing anyone who makes any attempt to follow international morality—

Mr. Bevan: Why?

Mr. Maude: I will explain to the right hon. Gentleman, if he likes.
Suppose that we had thrown ourselves on the General Assembly and had hoped to get redress and avoid the risk of conflict among our allies and in Israel in the Middle East, and to get international control of the Canal. Of course we could not have done it. But what this system does not prevent is aggression at one remove, aggression by infiltration, by the clandestine sale of arms, by volunteers, by overawing, by threats and by gradual wearing down. The aggressor can always get away with that, but the country which tries to forestall that by justifying the use of force cannot. It is a ready-made way of handing over the control of the world to the would-be aggressor. Where are we left, in these circumstances?
We ought, in my view, to be told by the Government just what they imagine the United States will do here. I do not believe that the United States has a policy, except to get us out and then spend as many dollars as it thinks are necessary to try to buy its way into some sort of favour in the Middle East. I do not myself think that that is enough. What is the position of Jordan and Iraq? What is the position of our Treaty and our bases in Jordan?
What is to be the position of Cyprus? Are we to have that developed as a deep-water naval base, as a port where we can


build the military position which we should never have lost, or are we to allow the Middle East to become the vacuum in which the United States and Russia fight out their rivalries, with the almost complete certainty of a third world war breaking out there?
If we are to redevelop our defence in the Middle East, what are we supposed now to be defending, and why? This is the question which the events of the last few months have posed to most people in this country. What has this been for, what is now left to defend, and how are we to do it? These are the questions which worry me and, I believe, nearly everybody in the country. Most people thought that we were right to act. They hoped that we had the courage to act properly and to see it through. They are bitterly disappointed and ashamed that we have not done so and now their minds are full of questions, not one of which, so far, has been answered. It is time that they were.

9.6 p.m.

Mr. Kenneth Younger: The hon. Member for Ealing, South (Mr. Maude) may well ask the list of comprehensive questions which he has just posed, because I think it has been the effect of the last five weeks that a great deal has been pulled down and nothing built up. None of us can at the moment profess to foresee with any clarity where we can go from here. That is one of the questions to which we must address ourselves.
The House always listens with respect and interest to the hon. Member, because he does not conceal his views. He expresses them with great courage and with a clarity which has been singularly lacking from a great part of our debates on this topic over recent weeks. If I may say one thing about his speech, with which he will not expect me to have agreed, I thought it was a very clear argument expressed in very outdated categories.
If the hon. Member had been living forty or fifty years ago, most of what he said might have made a strong appeal. He seemed to be assuming many things to be possible, in particular for this country, in the Middle East which were once possible, but are no longer. When he talked about our having attempted to take action and having been checkmated by a

number of people—Mr. Dulles, Mr. Nehru and others—

Mr. Maude: I said quite the reverse. I said that having been forced into negotiations during two long months, in the course of those negotiations we were frustrated by Mr. Nehru and Mr. Dulles. That is rather different.

Mr. Younger: I am quite prepared to accept that. I am sorry I got the hon. Member's words wrong. He used the word "checkmated" a moment later.
The hon. Member does not seem to consider why these various forces succeeded in frustrating us. Is it not precisely because conditions have so changed? Thirty or forty years ago, we would not have been having to treat India as an independent factor. We probably would not have treated the United States as an independent factor in practically any international issue. Today we must, and that is precisely why the hon. Member's thinking is so out of date.
During the five weeks since the ultimatum was sent to Egypt and to Israel we have had endless pretences and endless ambiguous statements about what we were doing and why we were doing it. It is no wonder that opinion is considerably confused. My right hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan), who opened the debate from this side of the House, spent a good deal of time in analysing and dissecting the various explanations which were given by the Government and he succeeded in showing that most of them made very little sense.
There is only one to which I want to refer, because it was to most of us a slightly new fact and I want to be quite sure that we have got it right. When the Foreign Secretary was talking about the circumstances in which our land invasion was ordered at dawn on 5th November, he was challenged that at that time the parties had virtually accepted the cease-fire and that there was no need for the operation to separate the combatants.
I want to be sure that I have got these dates right. The right hon. and learned Gentleman told us that on 3rd November, that is, two days before the troops went in, he was informed that Israel had said that she would accept the cease-fire


if Egypt did—in other words, conditionally. But on the following day, 4th November, one day before our troops went in, the Secretary-General stated that Egypt had expressed her readiness to cease-fire, as I understand, unconditionally.
It was then stated, and this is what I am not quite clear about, that there was some communication from Israel—I am glad to see that the Foreign Secretary is back—which apparently cast doubt upon Israel's earlier acceptance. Therefore, still on the same day, still on 4th November, before our troops went in, the right hon. and learned Gentleman said that the Secretary-General was asked for a clarification of that.
That, as I understand, is the situation, as told to us by the Foreign Secretary today, in which we ordered the land invasion, which had not yet begun, to go in at dawn on the 5th despite the fact that we were, as it seemed, on the verge of a general cease-fire. It is my belief, although the right hon. and learned Gentleman did not say so, that fighting had, in practice, stopped, whatever the position may be about the formal acceptance by both sides of the ceasefire. Nevertheless, we persisted in the operation.
The clarification for which the right hon. and learned Gentleman asked on the previous day was given on the following day—fairly early on that day—because, subsequently, he told us that the Cabinet met. The cease-fire was decided upon, and on the 6th, was it not, our representative in New York conveyed our decision to the Secretary-General and the cease-fire took effect from the following night? I hope that that is correct. I read it out from the notes I made, because I have not been able to see HANSARD.
If those are the facts, then surely my right hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale was justified in what he said about the extraordinary frivolity of carrying on this operation, to which we knew every single one of our major friends in the world, other than France, was opposed, and on which we had already been heavily outvoted more than once in the General Assembly of the United Nations.
It is a very curious fact that in the whole of this story there seem to me to

have been only two occasions when Her Majesty's Government felt to be under great pressure of time and acted with great rapidity. One was when they put a 12-hour limit on the ultimatum, in spite of the fact that very little was done for quite a time after that, and the other was this occasion. In both instances they seem to have been in a hurry to do only one thing, to forestall any action by the United Nations.
On the first occasion to which I have referred, the Security Council had actually met before that 12-hour period ran out. It would, at most, have meant making it a 24-hour ultimatum in order to see what the United Nations did, and on this occasion it would only have meant holding up the land invasion for a few hours, by which time we should have had the clarification from the Secretary-General which would have removed the cause of the operation altogether.
In the four weeks since the cease-fire there has been, even among those who have throughout supported the operation, a considerable difference of opinion. There are those who have continued to claim that the operation was a success and that worthwhile objectives were achieved, and others, equally supporters of the original operation, who say that it failed through outside pressure, through slowness of the military operation, and, perhaps, through infirmity of purpose.
I should have thought that the two major ministerial statements which we have had this week, that of the Foreign Secretary on Monday and that of the Chancellor on Tuesday, would have done a great deal at last to tear down some of the camouflage about the success of the operation. I should have thought that there could be no serious person, whether originally a supporter of the operation ox not, who could now doubt that the operation was a failure. I was, therefore, a little shocked to hear the Foreign Secretary himself upbraid those who say that it was a disastrous failure—those were the words he used—and that even now there is something morally wrong and unpatriotic in saying that it was a disastrous failure.
On the contrary, it is absolutely essential for this country to face the truth. We cannot start to devise the remedies so long as we continue practising self-deception. It has been a somewhat


depressing feature of the debate to see so many people who have apparently sought, not only to justify the original operation, but to continue to pretend that it has proved itself worth while.
That, coupled with the numerous speeches which have been mainly concerned with the denigration of all the individuals, countries and bodies upon whom we must now rely, has been a very depressing omen for the future; denigration of the United Nations, not only that it could not have acted five weeks ago had we given it the chance, but, also, that it is a hopelessly weak instrument today; denigration of the United States, to which I will come later; and the apparent brushing aside of our complaints that the Commonwealth was not fully consulted, in particular the countries in the Asian Commonwealth.
There is nothing I can do to persuade hon. Members not already persuaded of the truth that this operation is a failure, but I should like to quote one piece of evidence from a very important person who, throughout, has been a supporter of Her Majesty's Government's policy, and with whom, on practically no occasion except the one I am about to quote, have I agreed, but who, in recent days, has realistically said that the situation is worse and not better as a result of the operation. That is Mr. Menzies, the Prime Minister of Australia.
Mr. Menzies made a prepared statement, which I take from The Times of Saturday—he actually issued it on Friday—presumably after he knew what the outlines of Her Majesty's Government's decisions were to be. The Foreign Secretary was already back here and I presume that Commonwealth cooperation has not broken down so much that Mr. Menzies was not in possession of the facts. He said:
We are thus witnessing a state of affairs in which Russian morale has been elevated, the already difficult economic situation in Britain aggravated, the prestige of Britain and France in the Middle East swept aside, and the basis of Western European defence, which includes the maintenance of defensive positions in the Middle East, gravely impaired.
My point of view on most world problems is somewhat different from that of Mr. Menzies, and I would have added certain other points, but it is essential that even those who have defended the

Government's policy should have the realism of Mr. Menzies, because I do not see how we are to rebuild if we continue pretending that what we have done has been a great success.

Viscount Hinchingbrooke: The right hon. Gentleman is citing Mr. Menzies, but citing him from the attitude of his own party, which is a quite monstrous thing to do. The purpose of Mr. Menzies' intervention was to show that we should have carried through the operation from start to finish.

Mr. Younger: I thought that I had made it clear that my views on the merits of this were entirely different. I was seeking to quote Mr. Menzies only on the facts. I am not arguing whether this is the fault of those who dissuaded the Government from continuing the operation, or the fault of the Government for starting it. I am simply saying that this is a recognition of the factual result by the Prime Minister of Australia, who certainly is not prejudiced in favour of my party, or against Her Majesty's Government.
Among those who criticised today, there are, of course, those who say that the operation was a good idea, but was badly executed, and who genuinely feel that the time had come to by-pass the United Nations and strike an Anglo-French blow for what they regarded as primarily Anglo-French interests. In other words, there are people who say that this would have been a good thing if we had gone through with it. I want to make it quite clear that that was never the view of hon. Members on this side of the House. We have always believed the whole concept of this policy to be wrong and that, bad as the results are now, it would have been worse if we had not stopped on the 6th.
There are two main reasons—one of which, I believe my right hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale gave—why it would have availed little to occupy Suez and Ismailia as well as Port Said. It is an illusion to imagine that that would have finished the job. In answer to a Question today, the Minister of Defence told us that it had been calculated that it would have taken another seven days to complete the operation, and that when we had finished it our lines of communication would have been 101 miles long. Does anyone really think that the


operation could have stopped there with any worthwhile effect, from anybody's point of view?
The second reason why we were glad the Government stopped is that which was given by Mr. Pearson, of Canada, when he said, in the Canadian Parliament, that Britain and France were "very wise indeed" to have halted their operations when they did. He added:
I suggest that had they not done so the Commonwealth might not have been able to stand the strain.
If it is true that these operations would probably have had to go on for another seven days we can well believe that to be true. The fact is that hon. Members on this side of the House have never based their criticism, which was loudly voiced from the very first moment, upon any question whether there was a local success in this operation. We believed that a purely local success—which we thought would have been gained very much quicker and more completely than it was—would have terrible repercussions in the broader field. We thought that the action was fundamentally wrong, above all because it was a denial of the underlying principles guiding post-war British foreign policy.
I want briefly to summarise, under three or four headings, what I believe those principles to be. First, there has been an attempt on our part, and that of nearly all our friends, to move, however painfully, towards some kind of international authority, operating under some kind of international law or custom, to solve disputes by peaceful means. This is closely connected with what my right hon. Friend was saying about the basic change in relations between the great Powers.
It has become very widely recognised among all the great Powers that war is no longer the instrument that it used to be for settling disputes, especially among the great Powers, and also as between great and small Powers. They have recognised, therefore, that there has to be some body like the United Nations, and that it has to be given support. In this attempt to build up an international authority no nation has been perfect, but there has been a very considerable degree of acceptance—a very general acceptance among the smaller and medium Powers, and even considerable acceptance in the United

States and, as we had thought, both here and in France.
Indeed, one of the things that has divided us most sharply from the Soviet Union in recent years—certainly, to those who have attended the United Nations—has been the fact that she alone of the great Powers seemed not to be prepared to make any concessions to this new principle of an international authority. All the others were seeking to make this, in some degree, the basis of their policy.
Despite United States' backsliding, especially over Guatemala—about which hon. Members on this side of the House were very much more critical of the United States than were hon. Members opposite—no one who has been in the United States since the war can possibly doubt that the United Nations is a big factor in American foreign policy, if only because its headquarters are in that country, and the public knows about it, through radio and television, to an extent that no other public in the world does—and since public opinion plays an unusually large part in the formulation of American foreign policy it has become almost mandatory for any American Government to justify the action it takes, particularly if it is violent action, in terms of the principles of the United Nations Charter.
I therefore think that it is no mere chance that President Eisenhower is now insisting rigidly—hon. Members opposite think that he is insisting too rigidly—on sticking to the procedures of the United Nations with regard to the Middle East. I do not believe that it would be possible to persuade the United States to exert its full influence in the Middle East, as we wish, unless the United Nations were used as the medium. If that is true for the United States, it is doubly true for Canada.
In recent years, in the United Nations, I think that many of the smaller countries have often felt that it was asking a great deal of the giant Powers, the Soviet Union and the United States, to sacrifice much to United Nations because, after all, they had some possibility of "going it alone". The smaller nations thought that we, as a Power with great influence, but no longer at a level to "go it alone", could be considered the


greatest of those Powers which felt themselves deeply involved in the success of the United Nations.
We have, therefore, within the United Nations been able, I believe, to exert a leadership somewhat out of proportion to our real strength. I think that that was why there was such a shock in the United Nations when we and France, chose, as it seemed to nearly the whole world, to engage in a violation of the Charter. That is why I think that there was apparently a moment of despair on the part of the Secretary-General when, as hon. Members know, he offered his resignation. One must assume that it was because he thought that instead of having only one great Power, the Soviet Union, on whose non-co-operation he was forced to count, there were no fewer than three.
I believe that the first thing we have to do is to try to recover our status within the United Nations, and I am sure we cannot do that, by defiantly repeating that in this matter we were right and the other 60 nations were wrong. This is a very practical point. If we do, all the United Nations are bound to feel that if we ever see the chance of "going it alone" successfully again we shall do it again.
The second point I wish to make is closely related to my point about the United Nations. Another principle of our policy has been the need to establish entirely new relationships with Asia and with Africa, but particularly with Asia. After all, that is the main objective and will prove to be the real test of the modern multi-racial Commonwealth. This is linked with the United Nations, because I believe that it is only under the protection of the Charter and within the principles laid down there that we shall be able to succeed in—[Interruption.]

Mr. G. Lindgren: On a point of order. May we claim your protection, Mr. Speaker? Some of us came in to the Chamber to listen to the debate, but the Colonial Secretary and other Ministers seem to be preventing us from doing so by their cross-conversation. Will you ask them to cease?

Mr. Speaker: I could hear what the right hon. Member for Grimsby (Mr. Younger) was saying with perfect clarity, but I hope that conversation will be kept to the minimum.

Mr. Younger: I am grateful to you, Mr. Speaker.
The point I was trying to make was that one of our urgent tasks was to assist so far as we may in securing cooperation between the United States and India, who are going to be extremely influential in these Middle East matters. I believe that it is only through the United Nations, only through a worldwide body and one which cannot be identified only with the West, that we shall achieve that end.
I want to say something about Anglo-American co-operation which, since the war, has undoubtedly been one of the pillars of our policy. The two countries have disagreed before, both over the Far East and the Middle East, and we have had misunderstandings between us. But here there was something very different, a deliberate failure on our part to consult or even keep our American friends informed. I do not know of any other instance where we have behaved like that since the war. We failed to keep them informed of this drastic step, taken in conjunction with the French, and one which was out of line with what had been previously discussed with the United States. Her Majesty's Government should offer a much better explanation than they have yet given of why they did it. I do not see how, without a great deal of frankness, we can hope to be trusted again by the United States in this matter.
The hon. Member for Ealing, South said he thought that there was no point in going into all these questions of the past. I believe that there is. We are entitled to have the reputation of our country restored in this matter and it should be quite simple for the Government to do so, if they are willing to. I want to base myself purely on known and admitted facts. We know from the mouths of Ministers that the Foreign Secretary saw the American Ambassador early on the day when the ultimatum was delivered. That was the 30th. We are told that it was before Cabinet, probably about 9.30 in the morning. What is the context of this? On the morning of the 30th we had known of the Israeli mobilisation for about five days. We had for about two days information from the 10th Hussars, and


from other sources, for all I know, about concentrations in the Negev. The Minister of Defence said that today.

Mr. Head: I did not mention the 10th Hussars today.

Mr. Younger: No.

Mr. Head: The right hon. Gentleman said that we knew from the 10th Hussars, and I never mentioned the 10th Hussars. In fact, the 10th Hussars sent information which did not reach us until afterwards. The right hon. Gentleman might be accurate.

Mr. Younger: We were told a few days ago about the 10th Hussars. We were told categorically today, without any particular source, 10th Hussars or otherwise, being mentioned, that we knew of concentrations in the Negev between the 26th and 28th.
In any case, on the morning of the 30th the attack had actually been launched, so there can be no question but that we knew in which direction the attack was being launched. All these facts were known when the Foreign Secretary saw the Ambassador. My understanding is that no hint of the policy which was to be known later in the day was at that time given to the Ambassador. I shall be very astonished if the Foreign Secretary will deny that now. He has been challenged on it and all he is prepared to say is that he did not mislead the Ambassador. If he did not mislead the Ambassador, in those circumstances surely all we can assume is that he himself did not know about this forthcoming decision.
If he knew about it and did not mention it surely that was misleading. I find it barely credible that the Foreign Secretary, when he met the Ambassador in the morning, knew nothing about the proposals which were to be perfected and published as a completed ultimatum later that afternoon, but if he did not, let us hear it. If he did not know, then are we to assume that all these decisions were taken from scratch, not having been coordinated with anybody, with the French Government or anybody else, between that time and four o'clock in the afternoon?
This really would be very extraordinary if true, whereas, of course, it would not be

particularly extraordinary that that ultimatum was drafted, prepared and issued, if all that was required was to dot the i's and cross the t's of something provisionally worked out already with the French Government. This takes us back to the widespread belief that on 16th October, in Paris, and on 23rd October, in London, these matters must have been discussed. Only the participants, who had no advisers with them, know what happened, but the Foreign Secretary really should consider how this looks to the whole world from outside, and what the whole world will believe unless he denies it.
The context of the meeting of the 16th was that the French—I think there is no doubt about this; I shall be surprised if it is disputed—knew that an Israeli operation of some kind was pending. We have heard much about the deals in arms between the French and Israelis. They knew it but it does not follow of course, and I do not believe it to be the case, that the Israelis knew of any impending French operation. We know that there was great disappointment between the British and French Governments about the vetoing of the Canal Resolution, the one the Foreign Secretary referred to, on the 13th in New York. We know that just before this meeting Mr. Dulles had officially stated that he was not prepared to have the Canal Users' Association used as a means of coercing Egypt.
We had a speech made in the French Chamber by M. Pineau on the day of his meeting with the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary in which he railed against the Americans, emphasised the need for Anglo-French co-operation, said there was to be a meeting with the Prime Minister which would be of capital importance, and told the deputies that he still had many trumps in hand. He then went straight off to the meeting.
The meeting on 23rd was even more sudden. M. Pineau flew over and saw the Foreign Secretary between eight o'clock in the evening and midnight. The context of that was that a few days before the arms yacht, the "Athos", had been captured by the French Government; the day before, the Algerian leaders had been arrested; the day before, the French are reported to have learned of Israel's mobilisation proposals, and the same day


M. Mollet, in Paris, was withdrawing the Ambassador from Egypt.
Can it really be in that context that at these two meetings there was not a discussion of the opportunity that this impending operation might offer for intervening to halt Nasser's activities? Are we asked to believe that? If that was not what was discussed, why were the Americans not being kept in close touch with all these matters?
There is also the confusion about the Tripartite Declaration, where the Americans were also kept in the dark. The discussions were on the 28th and 29th. On the 30th, the Americans issued from the White House an official statement making it clear that they believed the Tripartite Declaration to be in full operation. There was no mention of any kind of exception for Egypt at all.
I have rather overrun my time on this matter. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] I promised that I would give the Minister of Defence adequate time to reply. I would point out that of our basic policies in the Middle East, we have always been told that the Tripartite Declaration and the Bagdad Pact were the two pillars. We have been becoming decreasingly enthusiastic about both of them, and we will not be satisfied with a mere restoration of the status quo. The fact is, however, that recent events have destroyed both those pillars, and we have as yet had nothing from the Government about what they propose to put in their place.
As we say in our Amendment, we believe that the step which has to be taken, before anything can be done in detail, is to restore our relations with the United Nations, with the Commonwealth and with our allies. Alas, it may well be that temporarily we shall have to leave most of the initiative in this matter to others. We have to work through our friends. We know that we shall get the fullest co-operation from Canada, from India and, no doubt, now from the United States—[Laughter.] It should be put on record that there was loud Tory laughter at the statement about co-operation with India.
In conclusion, I beg the Government to try now, whatever the mistakes of the past may have been, to think of the Middle Eastern problem not as one of maintaining some special position, least

of all a military position, by Britain alone or Britain and France alone, or even Britain, France and the United States alone. We should remember what was said by Mr. St. Laurent:
The era when the supermen of Europe could govern the whole world is coming to an end.
Let us not look at it in this way, but rather as at a problem of world wide co-operation which, since it involves Powers of East and West, both inside and outside the Commonwealth, can only be solved under the authority of the United Nations. It is because we believe that the Government's policy has cut across these basic principles of British policy—

Hon. Members: Sit down.

Mr. Younger: —that we shall vote against the Government tomorrow.

Mr. Bevan: On a point of order. The noble Lord the Member for Dorset, South (Viscount Hinchingbrooke), ever since he came into the House, has been indulging in loud interjections, making it almost impossible for us to hear my right hon. Friend's speech. I am astonished that he has been permitted to do so without being pulled up.

Captain Richard Pilkington: Further to that point of order. May I point out, Sir, that during the whole of this debate there have been continuous interruptions from Opposition benches?

Mr. Speaker: Two blacks do not make a white. I myself did not hear these continuous interruptions.

Mr. Bevan: I do not at all object to hon. Members interrupting. It is part of the informality of our proceedings, but a continual interruption of the sort we have been having is really quite intolerable, Mr. Speaker.

Mr. Speaker: I did not hear it in that sense. Mr. Head.

9.40 p.m.

The Minister of Defence (Mr. Antony Head): During the whole of the discussion—[Interruption.] The right hon. Member for Ipswich (Mr. Stokes) is a very fine example of what his right hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan) was complaining about. I also hope that the right hon. Gentleman will


restrain his right hon. Friend as a favour to me.
During the whole of the discussion of this problem, I think I have been in the Chamber for practically every one of the very frequent, repeated and very heated debates. I do not think anybody in this House would disagree if I said that during the majority of those discussions passions have risen very high and we have been very close to the subject we have been considering, the recent operations concerned with the Suez Canal. I personally cannot escape the feeling that some of our discussions have suffered from the fact that we have been so much divorced from the circumstances which have led up to the situation which confronted the Government and the general problems with which the Government were confronted in the circumstances of today.
May I very briefly say two things and two only. The first is the extent to which we—this country—have been left alone to look after the Middle East, which forms a vital part of the defence of the West as a whole. I am not given to grubbing about in my old speeches—I leave that to the hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg)—but, if the House will bear with me, I wish to read one short sentence from my maiden speech, made in 1946. I then said:
There are many people within and outside America who would like her to stand away, but modern inventions and modern war have made her one in a world strategic balance. It is a very far cry from the Middle East to the Middle West, but strategically they form part of the same defences."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 20th February, 1946; Vol. 419, c. 1179.]
That is the nub of the problem with which the Government have been confronted. I wish no recrimination, but we have had N.A.T.O., we have had S.E.A.T.O., we have had the Bagdad Pact and we have had a blank in the Middle East.
The second point is background, which hon. Members will forgive me mentioning very briefly, because I am short of time. It was referred to by the right hon. Member for Ebbw Vale in a speech during the hurly-burly of recent days, the first part of which—I hope I shall not embarrass him—showed some very deep thinking; but I did not like the second part. He said—and it is true—that atomic weapons have formed an umbrella under which the burglar can operate.
In other words, the power of modern weapons has produced a situation in which there is such reluctance to use force that the sanction of force in itself has to a large extent been removed. That is coupled with the fact that the United Nations, unless it works and is effective, is another influence in that direction. Matters are referred to it, long talks take place, nothing happens, and again the burglar has got away with it. So there are now two umbrellas and we should not forget those two umbrellas when we consider the action the Government recently took. There is the background which should always be in our minds if anyone is to think about the matter fairly.
What are the main divergences in this House today about the action of the Government? I should say there are two—those who were opposed to intervention at all, and those who regret the withdrawal as being a humiliation. That is so, roughly speaking, although perhaps one would be over-simplifying. We intervened and our intervention has been discussed in this House as I venture to think nothing else has ever been discussed. It has been gone through with a tooth comb by hon. Members passionately, and practically, in every kind of way, but one thing has been hardly discussed at all and no one has gone into that. I agree that it is a matter of hypothesis, but what would have happened if we had not intervened? Very few hon. Members have made speeches about that. I have heard no really careful speeches on that subject.

Mr. Charles Royle: Petrol would have been 4s. 7d. a gallon.

Mr. Head: Although I am not frightened at being interrupted, I should point out that I am pushed for time and am trying to say what I want to say. If we had not intervened we should have referred this matter to the United Nations. I am trying to be practical and not critical, but I maintain that although resolutions would have been passed, emergency meetings and so forth would have taken place, the war would not have been stopped.
Supposing the war had not been stopped. The right hon. Member for Bishop Auckland (Mr. Dalton) said, "We should have let the Israelis rip and


Nasser would have been defeated." I thought that was quite a tough remark when he had shown such interest in the question of casualties. In any event, I am not certain that what he says is right. Hon. Members who say that have made many assumptions without recalling the facts. We know the effort which Russia had made in materials and, in particular, in aircraft. In Egypt, received from Russia, were quite a lot—between 50 and 60—of good long-range bombers; the only good long-range bombers in that part of the world. The Balkan airfields are nearby. Can anybody be sure that aircraft would not have been flown into the Middle East in the middle of the conflict? Can anybody forecast what would have been the effect of those bombers had it not been for the grounding of the Egyptian air force by British intervention?
This is hypothesis, but I am saying that any hon. Member who entirely discounts the possibility, if the war had continued, of Russian intervention, of Egyptian bombers and of intervention by the other Arab States, is unwise. I think anybody would be a fool to rule it out as impossible that we should have ended with a crippled Israel, a bombed Tel Aviv and a united Arab world of which, under Russian arms and Russian influence, Nasser would have been the head. [HON. MEMBERS: "NO."] We cannot rule it out. It is a fact that we cannot rule it out.
Perhaps hon. Members want it the other way. Assume that the Israelis had gone straight through and completely wiped out the Egyptians. Would it be a very good state of affairs to have a dominant Israel surrounded by fearful Arab States? It would have been one extreme or the other. Non-intervention would have led to a continuance of the war and, in my opinion, it would have led to a situation with far fewer good prospects and much greater difficulties than the present situation. That is the policy of hon. Members opposite.

Hon. Members: No.

Mr. Bevan: If the right hon. Gentleman is telling us that he went to war on a hypothesis of that sort, I can give a much more alarming hypothesis under which to go to war with several other nations.

Mr. Head: I think that was below the right hon. Gentleman's standard. What I am saying is that hon. Members opposite must look one fact in the face—that non-intervention meant a continuance of the war. It is true that if we had referred the matter to the United Nations, we should have behaved, as hon. Members sincerely wished, with complete moral rectitude, but undue insistence on moral rectitude in matters like this can be a means of dodging hard and difficult decisions which are the only way of achieving a solution which ensures the safety of this country. I am aware of the dilemma of hon. Members opposite, but it is a fact. [HON. MEMBERS: "It is not our dilemma."] It is a dilemma because this insistence on high moral rectitude has got the world, and many individuals, into fearful trouble. I am extremely worried by that, but it is the reason for almost all appeasements.
In the other context, concerning the withdrawal, I would say this to hon. Gentlemen. There are many hon. Members who felt great humiliation over our withdrawal. I felt something of that myself—that on an occasion when British troops have intervened, a withdrawal is, by connotation and past experience, a humiliation. A withdrawal without getting any assurances or terms is associated in that way. But this particular operation was, I suggest, entirely different from the kind of operation where armed force is used entirely to impose a solution. This action was not taken for that reason—it was done to stop a war—and we invited into that area an international force. The moment that that international force was invited into Egypt—[Interruption.]—perhaps I might be allowed to finish my sentence—the moment that that international force was invited in, withdrawal of our force was inevitable.
During those operations, I tried to give a background of probabilities to the Commander-in-Chief. When this United Nations Force was invited in, and the invitation was accepted, I sent a signal to him and said, "Withdrawal of our forces is inevitable and you should make plans to prepare for that. There are no orders at the present time, but the policy, in my opinion—unless something different happens—is bound to lead to a withdrawal."
What I am saying to hon. Members is that if one asks for the intervention of an international force, and if one asks the United Nations to settle the dispute about the future of the Canal, withdrawal is inevitable, and sitting it out indefinitely in the area can lead only to a state where one is making it impossible for an organisation such as the United Nations to settle that dispute. It seems to me that that cannot be done so long as one remains in that field.
I have not as much time as I would have liked, but I should like to deal briefly with other points raised in the debate today.

Mr. E. Fernyhough: Mr. E. Fernyhough (Jarrow) rose—

Mr. Head: No, I have not the time.
The right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Leicester, South-East (Captain Waterhouse) posed a certain number of questions which had particular reference to my responsibilities, and, if I may, I should like very briefly to answer them. He said, first of all, that there was no plan for quick action and that, in his opinion, a plan for quick action would have made a very great difference. I would point out most strongly that there are two types of action that can be taken. One is intervention which is airborne and rapid by light forces on a jeep basis. That is the first type. The second is the operation where one is up against strong ground forces, and where one has to have heavy weapons. That is the second type, and that type of operation can go ahead only in large ships; and it needs a large supporting element of administration, arms and weapons. In no circumstances can such an operation be mounted in a matter of 48 hours. It is a military impossibility. I plead this only because this happens to be, because of my past life, a subject which I do understand.
The right hon. and gallant Gentleman spoke of the Service Ministers not being concerned with the planning. I was concerned with planning as a planner and I have been a Service Minister for five years. It is not the job of Service Ministers to plan; it is the job of the joint planners working to the Chiefs of Staff and to whatever committee the Prime Minister appoints. It is the job of the Chiefs of Staff to keep Service Ministers informed, and it is the job of the Service Ministers to represent any matters of

policy with which they disagree. But the planning is not the job of the Service Ministers, and never has been.
The right hon. and gallant Gentleman also stated—and I am grateful to him for stating it—that this operation was carried out mercifully. I should like to underline that fact. I myself saw something for a very short time of a few of the commanders and a very few of the forces during a very brief visit to Cyprus. But one thing that struck me was that this spirit of carrying out this operation with the minimum of casualties was paramount throughout our forces. I believe that if the United Nations had teeth, and if the United Nations had to intervene to stop someone else using their teeth, this would be very nearly a sealed-pattern operation for that kind of intervention.
The right hon. and gallant Gentleman also mentioned the United States, and he referred to them as our erstwhile friends. I feel very strongly indeed that there are many different ways of having a row. One can have a row and can hug it to one's bosom and make it poison relations throughout the rest of one's life. I have had rows, and I would quote if I may—he is not in his place, fortunately—my right hon. Friend the Member for Woodford (Sir W. Churchill). It is possible to have a fearful row with him, as many hon. Members know, and the next day it is gone. That is due to magnanimity and bigness of mind. All I am saying to the House is that in this row with America, if we hug it to ourselves and let it poison relations for the future, in my opinion, we are done.
Let us not recriminate, I beg hon. Members. In the future the whole of the Western world has got one object, as I see it, and that is to stop domination by Communism. In my opinion, one of the greatest victories which will occur to the Communists is if we continue this row between ourselves and the United States into the future.
I believe that our object is one, and one alone, and that is that through the United Nations and through our relations with the United States, the two of them should co-operate in an area which we have been left to handle alone, and where the greatest single danger to our country and the West has been occurring. I believe that this operation has exposed


it, has shown it to America and has brought the United Nations into the area.
We are at the moment in a period of some depression. I am saying that that always happens. In political affairs, what matters is not the situation today here in the House of Commons but the expectations. I say sincerely to the House that ever since 1945 I have prayed for United States co-operation in the Middle East. It has been the one vulnerable link in the chain. I believe that the Government's action has given teeth to the United Nations, the best chance of settling disputes. There are strong signs of American intervention in that part of the world. If the whole of this started over again, knowing what we do, and if we went back to that position, I say absolutely unhesitatingly that I would do precisely the same thing again.

Debate adjourned.—[Mr. Godber.]

Debate to be resumed Tomorrow.

WAYS AND MEANS

Considered in Committee.

[Sir GORDON TOUCHE in the Chair]

HYDROCARBON OILS, ETC. (CUSTOMS AND EXCISE)

9.59 p.m.

The Financial Secretary to the Treasury (Mr. Henry Brooke): I beg to move,
That, as from six o'clock in the evening of the fourth day of December, nineteen hundred and fifty-six, there shall be an increase of one shilling a gallon in the rate of the duty of customs on hydrocarbon oils, and the rates of the excise duties on hydrocarbon oils, petrol substitutes, and spirits used for making power methylated spirits, and of the rebates of the customs and excise duties on hydrocarbon oils (which under the relevant enactments depend on the rate of the customs duty on hydrocarbon oils) shall be increased accordingly;
And any Act giving effect to this Resolution may include provision relaxing, in view of the increase in the said duties, any limitations imposed by virtue of conditions attached to a road service licence under section seventy-two of the Road Traffic Act, 1930, on the fares chargeable for the carriage of passengers in public service vehicles, or imposed by virtue of a charges scheme under Part V of the Transport Act, 1947, on the fares chargeable by the London Transport Executive.
And it is hereby declared that it is expedient in the public interest that this Resolution should have statutory effect under the provisions of the Provisional Collection of Taxes Act, 1913.
I hope that the Committee will not think me discourteous if I am brief. At this stage of our discussion on this proposal I suggest that brevity has very special merits, for this reason, if for no other. As recently as yesterday my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer described at some length the broad considerations of economic and budgetary policy which led him to propose an increase in the fuel tax. Very soon we shall be discussing the details on a Bill, which will be quite -short, but it cannot be printed or published until this Resolution has been agreed to in Committee here and on Report. It is our intention to bring in the Bill tomorrow night and, as my right hon. Friend the Leader of the House said yesterday, it is proposed that it might be read a Second time next Monday, the remaining stages being taken later next week.
There will, in this way, be an opportunity, which we shall welcome, within the very near future to discuss this proposal both in its broad aspects and in its detail. Tonight, therefore, I might be trespassing on the patience of the Committee if I did more than remind it that the proposal in this Resolution is to increase the duty on petrol and other light hydrocarbon oils and derv by 1s. a gallon from six o'clock yesterday evening.
Beyond this bare fact, there are two points of interest which I particularly wish to mention. It is impossible to make concessions by way of rebate from the increased duty to any class of consumer. Nevertheless, I am very much aware that there is one group, in particular, whom the Committee would wish, if possible, to shield from hardship, namely, disabled persons, whether ex-Service pensioners or civilians, who depend for getting about on a motor invalid tricycle or other vehicle.
For technical reasons, it would be impossible to give them relief from the tax as such, but my right hon. Friends the Minister of Health and the Secretary of State for Scotland propose to increase the allowances which they make towards the running costs of invalid vehicles used by disabled persons in such a way that hardship may be avoided.
My second point relates to what are properly called public service vehicles, to which, perhaps, for the sake of brevity and clarity, I may refer as buses. Quite clearly, the increase in the duty will increase the operating expenses of bus undertakings. Road passenger operators, including municipal undertakings, are generally operating on small margins of profit, and all of them could not absorb all of this increased cost.
They are not in a position to increase their charges except through a procedure laid down by Statute which, in most cases, takes several months. Procedure taking that length of time is obviously quite inappropriate to the present situation, when we are taking immediate action to deal on a temporary basis with a temporary emergency. For that reason, we are proposing to provide in the Bill authority for road passenger vehicle operators to make strictly limited and temporary increases in fares without the necessity to go right through the usual

procedure. It would certainly be reasonable to expect that the operators, in deciding by how much they ought to increase their charges, will take fully into account any operating factors resulting from the present situation which tell in the opposite direction.
I thought I should mention these matters, as they are new. Having done that, I do not propose to add anything more now to what my right hon. Friend said yesterday, which will be very fresh in the minds of right hon. and hon. Gentlemen. We do not in any way shirk discussion on this Resolution, and I shall, of course, be very glad to deal with any points which may be raised in the course of debate. I would, however, submit that it may be for the general convenience of the Committee if we do not find it necessary to spend very long on this Resolution tonight, because within the next few days there will certainly be opportunity to discuss the whole matter with the advantage of having the Bill in front of us, and, if I may humbly say so, at a more convenient hour of the day.

Mr. John Howard: May I ask my right hon. Friend whether taxis are included in the provision which he says refers to buses? Have the taxi operators an opportunity to make immediate application to put up their fares?

Mr. Brooke: They are under a rather different form of control. No change in the law would be necessary if taxi fares were to be increased. I will certainly deal with that later.

Mr. Gordon Walker: I agree with the Financial Secretary that this would not be the occasion for a full-scale debate on this very important matter. There will be other occasions—I think that the Lord Privy Seal told us that the Second Reading of the Bill is to be on Monday—when we can cover the whole matter at length. There is another reason why we should not debate this matter very much tonight. That is the actual form of the Bill, because although the Chancellor has gone out of his way to say that he is not introducing an autumn Budget or an interim Budget, he is in fact doing that.
I understand the Chancellor's reluctance to call it an autumn Budget, after


his rather scathing remarks about the Lord Privy Seal's autumn Budget last year. In practice, this is just as much a supplementary Budget as the one introduced by the Lord Privy Seal in October last year. The effective part of that supplementary Budget was the Purchase Tax which raised taxes by the annual rate of £75 million. The Chancellor's present proposal will raise taxes at the annual rate of £90 million. It is indeed a bigger alteration to our fiscal system than that contained in the previous autumn Budget. In practice, this ought to be called Finance (No. 1) Bill. We are really debating a Budget Resolution before a Finance Bill. It is, of course, not customary to debate such a Resolution at length or for the Opposition to state its main views on the merits of the matter at that stage.
There is one point which I consider of some urgency. I take it, from the statement which the Chancellor made yesterday, that the extent of the fiscal changes depends upon America granting us a waiver on the interest payments on our debts, because he was assuming in the context of the general statement which he made about the balance of payments the difficulty that we were in and the run on gold reserves. I take it that if America did not agree to the waiver he would have to consider further and more considerable fiscal changes. In that case it is unfortunate that there should still be on the Order Paper a Motion criticising America in open and frank terms, signed by nearly half the Members of the Chancellor's party. I think it would be in accord with the Chancellor's appeal to everybody, with which we agree, to do everything possible to defend the £ that that Motion be taken off the Order Paper before we discuss the Second Reading of the Bill.
The Chancellor appealed to all of us to save the £, and we agree with that and will, for our part, do everything we can to help save the £ whether we are in Opposition or whether it should come to us to be in office. We have, however, very grave doubts about the relevance to our economic situation of the proposal which the Chancellor is to introduce in the Bill. It is bound to be inflationary. The changes to be made in the statutory

law to enable bus undertakings to raise fares shows how quickly inflationary anything that affects the cost of transport is bound to be. We agree very much with the proposed change to help disabled people who have vehicles, but, of course, there may be similar changes that we shall want to make in that direction. We will, of course, consider the general merits and details of this proposal very carefully when we get the Bill before us, and we will want time to deploy our arguments on the main theme and to consider and draft Amendments.

Mr. Ellis Smith: Can there be any merits in it?

Mr. Gordon Walker: I was using the term "merits" in an entirely colourless sense, which includes demerits.
Obviously, we cannot declare our opinion until we have seen the Bill, but we have the gravest doubts about whether this is a wise or relevant act, or, indeed, whether it is not really bad because it is getting in the light of a lot of other things that ought to be done instead.
With that general expression of our opinion, until we see the Bill, I would advise my hon. Friends on this side that it would be wise not to go at great length into the merits or demerits tonight and to keep our main fire for Monday on Second Reading.

Mr. Walter Elliot: There are only two things I should like to say. The first is a small point as to whether it is possible not to increase taxation on home-produced fuel. The purpose of these proposals is to limit the consumption of fuel, but it should also have the effect of developing any home sources, and I trust that it will be possible to find a means by which home-produced oil fuel will not suffer this extra taxation.
The right hon. Member for Smethwick (Mr. Gordon Walker) made an ill-advised statement about the waiver. I am opposed to asking for a waiver from the United States of America, and I hope it will not be asked for. I hope, therefore, that these arguments advanced by the right hon. Gentleman will not arise.

Mr. Gordon Walker: Is the right hon. Gentleman in favour of that Motion remaining on the Order Paper? All I asked for was its withdrawal.

Mr. Elliot: The right hon. Gentleman was begging that the waiver should be granted.

Mr. Gordon Walker: I did not say that. I said that I assumed that the Chancellor, in making these proposals, was counting on the waiver being accepted by America. I said nothing else about it, except to say that the Motion on the Order Paper did not fit in with that view of the Chancellor and that it ought to be withdrawn.

Mr. Elliot: That is what I was arguing against. I am not in favour of asking for a waiver. [Interruption.] I have opposed my Front Bench before on various points, and I am quite willing to put this case forward whether it is agreed to by the Front Bench or not.
To go at this moment to the United States asking for a waiver would be to put ourselves on the wrong foot entirely in the great arguments which are about to take place. As the whole House knows, I was not in favour of the original Motion. Indeed, some of us put down a counter Motion of our own. That argument does not enter into it.

Mr. F. Blackburn: Would the right hon. Gentleman apply the same argument concerning oil from America?

Mr. Elliot: I do not see that that has anything to do with the matter. We are talking of asking for a relief from interest payments which are due, and I was saying that I was not in favour of that. I am sticking to one point at a time. The point has been raised tonight, and I am merely taking the earliest possible moment to say that I hope my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer will not ask for a waiver from the United States.

The Chairman (Sir Charles MacAndrew): The right hon. Gentleman is going beyond the terms of the Motion.

10.15 p.m.

Mr. Harold Wilson: Further to that point of order. What we have tonight is technically a Budget debate on a Ways and Means Resolution under the auspices of the Provisional Collection of Taxes Act, 1913, to give effect to what was, in effect, a Budget statement

yesterday. Whereas we all recognise that it is usually customary that we debate the last of a series of Resolutions, which is a wide one, talking of changes in fiscal policy, I submit that there are abundant precedents that on a Ways and Means Resolution a wide debate could take place even though the outstanding Resolution—in this case, the only Resolution may be very narrow.
Erskine May, if I read him aright, suggested that in 1929 the whole debate took place on a Resolution dealing with the tea duty. It will be in the recollection of this Committee and of yourself, Sir Charles, that in the Election Budget of 1955 there was no general Resolution standing open, because, of course, the Government's desire was to preclude debate on the Finance Bill. Again, on the autumn Budget of last year, which was the precursor of this one tonight, the whole of the debate took place on one of the outstanding Ways and Means Resolutions, which was a very narrow and technical point. On that occasion, Sir Charles, you did not yourself in any way prevent us having a Budget debate.
Having said that, may I reinforce the plea of my right hon. Friend that we should debate these matters more conveniently next week? However, I wanted to make the point, since this may be a precedent for further Budgets slipped in by the back door, that there should not be a strict Ruling from the Chair which, I submit, is quite contrary to that given on earlier Budget debates.

The Chairman: I have listened to what the right hon. Gentleman has said with great interest, but what will be in order on the Second Reading of the Bill when it comes forward I would not now, of course, like to say. But this Resolution deals only with hydrocarbon oils and I think that we ought to confine ourselves to that matter at present.

Mr. Wilson: I have made it clear, Sir Charles, that I do not feel that we ought to have a long debate, but I think that an important precedent is involved here in case the Government leave on the Order Paper a very narrow Resolution dealing with hydrocarbon oils and thereby hope to preclude the whole debate. I submit that this Resolution is exactly parallel to the 1929 Resolution on the tea duty and to those in the Budget debates of April and October, 1955.

The Chairman: I think the right hon. Gentleman will agree with me that on the occasions which he recited there were several Resolutions before the one left over. On this occasion, we are dealing with only one Resolution, and I think he will agree that when we are dealing with only one Resolution we can deal only with that. On this occasion, it is down for debate as the tea duty Resolution was also left over for debate.

Mr. Wilson: I think there is a point here which affects the rights of the House and which ought to be cleared up. I apologise to the right hon. Member for Kelvingrove (Mr. Elliot), with whose views we sympathise and from whom we would like to hear more in a moment. Erskine May says that there is nothing before the Committee, but the last Resolution—

The Chairman: In this case, it is the only one.

Mr. Wilson: I apologise, Sir Charles, if I am raising a point on which you have not had an opportunity of taking advice.

The Chairman: I know all about it.

Mr. Wilson: In that case, Sir Charles, I hope that you will elucidate the point to the Committee and will give the necessary instructions, because what has happened in previous debates is that all the Resolutions to which you referred, those other than the last, will have been agreed to by the House. Therefore, there is one Motion before the House. That is the position. This Resolution before the House is the only Resolution and, therefore, the last one. It is the last, it is also the first. In page 770, Eskine May says:
… during the subsequent days in committee on the budget resolutions there is nothing formally before the committee but the last resolution—generally that for the purpose of amending the fiscal law….
Then there is footnote (q) which says:
In 1929 the resolution for the repeal of the tea duty was used for this purpose.
There is nothing in Erskine May or in Standing Orders to say that this rule is varied in cases where there is only one Resolution. The Chancellor seems to be

muttering something. I am sure that his advice would be useful to the Committee.

The Chairman: It is quite simple. If a thing is last and there is only one, it is also first.

Mr. Elliot: May I say that I fully appreciate the strength of your Ruling, Sir Charles, and intend to submit myself to it? I do not think that the point taken by the right hon. Member for Huyton (Mr. H. Wilson) is fully valid. This in the usual way is the Financial Resolution to a Bill, and it cannot be claimed that it is in any way a supplementary Budget or any kind of Budget. I hope to have the opportunity of developing the topic I raised later. I am sure your Ruling is right, and I submit myself to it.

Mr. Ellis Smith: Sir Dennis—[Laughter.] Those of us who understand what is behind that slip can laugh more than others. I regret the slip, Sir Charles.
We have received advice from both sides of the Committee the logic of which is that we should not take our opportunity to raise questions on this Motion. I understand that the Motion is that from which the Government derive their authority to increase the price of oil from six o'clock last night, but it would be wrong for us to acquiesce in that without making a few observations about it. I want to place on record not only my opposition to the proposal, but also the opposition of a large number of my hon. Friends.
Since the end of the war, even during the war, industry has responded to appeal after appeal. Local transport committees have run great risks and municipal transport undertakings have run into losses in making their contribution towards the avoidance of inflation. Now they are faced with this increase. It is very discouraging to those who have made such a magnificent contribution. On behalf of many of my hon. Friends, and many people engaged in local authority activity and in large-scale industry—I mean undertakings employing between 20,000 and 30,000 people, where large transport services must be provided at the works' gates every morning and evening—I say that we ought to have opposed this Motion tonight.

Mr. James Simmons: I want to take this opportunity to express my appreciation of the fact that Ministry of Health motor tricycles are to have special consideration. Will 8 horse-power cars for limbless men—double amputation cases—be included? What is the position of disabled men who do not use motor-propelled vehicles, but who use public transport and who will be heavily handicapped by the increases in public transport fares throughout the country? In many cities, including Birmingham, disabled men receive free passes on local authority transport.
I wonder whether the appropriate Ministry—the Ministry of Health, or the Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance—could find a way of providing the same coverage for all leg-disabled men using both privately-owned and municipally-owned transport. It would be a very small concession. I understand that local authorities estimate that £5 a year covers the cost of a free pass for a legless disabled ex-Service man. Could that provision be extended to cover those who will be hit hard by the increase in fares due to the petrol tax? While the Minister is thinking about that, will he consider the old-age pensioners as well?

Mr. David Jones: I am astonished at the suggestion of the Minister that we should set on one side all the elaborate legislation which Parliament set up some years ago to protect the travelling public against undue increases by public transport authorities. Both privately-owned and municipally-owned authorities have to go through a whole series of processes at the moment. They have to publish the application in notices and proceedings, and go through various other procedures, and time has to elapse between each of those steps before their application is finally heard by the Traffic Commissioners and authority is given to make an increase.
The Government are now apparently prepared to set on one side all this elaborate machinery, which has worked for the past twenty years, in order to get them out of a difficulty. It was only recently, under the 1953 Act, that the party opposite sought to compel the British Transport Commission to secure licences of this kind through these licensing courts, to protect the public against undue increases. Now they want to concertina

the necessary procedure into a few days so that municipalities will find it easier to obtain increases. In fact, they are doing this to get them out of their difficulty.
In the case of some services the number of miles per gallon obtained by double-decker buses running on fuel oil on heavy routes is very small. The Chancellor's estimate of an increase of one-fifth of 1d. yesterday will be ridiculed by municipal authorities and every public transport organisation in the country. It will cost a good deal more. Workmen's fares will have to be increased substantially to meet the extra cost.
If the right hon. Gentleman wants to prevent the demand for increased wages which is bound to arise he will find himself in considerable difficulty. He is not prepared to make a sacrifice in relation to the proportion of the revenue which he will derive from the tax; he now suggests that we should set on one side all the elaborate machinery set up under the 1930 and 1933 Acts in order to get him out of a difficulty. I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Stoke-on-Trent, South (Mr. Ellis Smith) that we should not accept the Motion without opposition.

Mr. Arthur Lewis: I want to oppose the Motion and to say that I am rather surprised that the Minister did not take the opportunity to tell us the reason for it. I suppose he is assuming that we will understand the necessity for it from the Chancellor's statement yesterday, but that statement did not give us the real reason and the Financial Secretary has not explained it tonight.
I want to know why this exorbitant tax has been put on petrol and hydrocarbon oil. Is it because the Government want the general public and industry to use less oil? Is it, on the other hand, because the Chancellor is anxious to save dollar expenditure? Or is it because he is hoping to recoup the losses—I think they amount to £6 million a month—caused by a decline in the consumption of petrol?
10.30 p.m.
The Foreign Secretary recently confessed to me that there is oil and petrol available for sterling. He also confessed that in Western Germany—good luck to


them—there is no petrol rationing, and that they do not have to pay an extra tax on petrol. I am pleased to know that Western Germany is in that position. But I am told the reason is that they have Rumanian and Russian oil and petrol. When I asked the Foreign Secretary to find out whether we could have some Rumanian and Russian- oil and petrol, he did not attempt to go into the question. Are we paying an extra 1s. because we have to have oil from the Middle East? If that is the reason, the Chancellor should attempt to get oil from other sources.
The right hon. Gentleman has not explained the real reason for this increase. If it is to cut consumption, let us have the rigid enforcement of rationing. Otherwise, the Chancellor's statement that he wants to stop inflation is ludicrous. I think the right hon. Gentleman said that the cost of living would rise by one-third of one point, but I am sure he knows that is not in accordance with the facts. There are a thousand-and-one things involved in the increase. It will result in an increase in the cost of bread deliveries. Moreover, most modern bakeries use oil to fuel their fires, and bakers are anticipating a further increase, in addition to the increase which the Chancellor has imposed.
I am told that there are a number of other commodities, such as fruit and vegetables—in fact, almost every item to be found in a housewife's basket—that will go up in price. Surely the Chancellor does not want to see that? If he does, there is only one alternative, a number of wage increase applications which the trade unions will have to place before the employers. If that happens, we shall find ourselves priced out of the markets.
I do not wish to criticise the people of West Germany, but they have already taken some of our markets and they have been successful in undercutting our prices in the world markets. If we find that the prices of our products are going up, because of this 1s. tax, and the Germans have no extra tax to pay and are getting all the petrol they want, we shall again fall short of our overall production at a time when the only way out of our difficulties is to increase production. Since the beginning of the Suez crisis there has been a fall in the production

of cars and car accessories. There is a fall in production, and unemployment, in that industry. One of the large motor manufacturers announced today that they have to stand workers off on short time, or to dismiss them.
The Chancellor will lose not only the production of cars, thus adversely affecting the export trade—which is bad enough—but Purchase Tax and P.A.Y.E. from workers now on part-time, or unemployed and drawing the dole. These losses will not help him to get the £6 million per month.
If the Chancellor wants money there are a thousand-and-one ways of getting it much better than the way he is suggesting. It would be out of order for me to suggest putting a 1s. on the surtax. No hon. Member on this side of the Committee would object to a suggestion of even to 2s. on it.

The Chairman: I, for one, would object to it, because it would be out of order.

Mr. Lewis: I thought it would be, Sir Charles. I would ask the Chancellor to look at other methods than the 1s. increase in tax.
My hon. Friend the Member for Brierley Hill (Mr. Simmons) has raised the question of disablement cars. We are all very pleased that disabled ex-Service-men are to get relief. There are probably hundreds of thousands of men and women who are not actually disabled but are getting the benefit of a car or tricycle from the Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance. There are thousands of ex-Service men who are not fully disabled but must use private transport, because it is dangerous, difficult or inconvenient for them to use public transport.
I know of some with a 30, 40 or 50 per cent. disability pension who do not get cars or tricycles, but because they have something wrong with them they cannot use the Underground or public transport. They have to use their own cars, often at great expense to themselves. Now they cannot afford to run them because of the terrific increase in price, although they must use them to get to work.
The Chancellor should look at this matter. Let him find out from the Ministry how many disabled ex-Service men, irrespective of the amount of their disablement, are using cars in this way. A


man may have chronic asthma or bronchitis, perhaps from fighting in Suez, and be unable to use public transport. These men have bought themselves cheap cars in order to get to and from work, although it is true that in the process they may use those cars at week-ends. I suggest the Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance should get into touch with those pensioners, ask whether they use those cars or other private means of transport, and assist them over their difficulty. At the moment, they do not get assistance from the Ministry, but surely it is possible for the Ministry to grant them some relief if it can be shown that they use such vehicles.
Then there are those registered by the Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance as industrially injured. Of necessity, some of them have to use their private cars and other vehicles. Surely they should have an opportunity of claiming relief from this tax.
My last word to the Chancellor is, please try to ascertain from the West Germans, the Rumanian Government or the Soviet Government, whether, as I understand that no dollar exchange is involved, they can supply us with the oil and petrol we need. If that were the case there would not be the need for rationing at all nor for this 1s. increase. If there were no need for rationing and the 1s. increase, there would be no need for us to be here discussing this Motion.

Mr. Michael Stewart: First, may I say how much I agree with what was said by my hon. Friend the Member for Brierley Hill (Mr. Simmons) and how much I hope the Government will give sympathetic consideration to these people.
I wish to refer briefly to an aspect of the matter which I think the Chancellor did not mention, and to which I refer only now because I believe this is the only point in the proceedings at which I can make reference to it. It is brought out if one looks at the first part of the Resolution, which says:
…as from six o'clock in the evening of the fourth day of December, nineteen hundred and fifty-six, there shall be an increase of one shilling a gallon …
In some contexts the wording is so familiar to us that we fail to notice just how extraordinary it is, but "shall be" is future tense. Lt is very unusual to use the future to refer to yesterday evening.

We ought to look at what we are doing. At present this is not an Act of Parliament; it is only a Resolution in Committee of Ways and Means. It gets the force it has by virtue of an Act of Parliament we have not only not yet passed, but the text of which we have not yet even seen and which cannot be brought in yet.
That is not the only degree of retrospection. Not only does this get its legal force from an Act which is not yet passed, but it gives legal force to something which the Chancellor said orally yesterday. We are in the position that the Chancellor can by word of mouth alter the law, we give it legal force the following day by a Resolution, and give that Resolution legal force the following week, or in a few weeks' time, by passing an Act of Parliament.
It will be said that there is nothing unusual in this as we do it in the Budget. Certainly Ways and Means Resolutions passed on Budget Day have the force of law straightaway under the Provisional Collection of Taxes Act, but there is not quite so much further retrospection usually as we have here. All the Resolutions but one are passed on Budget Day and only a few hours elapse between the moment the change in the law comes into operation and the moment we give it our approval in Committee of Ways and Means. Only one of those Resolutions as a rule is left, and that is in most general wording to be passed on subsequent days.
Two points arise from this. The first is that if we accept this procedure at all and regard it as constitutional, it can only be by analogy with what we do on Budget Day; and that brings out the point made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Huyton (Mr. H. Wilson) that, constitutionally, this is a supplementary Budget. We are using exactly the Budget procedures.
10.45 p.m.
The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Kelvingrove (Mr. Elliot) was surely in error in saying that this was the Financial Resolution of a Bill. The Financial Resolution of a Bill is passed after that Bill has been read a Second time. This is a Resolution in Committee of Ways and Means, on which a Bill is to be based, and the only parallel for that is on Budget Day. This is, therefore, a supplementary Budget, a miniature


Budget, if one likes—a one-Clause Budget, one might say. If it is not a Budget, then it is a most scandalous illegality.
It is only by putting it in the same class as a Budget that, constitutionally, one can justify the proceedings at all. And even if one does put it in the same class as a Budget, this rather startling conclusion follows. It is all very well to have this double retrospection, with an Act of Parliament casting its beneficent shadow on the Resolution, and the Resolution going back further still and giving the force of law to what the Chancellor said yesterday. It is all very well to have that done once a year, at a recognised time, when the whole of the community knows that it is liable to be done, and when the date on which the Budget is to be introduced is made known to the country some time beforehand.
It is one thing to have this extraordinary, retrospective procedure adopted at a regular, fixed, accepted time. It is quite another thing if the Chancellor is to be able to pop up at the Box in any month of the year, on any day of the week and alter the law by word of mouth. It was, I think, King Richard II who claimed that the laws of England lay in his mouth. I would ask the Chancellor to consider the subsequent history of that monarch, when he abandoned the position he held at the time when he made that claim. He did not end up in another place, but somewhere quite different—in another place, but in a very different sense of those words.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer (Mr. Harold Macmillan): Jolly good.

Mr. Stewart: I am obliged to the right hon. Gentleman for his words, which encourage me to go on to say—

Mr. Macmillan: Worthy of the President of the Oxford Union.

Mr. Stewart: But perhaps the right hon. Gentleman will now address himself to the serious point that here presents itself. This is a supplementary Budget, and while, as I say, it is one thing to have a regular Budget once a year, or, perhaps, to have two Budgets a year—a spring and an autumn one—if we are really to have a Budget at any time the Chancellor likes to come to the Box, it is straining the constitution about as far as it will go.
Now, it has been commonplace in the arguments of the Conservative Party that it is the champion of the rights of Parliament, and that it is we on this side who want to give excessive delegated powers to Ministers. There has never been an instance, I think, when the Government have been allowed to go to the full end of the constitutional tether as strikingly as this—that one not only uses the procedure whereby a mere Resolution of the Committee of Ways and Means is to have the force of law, but uses it retrospectively—so that the mere word of the Chancellor—not at a regular time of year, but at any time he likes—can alter the laws of England.
If hon. Members opposite agree to this, let no Conservative hereafter ever pretend that he has conscientious or constitutional scruples about delegating into the hands of Ministers powers that properly belong to Parliament. If hon. Members opposite swallow this, they are not in a position in future to object to any kind of delegation of Parliamentary power.

Mr. A. E. Cooper: I shall support the Government in this proposal with a very heavy heart, and I shall do so simply on the assurance given yesterday by the Chancellor of the Exchequer and repeated tonight by the Financial Secretary to the Treasury that this is a temporary measure to meet a temporary situation.
I am, however, forced to the conclusion that this is just one more example of the wrong economic thinking by the latter-day economists in the Treasury. It seems to me that they will never learn that increased taxation is by its very nature inflationary. We have been trying to drum that fact into successive Chancellors of the Exchequer since 1945, and yet with every year that has passed, with every financial crisis, new taxes have been imposed and the result has always been more and more inflation.
This will have effects far beyond the mere £30 million which my right hon. Friend told us yesterday would be the result so far as the Treasury is concerned. Today all over this country industrialists are marking up their prices as a result of increased freight charges which will be a minimum of 5 per cent. There will be a considerable increase in


expenses incurred by industry, by commercial travellers, in distribution of foodstuffs and of raw materials generally, which inevitably must be passed on in increased prices to the consumer.
The most serious part from industry's point of view, however, is that this inevitably puts a permanent cost on production which limits our possibilities of competing in export markets, and the Treasury economists have really got to face the fact that increased taxation will have the most serious effects upon this nation's economy over the years; there has got to be a completely new thinking within the Treasury if the country is going to survive as a viable economic unit.

Dr. J. Dickson Mabon: I hope that the plea which the right hon. Member for Kelvingrove (Mr. Elliot) made has not been vitiated by his disagreement with the Front Bench in a matter which I understand is out of order. The plea which he made is in relation to the indigenous hydrocarbon oil industry, a matter which I should like to raise now in view of the answer which the Chancellor gave to my hon. Friend the Member for West Lothian (Mr. J. Taylor) in relation to this point yesterday.
It can hardly be said that this is a matter of constituency pleading, since in neither of the constituencies of the right hon. Member for Kelvingrove or of myself is shale oil produced. Nor is it fair to claim that it is a parochial point because the bulk of shale oil is produced in Scotland. T think it is reasonable to consider this at this juncture.
The Chancellor said to my hon. Friend that the 50 per cent. concession granted in 1953 to the indigenous hydrocarbon oil industry would be continued within this Resolution, and it would therefore mean that instead of 1s. a gallon being the increase in tax it would be 6d. a gallon. May I point out that this was precisely the so-called concession which we got in 1953 and which, although it has benefited many of the workers in the industry in a transitory manner, has not really meant the succour of the industry itself.
For example, since the concession was granted in 1953, the tonnage production ran at 104,000 tons, and at the present time we are running at the rate of 79,000 tons, which means that we are losing

possibly a quarter, or perhaps a third, of the actual production of shale oil in this country. I submit that 10 million gallons of oil in these days can hardly be sneered at. It may well be a drop in the bucket of oil resources which the country requires, but it can hardly be sneered at as a matter which does not require the consideration of the Treasury. Even a temporary burden of a tax of 6d. a gallon on this industry for the next four months can well mean the difference between the survival of the industry as it is presently constituted, and its development as it ought to be. The fact is that the industry is having a series of close-downs at various pits, and already we have seen the closure of two important ones.
I suggest that it is very wrong of the Treasury, on rather curious arguments, as it seems to me, to claim that here is a so-called concealed subsidy and suggest that because the tax is reduced by 50 per cent. the industry must therefore be receiving a subsidy of a kind. The industry is still paying a tax which is retarding its development and causing it to decrease its production, which will, as the years go by, steadily bring about the extinguishment of production of hydrocarbon oils in this country.
I join with the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Kelvingrove in his plea that this industry ought not to be sacrificed. The Treasury must think again and give this concession, even in this temporary situation, because we can temporary situation, before we can raise the matter in the April Budget.

Mr. J. Hynd: I was interested to hear the hon. Member for Ilford, South (Mr. Cooper) say that the only reason he supported this Measure was that he accepted an assurance from his right hon. Friend that it was only temporary. I would remind him that from his own benches we were told the other day that the only member of the Front Bench of his party who could be believed now was the Foreign Secretary. We do not go even so far as that. I would ask him to hesitate before he accepts any assurances from his Front Bench.
Having regard to his contention that all taxation is inflationary, I fail to see why, because this is said to be only temporarily inflationary, it should attract his


support. I hope he will think over this matter during the week-end and be prepared to support our opposition to the Government's Bill on Monday.
We gathered from the Minister, when this increase in the duty on petrol was announced, that the main reason for it was that, because of the smaller amount of petrol being consumed, there was a considerable loss to the Treasury. We understood that they are trying to make it up by putting a higher duty on the petrol which is now being used. I should like to ask whether the Treasury has considered that, in as much as this higher price is being paid for petrol, in the main, by business people for business purposes, the extra tax which would be secured on the petrol will be written off the tax which would otherwise have been secured from business profits which will now be turned to the purchase of petrol. I wonder whether the Chancellor has taken that into account in assessing the extra 1s. That is merely a matter of arithmetic, but I should like to be assured on that.
My next question relates to a matter which I raised at Question time today, in regard to which I did not get a satisfactory reply. It relates to the continuance of the existing rate of road fund licence taxation and motor insurance.
I understood from the replies that there is to be no modification, although motorists are being driven off the roads for the greater part of the time in which they would normally use their cars. They are to be allowed to use their cars for only some two or three days per week, or, according to the capacity of the car or the amount of work to be done, for some 200 miles per month. Nevertheless, they will be forced to continue to pay the same rate of insurance premium, although, quite clearly, they will not be running the same kind of risk because they will not be using their cars so much and the dangers on the roads will be very much reduced.
The insurance companies will be able to continue their charges. I know the Exchequer has no direct influence over the insurance companies, but I was rather disappointed by the peremptory dismissal of the suggestion that the Treasury might at least make an appeal to the motor insurance companies to make some modification during this period.

The Deputy-Chairman (Sir Gordon Touche): I am afraid we cannot pursue the subject of insurance in this debate.

Mr. Hynd: I did not intend to pursue it further, Sir Gordon.
I want now to come to the subject of motor vehicle taxation, which is within the province of the Treasury and which is in the same category in these circumstances. Here again, for the same reasons, it is desirable that the Treasury should make some special modification of the Road Fund tax for the current period.
The Minister, in replying to the Question I put forward today, suggested that there was no need for this, because if a motorist did not use his car for a period he could send in his log book and have a remission of tax. If, however, a motorist is being allowed petrol for 200 miles a month, surely he will not have to send in his book every second or third week and claim a remission for one or two weeks. If he did, I do not suppose he would get it.
11.0 p.m.
Therefore, when a motorist is not only being prevented from using his car, by deliberate Government policy, over the greater part of the period for which he would normally use it, but is having to continue to pay the same insurance for a lesser risk but is now having to pay more in the increased tax on petrol for the restricted use of the car, surely it is only fair that the Treasury should consider whether during the period whilst the rationing of petrol and the increased tax operate, there should be a special remission of taxation. In spite of the answer given by the Parliamentary Secretary this afternoon, I hope that the Chancellor will seriously consider this, because it is really an imposition upon the ordinary motorist.

Mr. Harold Wilson: I do not intend to detain the Committee for more than a few minutes. I certainly do not intend to go into what my right hon. Friend the Member for Smethwick (Mr. Gordon Walker) called the merits of the tax, which he defined as including the demerits. I should like, however, to say a brief word on the procedural aspect that was raised earlier, particularly with reference to the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Fulham (Mr. M. Stewart).
I have no doubt that whoever replies—and I hope that either the Chancellor or


the Financial Secretary will say a word in reply to the points raised by my hon. Friends—will deal with the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Fulham on the question of retrospection. I have no doubt that the Financial Secretary will say that the Provisional Collection of Taxes Act, 1913, gives power to levy taxes retrospectively. All the same, this is—and I am sure that the right hon. Gentleman will agree—unusual.
The usual position is that after a Budget speech the Resolutions are put the same evening, except the one that is left open for debate, and they come into effect immediately that same evening. The difference on this occasion is that the Chancellor made his statement after Questions yesterday in the House, not in Committee of Ways and Means. For obvious fiscal reasons, the tax came into effect last night and it is only tonight that the Committee is being asked to validate what was announced by the Chancellor yesterday. That is unusual. No doubt there may be precedents for it and perhaps the Financial Secretary or the Chancellor will tell us about them. Nevertheless, it is a relatively unusual thing that the Committee is being asked to do to vote a very large sum of taxation in this retrospective way. Traditionally, whatever party has been in power, the House has always disliked retrospective taxation provisions, and, therefore, this is a point on which the Financial Secretary should comment.
I know that it would have been difficult for the Chancellor to have proceeded in any other way once he had decided upon this increase in the tax. He could only have done it, I think, by making his statement in Committee of Ways and Means yesterday. That would have meant giving notice to the House that we were going into Committee of Ways and Means and that might have caused quite a lot of concern in various places had it been known that the Chancellor was to make a statement in Committee of Ways and Means. It might have raised hopes or fears of what the Chancellor was doing. It might have had a quite serious effect, not only on the internal situation, but internationally. Therefore, we understand why the Chancellor has chosen this method. Nevertheless, it is a most unusual one and we hope it will not be followed too often in the future.
With regard to the other procedural point which I raised, I will not pursue it now. I think it is a matter which everyone concerned would wish to look into, and it may well be found that there are precedents in that case also.
Before I sit down, however, I should like to say one last thing about the substance of the Ways and Means Resolution. Our attitude to it has been stated by my right hon. Friend at the beginning of this debate. It is true that we informed the Chancellor that as far as we were concerned, we would advise our hon. Friends not to attempt to turn this into a large-scale debate. It would have been quite within the competence of this Committee to have gone on all night on this Resolution. After all, we are being asked to vote £30 million taxation in four months—a rate of nearly £100 million a year—so it would have been quite proper for the Committee to do so, and some might say that we are failing to discharge our duty as the House of Commons in dealing with this taxation in such a perfunctory manner.
Nevertheless, I am sure it was for the convenience of the House that we should not have taken this Ways and Means Resolution at the time that would have been suggested, namely, this afternoon, because I am sure the House wanted to debate the foreign affairs Motion, and it would have been a pity to have spent an hour or two on a Ways and Means Resolution in the afternoon. To that extent the Government readily fell in with our proposal for tonight's discussion.
But I can tell the Chancellor that there were many hon. Members who wanted to make a major speech on this tonight, and I and other of my right hon. Friends played our part in persuading them that there there would be ample opportunity next week on the Second Reading, and on subsequent stages. I understand that it will be necessary to take each stage of the Bill on separate days, as it is a Bill originating in Ways and Means. So we shall have some opportunity for saying what we really think about this tax.
My right hon. Friend made plain that we are reserving our fire on the tax for next week. This does not mean—and the Chancellor must not assume—that we in any way support the tax. I said yesterday in the House that we would sup


port any appropriate measures to strengthen the £, and I think it is the duty of Members on all sides of the House. But on Monday we can tell him what we think about this particular measure which is the first he has put forward. Because we shall have that opportunity, I am joining with my right hon. Friend in advising my hon. Friends not to oppose this Ways and Means Resolution tonight on the understanding that we shall say exactly what we think about it in the debate next week.

Mr. H. Brooke: In reply to the right hon. Gentleman, the Member for Huyton (Mr. H. Wilson). I will gladly fulfil the promise I gave at the beginning to seek to answer any point raised in the debate. He took up the argument used by the hon. Member for Fulham (Mr. M. Stewart) about the constitutional aspects of this. If I understood the hon. Member aright, he said that we must keep the Ten Commandants but can always break them at Budget time. I do not altogether agree with his constitutional ruling on these matters.
I can assure the hon. Member that there is nothing unconstitutional in what we are now doing. Nor is it a fact that because this Resolution is retrospective by some 28 or 29 hours it proves that this is an autumn Budget. It is perfectly practicable at any time to bring in a Ways and Means Resolution of this character which operates from a previous day. It would be ridiculous for the Chancellor to come to the House and say he was proposing that the petrol tax should go up—or, indeed, any other indirect tax—but that it should go up at some subsequent occasion, by which time it would be possible for the Committee to agree to a Ways and Means Resolution.
I was asked if there were precedents. In fact, no less a person than Sir Stafford Cripps once produced a Ways and Means Resolution which was retrospective for a period of not one day but twenty-six days. So if there had been a sin in this we should be committing only one twenty-sixth of the sin. But I assure the hon. Gentleman that there is no sin in it whatever. That other occasion was on the Profits Tax.
The hon. Member for West Ham, North (Mr. Lewis) asked for the reasons for this increase. They were given succinctly by the Chancellor yesterday. His first reason is that he wishes to safeguard this most precious commodity by additional taxation as well as by rationing. Indeed, he wants to stimulate economy within the ration, and I hope that hon. Members on both sides, recognising the oil position, will accept, however much they dislike this proposal, that that is a perfectly logical and reasonable thing to do.
The secondary consideration he has in mind is that in his Budget forecast the oil duty was estimated to bring in £340 million. It became clear that with these restrictions on oil supplies—which as hon. Members know will not start operating on 17th December, for we have all been conscious of them for some time already—the yield, if there were no change in the duty, would fall to about £310 million this year. If the policy embodied in the Resolution is enacted by the House, the Budget revenue will be restored to the original figure of £340 million.

Mr. Lewis: The Financial Secretary has missed my point. My point is that there is no necessity to restrict consumption or have an increase in tax because—and the Foreign Secretary has not denied this—supplies are available in Russia and Rumania. The Chancellor shakes his head, but the Foreign Secretary said that he knew about that. West Germans are in fact in the very happy position of having no rationing and no extra tax, because they are getting oil supplies from Russia and Rumania. I am suggesting that instead of putting 1s. on the tax the Chancellor should get supplies in the same way as the West Germans.

Mr. Brooke: Those are big questions and I am not the Minister of Fuel and Power. What I can say definitely is that there is a shortage of oil in this country at present, and I should think that even the hon. Member will recognise that the temporary closing of the Suez Canal and the breaking of the Syrian pipelines would necessitate very strict restriction for the time being on oil supplies to consumers in this country.

Mr. Lewis: Will the Financial Secretary answer my question? Will he do


something about getting oil supplies from other sources?

Mr. Brooke: Those are larger issues which it is possible to debate on other occasions. We are having a debate on the whole international situation and breaking into that today in order to pass this Resolution.

Mr. J. Hynd: Has the Chancellor taken into account the counter-effect of the losses incurred on business allowances claimed for the higher price of petrol charged to business expenses?

Mr. Brooke: I am giving the yield of the oil duty. It is perfectly true that any tax on oil has its effect on the yield of Income Tax and Profits Tax. What I am giving to the Committee are the straightforward, "clean" figures of the yield from what is technically known as the Hydrocarbon Oil Duty.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Kelvingrove (Mr. Elliot) and the hon. Member for Greenock (Dr. Dickson Mabon) spoke of Scottish shale oil. I think that the Resolution mentions these indigenous oils generally. The position is, as the Bill will make clear, just as my right hon. Friend the Chancellor said yesterday, that the existing preferential margin of 1s. 3d. a gallon in favour of these indigenous oils, including Scottish shale oil, is being preserved.
The hon. Member for The Hartlepools (Mr. D. Jones) referred to that part of the Resolution which concerns the control of bus fares.

Mr. William Ross: Will the right hon. Gentleman make it clear that these oils will have exactly the same increase as imported oils?

Mr. Brooke: That is so. I thought that there was some misunderstanding about that. I thought that the hon. Member for Greenock misinterpreted what my right hon. Friend said yesterday, and I thought it desirable as quickly as possible before the Bill was introduced to elucidate what the real intention was.

Mr. Ross: There is no preferential treatment in this increase for this indigenous oil?

Mr. Brooke: No. The duty on the indigenous oil will go up by 1s., but the preference margin will remain at 1s. 3d.
11.15 p.m.
In an interesting speech, the hon. Member for The Hartlepools protested against the idea that the Bill might contain a relaxation of the present statutory provisions which govern the procedure through which bus undertakings—including municipal undertakings—have to go before they can raise their fares. I hope that when he sees the Bill and considers this matter further he will reach the conclusion that the Government's decisions are not unreasonable. The statutory procedure is a very carefully planned one to make sure that everybody is properly protected, but it is without any doubt planned to deal with long-term or permanent changes in conditions and costs and not with temporary ones.
It seems to me perfectly clear that if a bus undertaking were to go through the normal statutory procedure in order to claim an increase in fares because of this extra cost a final decision might hardly be reached and promulgated until some months after the temporary emergency had passed away and the tax had been lifted. I cannot see that anybody would regard it as sensible or reasonable if some months after the tax imposed by this proposal were removed again the bus fares in a certain area were to go up because by then permission had been given and the bus undertaking needed a certain period in order to make good the loss it had sustained. I do not think that the House of Commons could impose a situation like that upon the country.

Mr. D. Jones: Surely when Parliament decided to make this provision it did so in order to make quite sure that the interests of all sections of the community were protected. If difficulty arises it should be for the Government to carry the responsibility, and not for them to remove that protection. It can be done in another way.

Mr. Brooke: I would ask the hon. Member to study what we are proposing in the Bill. If he has another way of doing it, let us hear what that way is. What I am explaining tonight is the reason—which I hope commends itself to hon. Members generally—why we felt that it would be an absurdity if the appropriate tribunal came to a decision some months after the extra shilling had been removed that it was reasonable for bus


fares in a certain area to be raised on account of the temporary extra tax.

Mr. Ernest Popplewell: Will the bus operators have to prove their case anywhere at all? If they so determine that their increased costs warrant it, will they be allowed immediately to put up their fares according to their own balance sheet and without reference to anybody else?

Mr. Brooke: With respect to the hon. Member, I think the best plan would be to allow the Government to have this Ways and Means Resolution without which they cannot publish the Bill and promulgate its proposals. These are matters which can be discussed with absolute propriety when we consider the Bill, but I think I should be getting out of order if I now went into great detail about a Bill which it is impossible for us to publish until the Committee and, subsequently, the House, has agreed to this Resolution.

Mr. R. E. Winterbottom: Presumably the hon. Member is indicating that in the Bill, to which he cannot refer in detail at present, there will be some provision for the raising of bus fares. Will he give an indication to the House that in the Bill itself the temporary nature of that increase will be made clear, and also give an undertaking—because the increase in petrol charges is of a temporary nature—that immediately it becomes obvious that the petrol difficulty has been eliminated the temporary tax will be taken off the Statute Book?

Mr. Brooke: I will certainly give an undertaking that the Bill's provisions will be temporary, and certainly the provisions in the Bill relating to bus fares will be temporary. I cannot give an undertaking that the right to raise fares will necessarily end on the very day that the tax is removed. Obviously, it may not be possible to raise the fares for some days after the tax has come into operation and one must have these matters fairly arranged. But I will give an absolute assurance that there will not be the right to maintain the increased fare in perpetuity simply because the right to impose it has been gained in this way.

Mr. Winterbottom: And that applies also to the tax on petrol?

Mr. Brooke: I am talking about the shilling extra impost which we are now proposing.
I am grateful to the hon. Member for Brierley Hill (Mr. Simmons) for what he said about the arrangements we are planning to make for disabled people. I am sure he will realise that we cannot introduce all kinds of new schemes which have not been practicable hitherto for this temporary provision. We are seeking to provide for the cars issued to a limited class of severely disabled people, war pensioners, including those with double leg amputations whom he mentioned, and also tricycles issued to the less severely disabled and others. In fact, as the hon. Gentleman knows, there is a system of, shall I say, financial assistance, and the proposal is that it should be extended because of the extra cost involved. I think that these are the main matters which have been raised—

Mr. Lewis: The right hon. Gentleman will recall that I raised a point about those pensioners who receive a Ministry of Pensions allowance and who may of necessity have to use their cars. Is it not possible, by the production of their log books, for them to get some allowance, even if it is only for the 200 miles basic petrol?

Mr. Brooke: I am afraid that I cannot hold out any hope that there will be any arrangement made in respect of this temporary tax which has not been possible in relation to the existing tax, which is at the substantial amount of 2s. 6d. a gallon.
My hon. Friend the Member for Southampton. Test (Mr. J. Howard) asked about taxis, and I think it right that I should say a word about that. In the Metropolitan Police district taxi fares are fixed by an Order made by the Home Secretary, and outside fares are fixed by the local authorities. In that case the increase cannot take effect until the byelaw sealed by the local authority has been confirmed by the Home Secretary. I gave a brief reply the moment the point was raised that no new legislation is required here because there is not the same very lengthy procedure as exists with the bus companies.
My right hon. Friend and I are obliged to hon. Members on both sides of the Committee who have not sought to prolong this debate bearing in mind that we


shall have a full day's debate on the Second Reading on Monday. I felt sure that our proceedings would be slightly protracted as soon as the right hon. Member for Smethwick (Mr. Gordon Walker) said that when he used the word "merits" he often meant "demerits," which indicates how difficult it is to reach complete understanding in this House of Commons about anything. But we seem to have reached a reasonable understanding tonight, and I hope that we can pursue this matter—

Mr. Jay: May I ask whether this shilling is put on white spirit as well as the matters concerned in the Resolution?

Mr. Brooke: The shilling is put on exactly those commodities which at present bear the hydrocarbon oil duty.

Mr. J. Hynd: I raised the question of the remission of road tax. Could the Minister deal with that before he concludes?

Mr. Brooke: I gave the hon. Member a firm answer yesterday, and I must give him an equally firm answer now. If members of the public respond to my right hon. Friend's appeal to economise in petrol by not using their cars at all, they need not pay any licence duty. I cannot hold out any hope whatever of

any special reduction in the duty during this period.

Question put and agreed to.

Resolved,
That, as from six o'clock in the evening of the fourth day of December, nineteen hundred and fifty-six, there shall be an increase of one shilling a gallon in the rate of the duty of customs on hydrocarbon oils, and the rates of the excise duties of hydrocarbon oils, petrol substitutes, and spirits used for making power methylated spirits, and of the rebates of the customs and excise duties on hydrocarbon oils which under the relevant enactments depend on the rate of the customs duty on hydrocarbon oils) shall be increased accordingly:
And any Act giving effect to this Resolution may include provision relaxing, in view of the increase in the said duties, any limitations imposed by virtue of conditions attached to a road service licence under section seventy-two of the Road Traffic Act. 1930, on the fares chargeable for the carriage of passengers:, in public service vehicles, or imposed by virtue of a charges scheme under Part V of the Transport Act, 1947, on the fares chargeable by the London Transport Executive.
And it is hereby declared that it is expedient in the public interest that this Resolution should have statutory effect under the provisions of the Provisional Collection of Taxes Act. 1913.

Resolution to be reported.

Report to be received Tomorrow: Committee to sit again Tomorrow.

DOLLAR IMPORTS

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Godber.]

11.27 p.m.

Mr. J. K. Vaughan-Morgan: The matter which I wish to raise is cognate with and apposite to the subject we were discussing earlier. It is the question of our dollar imports from the United States. This country has to find more dollars to pay for its oil, and it seems to some of us that the Board of Trade should seize this opportunity to review our present dollar expenditure.
Accordingly, I put down two Questions to my right hon. Friend the President of the Board of Trade on 27th November, 1956. I draw the attention of the House now to one remark in the Parliamentary Secretary's reply. He said:
We do not wish to pursue a policy of further discrimination in the realm of trade."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 27th November, 1956; Vol. 561, c. 214.]
I think he was very surprised at the loud bellow, "Yes, we do," which came from the benches behind him. It is clear to most of us on this side of the House that in the present circumstances of stringency it is vital that we should immediately review our dollar expenditure and discriminate against those items which, as far as possible, can be replaced from Commonwealth sources.
The two Questions I put down related to two groups of commodities which, from the knowledge at our disposal, we believe can immediately be replaced from sources within the Commonwealth. The argument which I am putting forward can, I know, be applied to many other commodities. The first Question to the Parliamentary Secretary was whether he would
suspend further licences for dollar expenditure on items such as fruit and canned fruit which can be replaced from Commonwealth sterling sources.
I received from the Parliamentary Secretary the very unsatisfactory reply:
No, Sir."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 27th November, 1956; Vol. 561, c. 213.]
The Parliamentary Secretary added—quite frankly, rather irrelevantly to my question—that most of the imports came

in free under the Mutual Security Act, which, I may explain, is part of a very-generous programme under which the United States gives away—not against payment of dollars—the surpluses of its home production which have been subsidised by the Government. My hon. Friend omitted entirely to note that my Question referred to expenditure and that the fund made available under the Mutual Security Act can be diverted from one commodity to another. It therefore, is not an answer to say, as he did, that the licences already issued cover fruit from the United States under the Aid Programme. I was referring to those items for which actual cash has to be found.
My second Question raised the matter of our tobacco imports from the United States, an even more glaring example of where economies in dollar expenditure could, in my view, be immediately made. The Question I put did not ask my right hon. Friend to cut down drastically the importation of dollar tobacco. It asked what steps he was taking to promote the substitution of Commonwealth grown tobacco for tobacco of dollar origin.
Here again the Answer was very unsatisfactory indeed, in fact, it was a confession that no steps are being taken by the Board of Trade at present to promote that substitution. Once again, in parenthesis, may I explain that the present dollar content of the United Kingdom manufactures is about 61 per cent. The House should visualise that figure against the background that in 1939 the dollar content was 100 per cent. and on the margin of between virtually 100 per cent. and 61 per cent. there has been built up a very flourishing Rhodesian tobacco industry and tobacco industries in other parts of the Commonwealth.
At a time when we are conscious of this dollar stringency, it is rather tragic to see that the President of the Rhodesian Tobacco Association has appealed to producers to reduce their crop next year in order to avoid over-production. I feel it is probable that when he replies my right hon. Friend will refer to the fact that we cannot overnight, or very quickly, change the composition of tobacco which goes into a popular brand of cigarettes. I fully appreciate that argument; we cannot change it all at once, but, as in the past half generation, we


can make gradual changes. In fact, the dollar content which now is 61 per cent. at certain times has, I believe, been as low as 55 per cent., which only shows what can be done if we really try. If we made a change in the dollar content of 2 per cent. per annum it should be remembered that in one year this country would be saved 3½ million dollars. That would give a further very satisfactory fillip to the Rhodesian tobacco industry at present.
I do not propose to go through the whole range of our dollar imports, and I do not propose even to give further details about the commodities I have mentioned. That would be inappropriate, but I—and, I think, many of my hon. Friends—feel the Board of Trade should at present and in present circumstances review very carefully what we are buying from the United States of America and set itself the task of trying to divert as much of our expenditure as possible to those in the Commonwealth who are and always have been our staunch friends.

11.34 p.m.

The Minister of State, Board of Trade (Mr. A. R. W. Low): I should like to thank my hon. Friend the Member for Reigate (Mr. Vaughan-Morgan) for the clarity with which he has put his points. He is, of course, well versed in the great possibilities there are in developing the production of Commonwealth natural resources. I think that we should all like to thank him for his activities in encouraging the development of Commonwealth natural resources, and for the close interest which he shows.
In the course of my speech, I will try to answer the points my hon. Friend has made, both on this occasion and when he asked Questions of my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary, to which he referred. I should like at once to say that I do not accept—and I hope that my hon. Friend will forgive me for saying so—his criticisms of my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary, and, as he will see, everything I am now about to say supports the line which the Parliamentary Secretary then took.
I want, first of all, to deal with the general points which my hon. Friend the Member for Reigate has raised about dollar imports. I think he really bases his case for stricter import licensing of some dollar goods on the need to conserve

dollar resources—he is anxious to save our foreign exchange. That is recognised internationally, as he knows, as a proper use of import restrictions, and he also knows, I think, that it is not consistent with our general obligations, or our policy, to use quota restrictions to give our home producers protection, or to give Commonwealth producers a preference. The proper method of protection is the tariff, and the preference is secured by Commonwealth duty free entry.
The question which my hon. Friend asks us to consider tonight is whether, because of present conditions, it is wise further to restrict certain imports from the dollar area, for balance of payments reasons. My right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in the course of his statement yesterday, used these words:
…we must do everything possible to maintain and increase the volume of world trade on which we, perhaps more than any other country, depend. For this reason, apart from any others, I would regard it as wrong to extend import controls in present circumstances."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 4th December, 1956; Vol. 561, c. 1054.]
Those general considerations to which my right hon. Friend referred are paramount. They are just as operative in our trade with the United States or Canada as in our trade with any other part of the world. The United States is our second largest market, and provides a good expanding market for our manufactured goods. But the soundness of that market depends on the progress of the more liberal trade policies to which both our Governments are pledged. We must, both of us, keep up the steady momentum of the reduction of trade barriers. A move backwards would do harm. And though we here are free to impose greater restrictions if our balance of payments forced us to do so, we should not lightly set our foot on the restrictive path.
Canada would be affected by any tighter restrictions we had to impose on dollar imports. Our exports to Canada have run this year at about 30 per cent. above last years' rate. No one would wish, I am sure, to restrict beyond the present level Canada's opportunity to sell her products to us. In fact, I think that, in general, we all want to see fewer, not more restrictions upon our trade with Canada, and on our trade with the United


States. We cannot afford to relax now, and we have not been able, generally, to do so since 1954, but, when we can, we shall take another step forward.
Those are the general considerations, and I should like now to turn to tobacco and then to fruit.
As my hon. Friend has said, the North American tobacco content of our cigarettes has been steadily reduced. In fact, since the war it has come down from 90 per cent. to 61 per cent.—in 1954. This reduction saves us now about 50 million dollars annually, and that, of course, has been made possible because of the satisfactory development of Commonwealth growths. I agree with what my hon. Friend said about that. The dollar content still stands at 61 per cent., and the dollar allocations are given on that basis. There is nothing sacrosanct about the figure of 61 per cent. but there is a strong risk that a further reduction would change the character and flavour of the cigarettes and that would almost certainly result in a reduction in the smoking of cigarettes. The United Kingdom Revenue would suffer, but so would Rhodesia to whom the knowledge that their tobacco was a slightly higher proportion of our cigarettes would be poor consolation for an actual reduction in the quantity of tobacco being sold to us.

Mr. Vaughan-Morgan: Can my right hon. Friend confirm that the dollar content has, in fact, at one time been down to 55 per cent.?

Mr. Low: I was just coming on to that point. I understand that 61 per cent. is the lowest that the dollar content has ever reached, but I do understand that the United States content—there is also some Canadian content—has been lower than the 61 per cent. I cannot confirm exactly whether it is 55 per cent. or 50-something else per cent. I think that clears up the point.
The United Kingdom takes between 50 and 60 per cent. of the Rhodesian tobacco crop. In theory, by paying higher prices United Kingdom manufacturers could get more at the expense of Rhodesia's other customers, chiefly Australia and South Africa, but that would add to our costs and also it would drive Australia and South Africa to replace with dollar tobacco.

Mr. Vaughan-Morgan: No.

Mr. Low: My hon. Friend says "No", but I understand that allowing for these purchases, United Kingdom manufacturers are, in fact, buying all the available non-dollar tobacco, of reasonable quality, and therefore if they are to get more tobacco of reasonable quality from Rhodesia somebody else has got to get less.

Mr. Vaughan-Morgan: I do not think that is true, with respect. When I was in Rhodesia only a few weeks ago the President of Rhodesia Tobacco Associated appealed publicly to producers not to produce less in this year but to produce no more. They could produce more. There is more land coming into cultivation.

Mr. Low: It is a question of quality here. I can only give my hon. Friend and the House the information that I have available. I think he knows that our manufacturers have an arrangement with the Rhodesian growers to furnish them each year with an estimate of their requirements for each of the three years ahead. There is, therefore, this close liaison. As he knows, the Government do not buy tobacco. The arrangements for purchase are between the manufacturers here and the growers. In fact, nearly all the money to be spent on this year's allocations covering the period ending July, 1957, is fully committed and no significant saving could, therefore, be secured now by any change of policy, even if we were minded to make it.
Now I will come on to the question of fruit. In the course of his Questions to the Parliamentary Secretary, my hon. Friend referred to fruit and soft fruit, and in the course of one of his supplementaries I think he was referring to apples when he called them soft fruit. As I understand it, apples are not soft fruit, and that may account for one of the differences of opinion which he had with my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary.
The position about our imports of fruit from the United States is that it is only imports of apples from the United States which actually cost dollars. Dealing with apples first, our total imports of apples are considerable. In the first ten months of this year their value was £13⅓ million.


Over three-fifths of that comes from the Commonwealth sterling area, in the Southern Hemisphere. Slightly under one-fifth comes from Europe and slightly under one-fifth comes from Canada and the United States.
Of the North American apples, some are allowed in before Christmas. Before the war, most United States and Canadian apples arrived at this time of year. Now, only about one-fifth of the total quota are imported during the period 16th November to 31st December. These arrangements take account of our need to spend our dollars in such a way that the bulk of the North American apples arrive when we need them most, that is to say in the period January to March, when other supplies are not available in sufficient quantities.
For this season, that is, the 1956–57 season, Aid funds were not available for United States apples. They had been available for the two previous seasons. Last season our total dollar expenditure on apples was £1 million, which was solely for apples from Canada. The £700,000 worth of apples from the United States cost us no dollars, because they came in under Aid.
This season we have increased the dollar expenditure to £1¼ million, but since there is no Aid the total quantity of apples imported from North America will in fact be lower. It is not practicable to have an import quota for Canadian apples and refuse a quota for United States apples. To do so would be contrary to our obligations under Article 13 of the G.A.T.T., and it would be a great mistake to think that the Canadians would thank us for it, for they firmly believe in the principle of nondiscriminatory use of dollar import licences when we have to impose them for balance of payments reasons.
The licences for this season's apple imports have already been issued, and contracts will have been made on the strength of them. I do not think that, even if my hon. Friend considers the arguments in favour of our current policy are not convincing, he would wish to

cause the dislocation and hardship involved in the cancellation of the licences. What we shall do next season will be decided in the summer.
The only other item remaining to be dealt with is canned fruit. Our total canned fruit imports in the first ten months of this year have in fact been higher than they were in the same period last year, just under £35 million against £29½ million last year, an increase of over £5 million. Of this year's total, the Commonwealth imports account for £23,200,000, which is an increase of £1,100,000. Imports from the United States account for £2,700,00, an increase of £1,900,000; but all the United States imports of canned fruit were under Aid and cost no dollars at all.

Mr. Vaughan-Morgan: May I refer again to that fact, which I mentioned in my speech? Under the M.S.A., it is possible to apply for the allocation to be switched to other commodities, and I would suggest that it would be of far more use to import maize, which we need, than apples and canned fruit, which we can get from Commonwealth sources.

Mr. Low: These matters are carefully considered and discussed and plans are made, and I do not think it is possible to alter them now. We make the best use of the very generous aid that we get from the United States, and I assure my hon. Friend that the kind of point he has mentioned, as to how we should best make use of the aid that we are given, is always in the minds of the Government. It is, however, fair to say that the giver of the aid himself must have some say in exactly how it is used.
I hope that having been given these facts, my hon. Friend will accept that we have paid close attention to the points he has put to us and that we are acting rightly in what is, after all, an important matter affecting our trade as well as our balance of payments.

Question put and agreed to.

Adjourned accordingly at eleven ninutes to Twelve o'clock.